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Critical History and Collective Memory: A Problem in Jewish Education.
(Abstract)
This research has been stimulated by the profound ambivalence
which Jewish schools show in deciding whether or how to teach
Jewish history.
This ambivalence is first examined in the context of a
philosophical analysis of the relationship between critical
history and other forms of historical consciousness.
Finding this approach deficient, a psychological examination
of how Jewish students experience the study of Jewish history
is proposed.
A critical review of research into children's historical
thinking leads to the suggestion that alternative research
traditions may be more fruitfully employed here. As a result,
it is proposed to apply a concept mapping methodology to the
investigation of what Jewish students acquire from the
critical study of Jewish history.
Theoretical problems raised by this proposal are confronted
and resolved, and a defensible research strategy is then
formulated according to series of explicitly articulated
empirical and theoretical assumptions. This culminates in the
presentation and description of an instrument for the
generation and analysis of conceptual representations of
Jewish historical knowledge in cognitive structure.
Two case studies are offered.
These are followed by a discussion of (1) how these studies
might inform debate about the consequences of teaching
critical Jewish history in Jewish schools; (2) the
possibilities offered by applying a concept mapping
methodology to Jewish education in general.
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CHAPTER ONE
Jewish history teaching: On returning to old problems with fresh
approaches.
"Practical problems do not present themselves wearing their
labels around their necks. Problem situations, to use Dewey's
old term for it, present themselves to consciousness, but the
character of the problem, its formulation, does not. The
character of the problem depends on the discerning eye of the
beholder. And this eye unilluminated by possible fresh
solutions to the problems, new modes of attack, new
recognitions of degrees of freedom for change among matters
formerly taken to be unalterable, is very likely to miss the
novel features of new problems or dismiss them as
'impractical'."
3. Schwab, "The Practical: A Language for curriculum"
(1 970)
This research constitutes an attempt to characterize more
adequately an educational problem. It tries to formulate that
problem in an original manner so as to generate new ways of
solving it.
This problem is of both a general and personal nature. In
general terms, the 'problem situation' consists of the
ambiguous way in which Jewish history teaching is planned,
organized and prepared in Jewish schools in Britain and the
United States. In personal terms, it is constituted by the
ambivalence and uncertainty which are regularly encountered
when attempting to encourage Jewish schools to review or
revive their Jewish history curricula.
8It is not facetious to compare the state of Jewish history
teaching in Britain with the preparation and provision of
school dinners. Most Jewish schools provide, but few make
consumption compulsory. As their students grow older, teachers
seem less and less anxious as to whether their charges
partake. Parents generally agree that it is somehow of value,
but would probably find it hard to explain why, given what is
usually served up. Experts have frequently complained about
standards - that provisions are either too stodgy or too
spicy. Yet, over the last 20 years, neither the menu nor the
tableware have substantially changed.
If this assessment seems imprecise it is substantiated by
research in both England and the United States which has
extensively if not comprehensively charted the present
condition of Jewish history teaching.
In Britain, two unpublished pieces of research have found
that:
Only two Jewish primary schools have a timetable slot
specifically devoted to Jewish history teaching. Instead,
Jewish history is largely integrated with other Jewish and
non-Jewish subjects, where something of it is taught by all
schools questioned. Only occasionally do schools follow a
course which can be identified as Jewish history, and, in
these cases, pedagogic materials are created by teachers who
are 'enthusiastic' about Jewish history rather than subject
specialists (Z.F.E.T. 1992)
In Jewish high schools Jewish history is the one area of
Judaic study apart from "Chumash" which appears at some point
on the timetable of all schools defined as non-secessionist
(Heilman 1982). Indeed, all head teachers interviewed as part
of one piece of research stated their wish to have more Jewish
history taught in their schools. They complained that it was
9lack of timetable space that made this impossible (Michelson
1990).
Only one Jewish high school in Britain follows either a
written curriculum or syllabus for Jewish history up to age 16
(and in this instance it is derived from the main themes set
out in a Chief Rabbi's essay of 1936). Only three schools
teach Jewish history to students over the age of sixteen. In
the remainder and even in these three, Jewish history is
generally taught for extremely limited periods of time (less
than two teaching periods a week). It is normally dropped at
the age of fourteen.
There is evidence that schools make little effort to employ
Jewish history teachers who are qualified to teach either
history or Jewish history. No Jewish history teacher possesses
a senior position in a Jewish school qua teacher of Jewish
history.
It would seem that a school's decision about whether and how
to teach Jewish history is largely dependent on circumstantial
factors; for example, in orthodox girls schools where the
subject is deemed preferable to a Talmudic alternative which
is regarded as unsuitable for girls, or in less orthodox
schools where, in a number of cases, the subject's inclusion
hinges on whether any of the senior staff happen to be 'keen
on' Jewish history.
Given these circumstances it is not exactly astounding that
Jewish schools either lack Jewish history textbooks or still
use textbooks which have not been revised for more than twenty
years. It is also not surprising that theoretical issues in
Jewish history teaching have been little reflected on and not
at all written about in this country. There is not one
reference to research into any aspect of Jewish history
teaching in any volume of British Educational Research.
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Michelson talks enviously of the situation in the United
States where, he says, "Jewish history is a standard component
of a Jewish studies curriculum, taught as a secular and as a
religious subject" (ibid. p.33). Arguably, however, this
assertion owes more to despair than reality.
Bernstein, for example, has found that 	 despite the fact that
Jewish history has become more prominent.. . in recent years
[in the United States], it remains somewhat adrift in terms of
the lack of clearly articulated direction among principals and
Jewish history teachers" (Bernstein 1986).
He found a number of features to characterize the condition of
Jewish history in the Jewish schools he investigated, all of
which were modern orthodox.
He looked at schools which all taught Jewish history but found
that Jewish history teaching time tended to concentrate in
those years when the most able students had moved onto early
college admission programmes.
He found that there is a tendency for the subject to be taught
by inappropriately qualified teachers or to be swallowed up as
a minority option in general history courses.
Above all he pointed to two problems:
"The single problem described by nearly all of the Jewish
history teachers interviewed as part of this study can be
summarized in a single word: time. The tight constraints of
the day school schedule make it impossible to do justice to
Jewish history, whose expanse and diversity is much greater
than most other history courses" (ibid. p.36).
Secondly, "there is the present lack of thought given to the
Jewish history curriculum. In none of the schools studied is
the supervisor of Jewish history instruction a department
chairperson. Moreover, none of the present supervisors are
11
themselves trained in Jewish history.... they have little time
to focus on Jewish history instruction" (ibid. p.37).
Bernstein's sample is a limited one but it corresponds
reasonably well to the typical Jewish secondary school in
Britain, where all Jewish high schools are orthodox, and
allows the possibility of sketching the most prominent
features of Jewish history teaching in (modern) orthodox
Jewish high schools in large parts of the English speaking
world. It seems that we can say:
1. Jewish history is taught in the vast majority if not all of
these schools
2. Headteachers of Jewish schools would like to see more
Jewish history taught.
3. Jewish history is rarely taught for substantial lengths of
time.
4. Teaching is not usually based on clear thought about what
is happening or hoped for from Jewish history lessons.
5. Jewish history is frequently taught by teachers who have
limited expertise in the field.
No doubt, it can be said that these features differ little
from those which characterize many other subjects on the
school timetable in general, or in the field of Jewish studies
in particular. Yet, the point we are making about Jewish
history teaching is not just that it is impoverished or
inadequate, but that it displays what might be usefully be
described as a schizophrenia - a profound disparity between
rhetoric and reality, or between word and deed.
12
If, therefore, some of the details in this overview lack
appropriate rigour, the broad outlines of the account do allow
us to draw up a picture of a subject which is characterized by
a profound ambiguity. It is taught almost everywhere but
without it usually being clear why or how. It frequently beats
off fierce competition for space on the timetable but only
occasionally wins sufficient time to be taken very seriously.
It is rarely condemned as a waste of time but is rarely
considered indispensable.
Trying to Discern Fault Lines.
The problem with a survey such as this is that even if it does
reveal features that are common to all schools in the sample,
it does not indicate whether in all cases these features have
been shaped by the same forces or if they will require the
same treatment. We would argue that, in this case, the sample
is both sufficiently broad and sufficiently well supported by
anecdotal evidence for us to tentatively argue that if a
typical ambiguity does characterize the state of Jewish
history teaching, then it is most likely to be the result of
different forces (or different combinations of forces) in
different places.
There seems enough evidence to suggest that at least two
distinct (though not unrelated) forces are at work in
determining the state of Jewish history teaching. The first of
these we will call "ambiguity from ambivalence" - a largely
ideological matter which seems to derive from uncertainty
about whether history is a desirable component of Jewish
education. The second we will call "ambiguity from vagueness"
- a pedagogical/operational question which appears to stem
from uncertainty about what to do with the subject even when
it is desired.
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As far as the first matter goes, it is almost a cliche that
history and religion exist in an antipathetic relationship.
Religions are the institutional expressions of faith. They are
driven by belief or what some call "truths". History, it is
popularly supposed, desires to "record what really happened".
Its goal (apparently) is to find objective truth (in the
singular). From this perspective, it is not surprising that in
a sample of orthodox schools such as this there should be an
undercurrent of uncertainty about history teaching which
derives from suspicion about how it might undermine the
community's collective memories and myths.
Invariably, as was suggested above, this uncertainty does not
reveal itself either as outright resistance or hostility.
Thus, all modern orthodox Jewish schools do teach Jewish
history, it is just that some will either only allow Rabbis to
teach it, or will not permit the teaching of certain
'controversial' topics. History and Judaism are not,
therefore, in complete opposition but exist in a more
ambiguous relationship. As one head of Jewish studies has put
it, he "would love to teach more Jewish history, but his
difficulty is that Jewish history tends to be too secular for
Jewish studies, and too Jewish for history".'
It is precisely this kind of ambivalence which seems to lurk
behind the uncertainty which traditional and orthodox schools
display in their attitude towards the legitimacy or usefulness
of teaching history. On the one hand, they show interest in
what might be called "soft history" - in relating to the past
through evocation and commemoration, rather than detached
criticism. Thus, in Jewish primary schools, teaching about the
second temple period usually has more in common with the
faithful teaching of Bible stories than with project work on
Roman Britain (Z.F.E.T. op cit). Yet, on the other hand,
because this kind of memory-making activity often shades into
1 A Head of Jewish Studies at a Jewish Secondary school in London, in conversation.
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the realm of "hard history" which would undermine uncritical
relationships with the past, it invites grave doubts,
especially in the secondary sector.
Some Jewish secondary schools even query whether the critical
study of Jewish history can ever be appropriate when history
has set itself up as an explicator of reality outside of and
in contradistinction to tradition. From their perspective, it
is less undesirable, for example, that young Jewish people
study topics on Islamic Civilization in the context of
National Curriculum history than if they take an option on the
history of the Jews in Britain. Better, the argument goes, not
to learn about the Jewish past at all, than to learn something
that might not easily submit either to traditional teaching
about the relationship between Jews and non-Jews or to the
traditional treatment of Jewish sources. - We would argue that
in such schools Jewish history teaching is powerfully shaped
by ambiguity from ambivalence.
Plainly, there are also Jewish schools (and even orthodox
ones) which do not feel so threatened by the existential
questions history raises, if only because they are not fully
aware of them. Indeed, in educational environments where the
bulk of students are either Jewishly uncommitted or anti-
religious, history promises to play a central role in the
inculcation of young people into a sense of Jewish fellowship
(Arzt 1983). We suggest that when such schools continue to
display uncertainty about history's place in the curriculum
there must be another force at work. This is what we identify
as ambivalence from vagueness.
Typically, such schools know for sure that they want to teach
Jewish history but don't know how to do so effectively. They
display a commitment to Jewish history teaching (for example,
by setting aside significant amounts of teaching time for it
and/or by purchasing large numbers of Jewish history
textbooks) but they do not seem to have created the
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circumstances or to have developed the tools with which to
realize their commitment. When pressed they would probably
find it difficult to explain why they think Jewish history is
so important. 2 Of course it is more difficult to say why they
are held back in this way 3
 but it seems fair to attest that
their problem cannot only be an ideological one, and that it
is at least in part a question of procedure and technique.
To further complicate matters it is evident that vagueness and
ambiguity are invariably inseparable. Many schools are dubious
about history's promise precisely because they have little
idea of what it involves or results in. After all, there seem
to be very few examples of best practice which they might try
to emulate. At the same time, it is doubtful whether many
Jewish schools have completely conquered their fear of
critical history's disruptive influence. As one head teacher
put it, "Too many historians have ended up as sceptics for us
to be totally sure about it".3
If, therefore, we intend to identify the forces behind the
current state of Jewish history teaching, the most certain we
can be is that its ambiguous state is probably the product of
either ambivalence about the subjects educational role and its
relationship to Jewish tradition and/or vagueness about what
teaching it involves.
2 This emerged during a number of loosely structured interviews with Jewish history teachers,
conducted as part of preparation for this chapter.
The head of an orthodox Jewish secondary school in London, in conversation.
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Establishin g Research Goals
From the account we have provided, it will be evident that
there are a number of troubling features about the ambivalence
which Jewish schools display towards the teaching of Jewish
history. In the first place, there are questions about where
ambivalence towards Jewish history comes from. Our brief
survey conveys a strong sense that ambivalence depends more on
hearsay about the consequences of seriously studying Jewish
history than on proper consideration or information about the
relationship between the study of Jewish history and Jewish
memory. It appears to be conditioned by a stereotype of what
one might call the historian as heretic.
Secondly, and no less disturbing, there are the often bizarre
curricula consequences which ambivalence seems to produce.
Because those who run Jewish schools have not made up their
minds about Jewish history, they have created curricula that
have had to conform to often contradictory and frequently
absurd sets of requirements. 4 This leaves students wondering
how seriously they should take their study of Jewish history.
Finally, and perhaps least obvious, there is a sense in which
uncertainty and ambivalence undermine what might be. Orthodox
Jewish schools may be ambivalent about the place of Jewish
history teaching in Jewish education, yet, in the world of
Jewish adult education there is little doubt that the study of
Jewish history has captured the imagination of many adults who
had previously been disillusioned with Jewish study. Jewish
history courses have been at the heart of a significant return
to Jewish education by older people in both the United States
and Britain. 5 It makes one wonder whether Jewish schools are
not missing opportunities which others who are more in tune
For example, some Jewish schools have offered modern Jewish history courses which contrive
to leave out the origins of Reform Judaism and the history of Zionism.
Units on Jewish history are found at the heart of many programmes offered by the Florence
Melton Mini Schools across the United States and the Spiro Institute in England.
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with market forces are cultivating. If school-based Jewish
history was treated with similar seriousness might it not also
transform the perception of Jewish studies among Jewish
adolescents ?
As we intimated earlier, there is also a personal dimension
here. Having spent many hours and much emotional energy
devising Jewish history curricula in schools which cannot then
make up their minds about what they want from or want to do
with Jewish history, we have experienced at first hand the
damage and disappointment caused by the educational indecision
that results from ambivalence about the subject.
For these reasons and against this background we have come to
ask ourselves what really is the relationship between Jewish
history and Jewish memory. Does the study of history undermine
or erode memory, challenging traditions which have survived
intact into the modern age, or, are there generic similarities
between history and memory which create the possibility that
history may heal collective memory loss, even if that healing
may be a painful and unpredictable experience ?
These are not original questions. In recent years they have
become publicly articulated concerns in a number of different
societies which have been troubled by fear of, what has been
called, "the loss of community" or by the prospect of
collective amnesia. Thus, in Britain, there has been public
discussion about the contribution which national curriculum
history could or should make to young people's sense of a
collective past and of a shared future (Aldrich 1987). In the
Jewish world there has been debate about the means and ends of
holocaust memorialization' and about the role of Jewish
education in securing Jewish continuity (The Report of the
Commission on Jewish Education in North America 1990; Sacks
1993).
6 "Who owns the Memory ?" Jerusalem Reoprt (Cover Story) v.3 n.21 (Feb. 1993)
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In less populist domains, these questions have been considered
from the perspective of analytical philosophy (Le Goff 1988),
social psychology (Halbwachs 1980) and history itself
(Yerushalmi 1982); but not with regards to what might be
called a set of explicitly educational dimensions. There has
been little consideration, for example, of how young people
and especially young Jewish people experience the encounter
between the critical study of history and Jewish tradition.
There has been even less consideration of what this might mean
in educational terms.
We do not yet know whether young Jewish students relate to
tradition and critical history as rival views of human
experience or whether they are even aware of such a rivalry.
We have little idea if or how Jewish students from different
backgrounds think differently about Jewish history, and we
have no sense of the kind of impact which the study of
critical history may have on the way in which young Jewish
people conceive of the Jewish past.
These are the questions which move our research. They are
expressed as Jewish problems, for both personal and practical
reasons, even if the problem they articulate is not an
exclusively Jewish one. All religious communities must decide
what role history should play in their children's education.
They must decide whether history will turn their children into
heretics or sceptics or whether it can enable another
generation to recover a rich past which would otherwise be
forgotten. All religious communities must determine the
relationship between the past described by traditional
teachings and the past which is portrayed by academic journals
and school history textbooks.
We propose to begin an examination of these questions from a
philosophical perspective, since it is only by so doing that
we will properly be able to establish what exactly the
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terms 'critical history' and 'collective memory' mean. We hope
that a philosophical beginning of this sort will then enable
us to procede in an educational direction by establishing,
first and foremost, what, in formal terms, the relationship
between Jewish history and Jewish memory might be.
CHAPTER TWO
History, memory and Jewish historical consciousness.
A philosophical consideration.
Gershom Scholem (1897-1982) left an extraordinary legacy to
Jewish studies. The bibliography of his published works
stretches to nearly six hundred entries and includes numerous
influential historical studies, detailed philological
investigations as well as phenomological surveys. More
remarkable, as Martin Buber once remarked, Scholem "literally
created a whole academic discipline within the realm of Jewish
studies" (Biale 1982). Before Scholem, there had been only
occasional or haphazard attempts to study the history of
Jewish mysticism. Scholem not only developed a rigorous
methodology for the study of Jewish mysticism, he established
an immense programme for research and founded a discipline
within which properly to conduct it.
It is all the more significant, therefore, that when asked
what he saw as being the role of the Jewish historian, Scholem
replied that it was "to make sure that our tremendous
tradition is brought up and made a problem of" (1974). For
this appears to provide powerful affirmation for what we had
previously dismissed as a prejudice against the study of
Jewish history in orthodox Jewish schools. Indeed, in these
terms, Scholem's extraordinary devotion to the realization of
such an iconoclastic programme may enable him to serve as an
iconic example of the "historian as heretic" - a
characterization we had previously regarded as a dubious
stereotype.
It is our intention in this chapter to examine, from a
philosophical and historical perspective, whether critical
historiography does necessarily exist in an antagonistic
relationship with the forms of historical consciousness which
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have sustained traditional Judaism. This will require us
saying, first, what we mean by critical historiography. Then,
we will have to explore what alternative forms for
apprehending and organizing the past might consist of and how
they differ from historiography.
We propose to consider these questions in formal philosophical
terms as well as in historical terms, that is, as regards the
development of historiography over the last two centuries and
its relationship to traditional society. We will also pay
attention to the particular context of Jewish culture, since
it might be said that Diaspora Judaism provides a special case
of the relationship between history, collective identity and
self-understanding. After all, as has been widely pointed out,
it is somewhat paradoxical that a people of memory, such as
the Jewish people, should have found so little use for
historians until very recent times (Kochan 1977, Yerushalmi
1982).
"What is Hi stor y ?"
In the 1960's, philosophizing historians frequently complained
about the paucity of philosophical discussion about history.
Today, largely thanks to the efforts of these same historians,
numerous works of philosophy of history exist in print, a
number of which have become standard reading for sixth formers
or first year undergraduates. In most of these accounts
history is analysed from within the context of the classical
Nature - Culture trope (Davis & Starn 1989). In one version,
for example, 'History' as an intellectual process and as an
activity of the reasoning mind - the endeavour to establish
the truth of earlier events - is pitched against the 'past',
conceived as a more mythical complex, inherent in the present
as "created ideology with a purpose" (Elton 1967, Plumb 1969,
Marwick 1970). Alternatively, in a 1980's variation, the
historian's more or less calculated accounts of the past are
contrasted with the supposedly organic flow of memory. In
David Lowenthal's words: "memory is inescapable and prima-
fade indubitable, while history is contingent and empirically
testable" (1985).
If these distinctions have been somewhat blurred by post-
modernist criticism (for example, in the work of White 1973,
Rorty 1989 and Eagieton 1989) they nevertheTess provide a
means of access to considering what history is, even if we can
not say very precisely what it is not. For, what emerges from
these discussions is the sense that history is an intellectual
act of a certain sort. History (or in Hegel's words, "the
narration of the things that happened") is not the past. It is
an act of reconstruction or re-presentation. As Wyatt (1964)
has usefully put it, "the past as an authentic reality cannot
be recovered, it has to be reconstructed. History is a
persistent effort to give plausible form to an array of data,
a form which continually transcends itself in the light of new
data".
This statement is worth examining further, since it exposes
some characteristic features of and assumptions behind what
can be called critical historiography. For a start, we can
point to the way in which a conception of history as
reconstruction is intimately associated with a sense of
rupture between past and present, that is, with a sense of the
past as no longer being immediate or present. Whether
historiography is cause or consequence of this rupture we will
examine later; for the moment, we are interested in the
significant if formal implications of the notion of
reconstruction. For, during most of history men scarcely
differentiated between past and present; referring even to
remote events, if at all, as though they were then occurring.
Up to the nineteenth century those who gave any thought to the
historical past supposed it to be much like the present
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(Lowenthal op cit). Historiography conceived as
reconstruction, however, infers a discourse of mediation,
epistemologically fragile, always problematic and always
incomplete. It characterizes history as an intellectual act
which seeks to re-present a past which has increasingly become
a realm separate from the present. In Michael OakshotUs
words, "history is . . . an enquiry in which authenticated
survivals from the past are dissolved into their component
features in order to be used . . . to infer a past which has not
survivect' (1983).
Historical reconstruction, then, is inherently interpretative.
Paul Connerton has written that "knowledge of all human
activities in the past is possible only through a knowledge of
their traces". "Just to apprehend marks (which some
phenomenon, in itself inaccessible, has left behind) as
evidence, is already to have gone beyond the stage of merely
making statements about the marks themselves. To account
something as evidence is to make a statement about something
else, namely, about that for which it is taken as evidence"
(1989). History, Connerton concludes, is an inferential
process.
This is a conclusion reached less abruptly and in more
colloquial terms by Jack Hexter in the course of developing
his notion of the way in which history emerges as the product
of encounter between the record of the past and what he calls
the second record of the historian (1972). Hexter depicts the
record of the past as an array of non-dimensional points,
which however closely arrayed, do not make a pattern by
themselves. The pattern is always the work of the historian or
of someone acting in the capacity of the historian. It always
involves an inference. The points themselves do not have the
dimension of history and cannot alone legitimize the
inference. To legitimize it the historian himself must supply
something. Without that something there can be no history, and
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that something must come from the historian's second record
(that is, everything that historians bring to their encounter
with the record of the past), since there is no place else
from which it can come.
Hexter's argument is sometimes criticized for being imprecise
but it graphically displays an assumption which is central to
the notion of history as reconstruction - that of the
historian's autonomy vis a vis his evidence - since, in this
account, history does not exist as a given but is made by the
historian. This position is helpfully articulated here because
the notion of the historian's second record, enabling a leap
from nondimensionality to dimensionality, is sufficiently
ambiguous to allow any number of possible readings of what the
historian's autonomy might comprise, ranging from categories
founded on Collingwood's idealism through different degrees of
linguistic determinism (say from Hayden White to Focault)
through to the social or cultural determinism of Agnes
Heller's A Theory of History (1983). In all these versions,
whatever their differences, it is presumed that in history-as-
reconstruction, the historian not only supplies the criteria
by reference to which evidence is criticized, but that in fact
he also causes evidence to exist qua evidence.
It will have become apparent from the above that criticism is
a preeminent attribute of reconstructive autonomy in history.
In functional terms, historians continue to question the
statements of their informants (or treat evidence critically)
because if they were to accept them at face value that would
amount to abandoning their autonomy as practicising historians
and relinquishing their independence of social memory (Lewis
1975). We would go further to say that, intrinsically,
criticism is an attribute of autonomy, since to assert
independence of any narrative, memory or tradition - to treat
it historically - is critically to transcend it. Indeed, to
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deny the givenness of a history independent of oneself is to
render all things interpretable (or subject to criticism).
For many, it is this which makes historiography "iconoclastic
and irreverent". It is what causes Pierre Nora, for example,
to claim that "history's goal and ambition is... .to annihilate
what in reality has taken place" (1989). This is a judgement
we will leave aside for the moment. At this point we are more
concerned with the formal attributes of critical history
rather than their possible implications. These lead us back to
where we started, with Wyatt's conception of history as "a
form which continually transcends itself in the light of new
data". As critical discourse, history can only be tentative,
since it will always be subject to the imminent possibility of
a reflexive turning of history upon itself in the production
of a history of history (Le Goff 1988). Moreover, as an act of
reconstruction carried out in the encounter between the
present and the past, history will always be contingent and
contested. The context which presently integrates all relevant
data can always be replaced by another preferred context or
undermined by the sources used by another historian. - These
are the realities behind Croce's profound if now familiar
formulation that each age writes its own history.
At this point one might ask if the history we have portrayed
is substantially different from fiction. We seem to have left
history at the brink of a debilitating subjectivism or
relativism, which makes the writing of history look like an
arbitrary if diverting pastime.
Indeed, some historians do appear to lose their nerve when
faced by conclusions such as these. Gordon Wood, for example,
argues that "only a faith that the past really exists. .
brings us closer to knowing the truth about the past 'as it
really was'. Old fashioned this epistemology may be, but only
such faith makes history writing possible" (1982). Wood
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appears to believe that historians need the security (even if
artificial) of certainty, so that they do not despair of
sensibly going about their practice.
At the other extreme are those like Keith Jenkins who find
history's contingency liberating, since "it throws out old
certainties 1 and those who have benefitted from them are
capable of being exposed" (1991). Jenkins follows literary
theorists like Fish and Eagleton in arguing that the way out
of 'hapless relativism' in a situation like this is through
the analysis of power in practice. For, "although logically
all historical accounts are problematic and relative, some are
actually dominant and others marginal" (ibid). It is an ironic
awareness of ideology that gives history some stability rather
than always undermining it.
We propose to follow Wyatt - a non-historian - who suggests
that historians "accustom themselves to dwelling on the sharp
edge of paradox, striving for what appears at that moment the
most comprehensive context, while knowing at the same time
that it will, of necessity, soon be transcended" (op cit). We
would add that it is worth remembering that not all
reconstructions are equally good. That they are
reconstructions does not free them from the obligations of
rational or professional responsibility. History may be an
intellectual act but it is a public activity in which the
historian's claims and procedures are subject to public
scrutiny. As Wolfgang Mommsen (1975) has argued, these
procedures are not empty formalities which protect
professional domains or ideological positions, they are
guarantees of reasonableness which give historical discourse
its stability. If, as Jenkins has argued, history in the main
is what historians make, it is nevertheless subject to the
standards required by its consumers.
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Alternative Ways of Apprehending the Past.
If it is said that definitions are formalized procedures for
making distinctions, then it follows that in the process of
defining history we have also hinted (if only inversely) at
what may be alternative, non historiographical, ways of
apprehending and organizing the past.
We proposed that history was an act of reconstruction or
representation, an intellectual act of a certain sort which
consists of a persistent effort to give plausible form to an
array of data from the past, continually transcending itself
in the light of new data. On a counterfactual basis we could
therefore expect non-historiographical forms of historical
apprehension to possess features which would include
immediacy, privacy, idiosyncrasy, authority and perhaps
sacredness. However, as we said earlier, poststructuralist
criticism has undermined the construction of definitive
distinctions such as these in a way that makes most forms of
historical apprehension look like heavily constructed
narratives, with only institutionally regulated differences
between them.
Lowenthal has offered a more measured analysis of non-
historiographical representations of the past in The Past is a
Foreign Country, one of only a few serious studies to include
a discussion of different forms of historical representation.
Although his book is primarily about attitudes towards the
past, it does include a substantial analysis of three distinct
though associated ways by which we know about the past -
remembering things, reading or hearing stories and chronicles,
and living among relics from previous times (1985 p.185 ff).
Lowenthal provides some strong examples of the ways in which
each of these "routes to the past" are interconnected and
blurred. For instance, how relics mean only what history and
memory convey, and how artifacts frequently originate as
28
memorial or historical witnesses (p.249). In detailed
examples, he recounts how interviews with residents of certain
areas of London show that their "living memories" invariably
include events from long before their birth; and how
unassuaged injuries and injustices have led many Irish people
to conflate remote with recent times and even with the present
(p.250). In fact, at one point he goes so far as to assert
that history and memory are distinguishable less as types of
knowledge than as attitudes towards knowledge (p.213).
Strikingly, however, at the next juncture in his argument
Lowenthal decisively sets history and memory apart. This, he
explains, is because historical knowledge is by its very
nature collectively produced and shared. Historical awareness
implies group activity, while memory does not (p.213). Memory
is wholly and intensely personal, it is always felt as a
particular event that happened to me (p.194). Our
recollections can never be fully shared (p.195). While memory
is private and validates personal identity, history is public
and perpetuates collective self-awareness.
Lowenthal's difficulties in distinguishing history from memory
point to a problem all scholars have had in discussing the
ways in which human collectives apprehend the past. As Amos
Funkenstein has put it, "we naturally ascribe historical
'consciousness' and 'memory' to human collectives - family and
tribe, nation and state". And yet, "this is confusing, since
consciousness and memory can only be realized by an individual
who acts, is aware, and remembers. Just as a nation cannot eat
or dance, neither can it speak or remember" (1989). To put it
differently, while on the one hand "memory may even constitute
self-consciousness. . . .on the other hand, even the most
personal memory cannot be removed from the social context"
(ibid).
Faced by such an epistemological paradox it is tempting to
conclude that a collective can perceive or organize the past
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only through the mediation of historians, public actors who,
because they wear the badge of professional autonomy, can
claim to speak for no authority other than the truth, and who
can presume to provide society with its self knowledge. This,
however, is misleading. We will see from an empirical as well
as a theoretical perspective that societies have obviously
apprehended the past other than through the agency of
professional historians working with or on inscribed
narratives. Moreover, they have done so as collectives, and in
ways which will not require us to make use of explanatory
categories taken either from Jungian psychology or varieties
of collective genetics.
Society is predicated on shared historical consciousness. It
is this which enables its members to share experiences and
assumptions, and it is evident that if historiography is a
source or expression of such consciousness it is, as
Yerushalmi has argued, "only the most recent of a number of
alternative ways, each viable and with its own integrity, in
which human beings have apprehended their collective pasts"
(op cit).
Yerushalmi 's assertion is self-consciously indebted to the
work of Maurice Halbwachs, the French - Jewish sociologist who
pioneered the systematic discussion of collective memory.
Halbwachs argued that it was through their membership of a
social group - particularly, kinship, religious and class
affiliations - that individuals were able to acquire, to
localize and to recall their memories (1980). This does not
presume that the social group constitutes a genuine psychical
unit, rather, as Mary Douglass reports, that it comprises a
flexible set of social segments, consisting of live
individuals who sustain their common interests by their own
selective and highly partial view of history (ibid).
Collective memory, therefore, is not a metaphor but a social
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reality transmitted and sustained through the conscious
efforts and institutions of groups (Yerushalmi op cit).
In recent years sociologists and anthropologists have
elaborated on this concept in the course of examining what has
variously been called "everyday historical consciousness"
(Heller 1983), "historical memory" (Bauman 1982) or "social
memory" (Connerton op cit). This elaboration has payed
particular attention to the most problematic aspect of
Halbwachs' account, that is, his failure to explain how the
dynamics of collective memory work; in other words, how, given
that different groups have different memories which are
peculiar to them, they pass them on from one generation to the
next.
In the last ten years a substantial body of work has emerged
in this field which is all the more impressive in having dealt
with phenomena which are both procedurally informal and
culturally diffuse without having declined into
hypostatization or having presented as a unity a reality that
is complex and structured by a variety of different social
categori es.
Commemorative Ceremonies
Connerton, for example, has offered an acute analysis of what
he calls "the acts of transfer which make remembering in
common possible" (op cit. p.39). He points to the role played
by more or less informally told narrative histories in
grounding communal memory (p.16/17), to the place of gossip in
village life and to the transmission of background narratives
from one ruling group to another (p.19). Connerton,
nevertheless, singles out certain "types of repetition" as
constituting acts of transfer of crucial importance (p.40). As
he explains, he has "seized upon commemorative ceremonies and
bodily practices in particular because it is the study of
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these that leads us to see that images of the past and
recollected knowledge of the past are conveyed and sustained
by (more or less) ritual performance" (ibid).
Connerton proposes that commemorative ceremonies are
preeminent instances of how we preserve visions of the past by
representing them to ourselves in words and images. They keep
the past in mind by a depictive and performative
representation of past events. They are reenactments of the
past, but do not simply imply continuity with the past. They
explicitly claim such continuity through a rhetoric of re-
enactment which is calendrical, verbal and gestural. They are
culturally pervasive performances which involve the return of
the past in a representational guise, and which normally
include a simulacrum of the scene or situation recaptured.
Connerton offers a few examples of commemorative ceremonies
ranging from the narrative cults created by National
Socialism, through covenantal ceremonies in Judaism and
Christianity to the invented rituals of modern nation states.
His discussion is however more helpful for its formal analysis
than for its examination of specific exemplars of
commemorative ceremonies. These are more readily available and
more richly textured in other works, for example in Les Lieux
de Memoire, the seven volume collaborative study of the
objects and events that "codify, condense and anchor the
national memory of France" (eg. Nora 1984). Less grandly there
are also the collected studies on the invention of tradition
in British and Colonial society (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983), or1
even more particularly (as we will see shortly), Yerushalmi's




The concept of bodily practices re-enacting the past is a less
familiar one, but, in Connerton's argument it refers to a
phenomenon which is even more fundamental and widespread as a
form of historical representation. As he explains, we all
"preserve the past deliberately without representing it in
words and images. Our bodies... .keep the past in an entirely
effective form in their continuing ability to perform certain
actions", like, for example, swimming well or driving motor
vehicles (p.72).
In the same way, posture, gestures, etiquette and habit - what
Connerton calls 'incorporating practices' - provide an
effective system of mnemonics for the values and categories
which groups are most anxious to preserve, whether these are
class or sex distinctions or faith commitments. The past is
kept in mind by a habitual memory which is sedimented in the
body and which is reenacted through its present conduct. Thus,
in some cultures, power and rank are commonly expressed
through highly structured but apparently 'automatic' postural
behaviour, while in other cultures bodily gestures conserve
important religious values and categories at the level of
habit rather than formal ceremony.
This can sound mysterious since incorporating practices are
largely traceless or ephemeral. They are incapable of
providing a means by which any evidence or will to be
remembered can be left behind, because, unlike other forms of
historical reenactment, they do not exist independently of
their being performed. As Zygmunt Bauman has explained, "The
historical memory of a group.. . .doesn't always surface to the
level of communication. It finds its expression in the group's
proclivities to some rather than other behavioural responses"
and "is not necessarily recognized by the group as a
particular concept of the past" (op cit.). For Connerton this
is part of the power and persistence of bodily practices. They
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simply "are not susceptible to critical scrutiny and
evaluation by those habituated to their performance" (op cit).
"Everyday Historical Consciousness"
It is difficult to know where exactly the notion of "bodily
practices" separates from another form of historical
representation which Heller calls "the sense of the
historical" (op cit). Whereas for Connerton bodily practices
constitute an immediate or embodied reenactment of the past,
identified with what others call habit memory, it seems that
for Bauman, bodily practices constitute an external
representation of a more fundamental internal process -
historical memory - which is embedded in everyday
consciousness. In Bauman's argument it is historical memory
which is both ploughed into collective actions and which plays
an equally prominent part in the everyday activity of making
sense.
This is not merely a difference in emphasis, in terms of the
extent to which bodily practices are mediated by historical
consciousness, Bauman's argument actually points to an
additional and alternative form of historical representation
which largely has its source elsewhere.
In Bauman's account historical memory denotes "an acquired set
of narratives or histories, embedded in everyday consciousness
and daily reinforced by micro-social experience, which serve
to make sense of the present" (op cit). The concept of
historical memory therefore helps to explain how groups which
have not been able to record or inscribe a remembered history
are nevertheless able (collectively) to make sense of the
contemporary world. In these terms, historical memory is not
merely a concept which refers to the reenactment of the past
in behavioural or unmediated terms, but it signifies a point
of reference for making sense of the world.
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The concept of historical memory can, however, be even richer
than this, in that it can help to explain what makes all human
transactions possible. This, for example, is the substance of
Alasdair Macintyre's account in certain influential passages
in After Virtue (1985).
Macintyre's concern is with the development of a moral
philosophy, but, as he explains, every moral philosophy has
some particular sociology as its counterpart. His philosophy
is tied to a conception of a society which can come to
understand itself through making use of a shared stock of
stori es.
Narrative, as Macintyre argues, is embedded in everyday
discourse. It is what makes experience and existence
intelligible (ibid). "In successfully identifying and
understanding what someone else is doing we always move
towards placing a particular episode in the context of a set
of narrative histories, histories both of the individuals
concerned and of the settings in which they act and suffer".
Human transaction - the capacity of members of society to
converse and to make sense of each other's actions - therefore
depends on members of society owning a shared repertoire of
narratives or histories.
The problem with Macintyre's account from our perspective is
that it does not explore how members of society actually
acquire such a shared repertoire. Although, in his terms,
society is founded on humankind's capacity to learn or acquire
narratives, he offers little more than general notions of
socialization and education in order to explain how these
narratives are transmitted or learnt.
For this reason, Heller's Theory of History provides a useful
analogue to Macintyre's argument. Keller moves in a different
direction. She is concerned with writing a sociology, but
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cannot abstract herself from certain philosophical and
psychological assumptions.
For her, too, stories play a prominent role in the everyday
process of making sense, by bringing things into order in our
world. In her argument this is because everyday life has its
own forms of historical consciousness which are rooted in the
consciousness of "practically everyone who reflects on his/her
life experience in our world" (op cit). To be precise, the
every day activity of making sense is not so much founded on
any special knowledge of history or the past but on
consciousness of historicity, that is, on consciousness of
"society's capacity to act on itself and determine the order
of its representations" (ibid).
Macintyre and Heller occupy different realms and they posses
different agendas. He seeks to root and derelativize morality,
she prefers to consider the possibility of action against that
which is rooted. Both of them, nevertheless, share (with many
others) an affirmation of the prominence of narrative (or
histories) within the texture of everyday consciousness. Of
course, this concept occupies a different place in their
accounts but its presence does enable us to signal the
existence of processes of historical representation which are
distinct from historiography and which are central to human
self-understanding and transaction.
The Public Staging of the Past (Between Tradition and the
National Heritage)
The forgoing analysis may have reenforced the impression that
non-historiographic apprehension of the past is inherently
private and personal, that it consists of internal processes
equivalent to memory. Yet, this would be insufficient. For, as
Patrick Wright argues, "far from being 'behind' the present,
the past also exists as an accomplished presence in public
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understanding. In this sense it is written into present social
reality, not just implicitly as residue, precedent or custom
and practice, but explicitly as itself - as history, National
Heritage and Tradition" (1985). And it is this which accounts
for the inertia of the past - its ability to survive the
advent of history.
Wright's argument enables us to identify two general levels at
which the past is publicly presented in the present. At one
level, it exists as "a paradigmatic kind of historical
continuity which might more accurately be called tradition".
While at another level, it exists as a "cultivated sense which
is reproduced through a variety of public agencies (like
schools, television, political debate and historical fiction)
and which stages the past explicitly as itself" (ibid).
Tradition, according to Edward Shils is "anything.. .created
through human actions, thought and imagination.. .which is
transmitted or handed down from one generation to the next,
from the past to the present" (1981). One suspects that Wright
intends it to mean more than this. No doubt, few would
disagree that tradition can exist in an objectified form, as
knowledge, inscriptions or activities which constitute
transmitted elements in any new forms of knowledge,
inscription or activity. Nevertheless, as Nattan Rottenstreich
has argued, and as Wright intimates, tradition is also a form
of historical consciousness with a distinctive epistemological
and ontological basis (Rottenstreich 1972).
In some societies (usually characterized as traditional ones)
tradition is the mechanism by which the past is made the
normative dimension of the present. It is a highly specific
form of historical consciousness in which the present does not
exist as an autonomous dimension of time, but is rather
conceived as commentary and elaboration on the past. In this
context, the totality of life is shaped and passed down from
one generation to the next.
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Of course secular societies are not traditional societies, in
the sense that they have succeeded in elevating the present to
the level of independent causative factor. They are settings
in which the past is no longer binding or completely
normative. However, no society exists in a state of complete
discontinuity. If tradition no longer constitutes the totality
of life it survives as historical consciousness or as
historical continuity, and in these forms it re-presents the
past to a present which treats it with greater or lesser
degrees of criticism and autonomy. Few societies reconstruct
anew their institutions and their ideals, even fewer derive
them from history books; most, if not all, inherit them as
tradition through families, schools, religions, political
parties and the media; and it is in these settings that the
past is most widely apprehended in the present.
Wright points out that the public agencies among those we have
just enumerated also reproduce a past beyond tradition, which
is staged explicitly as itself. He refers to this as the
'national past' and describes how it consists of "the public
reproduction of a 'national' understanding of the past which
includes 'reverence for national heroes' and 'the
commemoration of great national events'. He shows how the
national past is moreover grounded in the concrete, unarguable
existence of a national heritage made up of landscapes, old
buildings, monuments, folkways, skills and exhibitable
objects, all of which are presented as standing in need of
preservation, deference and respect". In the context of
Wright's argument this presentation of the past as National
Heritage has sinister implications, since, as he explains, the
'national past' as a public presence tends "to institute as
fact its thematic generalization of history. It presents this
interpretative work in the concrete terms of what at the same
time it stresses as the National Heritage" (op cit)
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In many accounts it is tradition which is presumed to
epitomize a non-historiographic apprehension of the past
because it is frequently uncritical and immediately implicit
in the present. In Wright's argument, however, it is the past
as presence, as National Heritage, which is most sharply
contrasted with historiography, since in these terms, it is
supposed authentically to preserve a slice of past reality
within the context of the present, without the mediation of
either interpretation or reconstruction. In presuming to
preserve the past within the present it makes redundant
history-as-reconstruction. After all, the past need not be
reconstructed if it can be tangibly and immediately
apprehended.
ollective Memor
Earlier, we quoted Yerushalmi 's assertion that "collective
memory is not a metaphor but a social reality transmitted and
sustained through the conscious efforts and institutions of
groups." Hopefully, we have now provided an introductory
survey to the diverse efforts and institutions which make up
this reality. Their diversity is significant, since by
referring to them as aspects of collective memory, it easy to
lose sight of the way in which they are composed of
institutions as well as internal processes, how they are both
formal and informal and how they can be made up of rituals as
well as of relics. This, for example, is a point which is
powerfully made in Les lieux de Memoire, where a comprehensive
examination of the objects which constitute French national
memory includes the study of monuments, emblems,
commemorations, symbols, rituals, manuals, basic texts and
mottos.
Evidently, if the past is remembered, preserved, reenacted or
recalled, and if histories are transmitted from one generation
to another, there are and have been a variety of ways in which
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this can be and has been done. Modern historiography is the
most recent, but only one of a number of viable alternatives.
To quote Halbwachs: "History is neither the whole nor even all
that remains of the past. In addition to written history,
there is a living history that perpetuates and renews itself
through time and permits the recovery of many old currents
that have seemingly disappeared. If this were not so, what
right would we have to speak of 'collective memory' ?" (op
cit)
History and Collective Memory
The question we have been working towards concerns the nature
of the relationship between historiography and these other
ways of apprehending the past. Halbwachs describes history and
collective memory as existing in a state of "ultimate
opposition". He claims that they are not only intrinsically
different but that history actually creates a rupture between
the past and the present which does violence to the workings
of tradition or social memory (ibid). We want to establish
whether in empirical terms this has always been the case, and
whether in formal terms this is either necessary or likely.
Certainly, there is enough ambiguity surrounding the origins
and development of what can be called modern historiography to
allow for a variety of possible characterizations of its
relationship with collective memory, ranging from surrogacy to
enmity, with almost any variation in between.
There is, for example, a well known paradox within the
transformation of historical writing in the nineteenth
century. On the one hand, history is characterized as having
emerged as an important supplement to the Enlightenment
(V.A.Harvey 1966). It is said that historical research created
a new distance from the past, setting people free from the
traditions which might otherwise have guided their assumptions
and behaviour (Mendez-Flohr & Reiharz 1980). In Dilthey's
40
words, "the historical awareness of the finitude of all
historical phenomena, of every human or social situation, the
consciousness of the relativity of every sort of belief is the
final step towards the liberation of man" (cited by Rossi
1975).
On the other hand, history may have served to deepen
identification with and affection for given facets of culture
(Croce 1941). The nineteenth century historiographical
enterprise would probably have been unthinkable outside of its
setting within the broader struggle for political identity. To
many enthusiasts at the time, the study of history and the
care of the records from which it was written was required and
justified by the belief that the national society would be
legitimated and strengthened by the assimilation of knowledge
of its own past by future generations (Shils op cit). The
transformation of historical writing in Germany was in large
part the work of scholars who were intimately involved with
the life of the political society to which they belonged. The
political commitment of Niebuhr and Ranke, for example,
imparts to their work the sense that in constructing a canon
of historical research, they were at the same time
participating in the formation of a political identity and
giving shape to the memory of a particular culture (Connerton
op cit).
How one sees the relationship between history and other forms
of historical representation depends to a large extent,
therefore, on where one locates the origins of historiography.
Whether critical history is seen as being the child of the
Enlightenment (or possibly the Renaissance) and its quest for
autonomously derived truth or whether, alternatively, it is
pictured as the child of nineteenth century nationalism (in
partnership with Romanticism) and its quest to rediscover
forgotten roots, will powerfully determine how one conceives
of the place of history in the socialization of children, the
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relationship between history and tradition and other forms of
collective memory; and the role of the historian in society.
Francois Furet, for example 1 has powerfully argued that the
development of historiography was closely linked to the growth
of nationalism (1982). He explains that it was from "out of
the quest for genealogical legitimacy that history became the
dominant discipline of the period . .. . and the soothsayer of
national progress". According to Furet, it was against this
background that history "became indispensable for very young
children who had to be trained early in patriotism and
critical judgement." He cites Ernest Lavisse, historian and
influential history textbook writer in nineteenth century
France, who promised that the teaching of history would train
"citizens imbued with a sense of duty, and soldiers who love
their rifles" (ibid). "To history education", Lavisse wrote,
"falls the glorious duty of making our fatherland loved and
understood" (cited in Le Gof op cit). Of course, as Furet
notes, it does not follow that such a desired outcome
followed, automatically or otherwise, from the introduction of
history as a discipline into schools. The point is that it was
widely assumed that history and historiography would reinforce
collective values and commitments. History, was seen both as
the child of Nationalism, and as the handmaiden of collective
memory.
Shils makes a similar case. In his account of the encounter
between historiography and tradition he claims that "in
Western countries historians became the chief custodians of
the traditions of national history ....., since their bona
fides as patriots was generally accepted by the laity".
"Legislators and civil servants were willing to append public
funds to train and employ teachers of national history and to
support academic research" because it was assumed that "the
teaching of national history would promote a belief in
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continuity and identity with the national past, reverence for
national heroes" and much more besides (op cit).
Thus, the historian gained a special position in nineteenth
century culture. Historical research was devoured by a wide
stratum of the educated public in textbooks, lectures,
speeches and monographs (Funkenstein op cit). This research,
including the most professional, provided a faithful
reflection of the problems of identity of the nation state and
its societal wishes (for instance, in the writings of Gibbon
or de Tocqueville) and also established or made concrete the
symbols of the nation (say, the place of the Druids and Celts
in the remote Welsh past) (Morgan 1983). It meant, according
to Funkenstein, that in the nineteenth century nation state,
collective memory was largely produced by historians (op cit).
(emphasis added)
This version of events can not be overstated, since a
different paradigm usually overshadows it. This identifies
history as a product of the Enlightenment, which found
realization in the debunking or corroding of once powerful
religious myths and traditions (Harvey op cit). It portrays
critical historiography as challenging established
interpretations of biblical texts and traditions, supplanting
traditional accounts with more rigorous or researched
narratives. In this account, history and religion could not
but have existed in an antipathetic relationship.
For many, it is not only religious tradition that has been and
is corroded by history - it is all of the remembered past.
This was Lord Acton's point some time ago, when he argued that
"if the past has been an obstacle and a burden, knowledge of
the past is the safest and surest emancipation" (cited in
Lowenthal op cit). It was also the main thrust of Plumb's
argument in The Death of the Past. More recently, Bernard
Lewis has written from within the same 'enlightened' tradition
that "critical history begins with a dissatisfaction with
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memory and a desire to remedy its deficiencies". "Professional
historians, unlike their predecessors, are not content merely
to repeat and pass on the memories of the past. They seek
rather to fill its gaps and correct its errors. Frequently, as
a result, and perhaps this is a purpose of their efforts, by
analyzing the past they kill it" (op cit).
In France, where historiography has taken such a strong
formative and didactic role, its impact on tradition and on
memory has, according to this argument, been devastating. Nora
powerfully argues that this is because historiography
"operates by introducing doubt, by running a knife between the
tree of memory and the bark of history" (op cit). By
interrogating traditions, it is no longer capable of passing
them on intact. Thus, movements or moments in the French
Revolution (like the storming of the Bastille, for instance)
which had a decisive impact on French collective memory have,
for many, lost their potency through having been seized on by
certain kinds of historians (cf. Schama 1989).
As Hans Meyeroff notes, there is a notable irony in this
situation. "Previous generations knew much less about the past
than we do, but perhaps felt a much greater sense of identity
and continuity with it" (1955). For Nora this is the
consequence of a definite chain of cause and effect. As he
explains, "the less memory is experienced from the inside the
more it exists only through its exterior scaffolding .....hence
the obsession with the archive that marks our age". "The
indiscriminate production of archives is the acute effect of a
new consciousness, the clearest expression of the terrorism of
historicized memory" (op cit). The archive is supposed to
preserve the past, but it merely serves to further deaden
living memory which can exist only in a state of permanent
evolution.
The two paradigms we have described directly impinge on how
the role of the historian is conceived. On the one hand there
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are those who emphasize the historian's critical role. Leonard
Kreiger, for example, asserted that it is the historian's task
to reform memory, while Carl Becker proposed that it is to
test memory and fortify it with sources (1932). For Michael
Kammen, "historians have a noble and public obligation that
might be described as explaining a culture to itself" (1982).
All of these statements take their cue from what has probably
been the dominant paradigm in Western universities, but as we
argued above they only provide part of the picture. To quote
Funkenstein again, it is only "on rare occasions that the
historian comes out against distorted and even damaging images
of the past; even more rarely, he succeeds in creating a new
discourse beyond his professional sphere". If anything, "the
critical argument itself can become a pattern for 'collective
memory' as has happened with Marxist or psychological
terminology" (op cit).
Funkenstein statement comes at the end of a measured and
learned discussion in which he, cleverly, goes some way in
resolving the ambiguities in the relationship between
collective memory and historiography by introducing an
additional superordinate concept - historical consciousness -
to which they both contribute and by which they are both
enriched. As he says, "Western historical consciousness does
not contradict collective memory, but rather is a developed
and organized form of it. Nor does it contradict
historiographical creation, for both lie at its base and are
nurtured by it. All three express the same collective
mentality, and the expression is always manifest in the
individual who recalls and expresses it" (ibid).
This is not mere conceptual slight of hand, since this
formulation goes some way in identifying the commonalities and
differences within and between collective memory and
historiography. Nevertheless, in reconciling collective memory
and historiography at a superordinate level this argument
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highlights the fact that at another more mundane level they do
exist in a shifting state which is both antagonistic and
mutually supportive.
In functional terms, if historians were to accept remembered
or recalled history without question they would be
relinquishing their professional autonomy as practising
historians as well as their independence of social memory.
History's integrity as an academic and intellectual practice
is predicated on its criticism of inherited narratives.
Nevertheless, if history did not begin in the present and if
it did not start from a context which consisted of and was
shaped by collective memory it would neither be meaningful nor
intelligible to a professional or lay audience. Moreover, it
is evident that even the most critical of historians is bound
by assumptions, which may or may not be conscious, and which
are themselves inheritances of given accounts of the past.
Funkenstein's conceptual solution cannot therefore settle what
is a formal as well as an historical ambiguity. Neither, one
suspects, can it be applied wholesale to an analysis of the
relationship between Jewish historiography and Jewish
collective memory, even though the Jewish context actually
provides Funkenstein's initial frame of reference. For, as we
said earlier, there are a number of reasons why the Jewish
people appear to provide a special case of the relationship
between meaning in history, memory of the past and the writing
of history. Not the least of these is the paradox that
although the Jews have for so long seen themselves as the very
axis of world history, they nevertheless ceased to be a
historiographic people from the time of Josephus (in the first
century of the common era) until the birth of Jewish studies
in the nineteenth century. If only for this reason we should
give separate consideration to the relationship between Jewish
historiography and Jewish collective memory.
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Jewish Historiography and Jewish Collective Memory
Over the last ten years most if not all discussion of Jewish
history and Jewish memory has defined itself in terms of
Yoseph Chaim Yerushalmi's book, Zachor. That is not only
because this 'little book' is provocative, personal and
immaculately crafted, but also because it provides the first
and only comprehensive account of Jewish historiography and
Jewish collective memory, or in Yerushalmi's own words, "of
the relation of the Jews to their own past and the place of
the historian within that relationship" (p.6).
Yerushalmi locates his study in a conceptual and empirical
tradition that goes back to Halbwachs' pioneering work in 1925
in Les Cadres Soclaux de 7a Memoire. He warns however that the
general categories usually invoked in the study of collective
memory cannot be directly applied to the Jewish case partly
"because we are dealing here with so literate and bookish a
people" and partly because "Jewish society prior to modern
times was so much moulded by guiding elites". - Although,
having said this, it is notable that many of the categories he
employs are in fact included in our earlier survey of the
vehicles of collective memory.
Yerushalmi's thesis is richly textured and richly supported.
It begins by signalling the centrality attributed in biblical
theology to the injunction "Zachor" - ' Remember', or more
accurately, 'act with memory' and yet it points to the at best
minor role assigned to and played by historiography - the
actual recording of historical events - in addressing or
arousing the collective memory of the Jewish people (p.5).
Yerushalmi argues that in the Biblical period "meaning in
history, memory of the past and the writing of history"
happened to be linked "by being held together in a web of
delicate and reciprocal relationships". However, even in the
Bible, historiography was but one expression of the awareness
that history was meaningful, and neither meaning nor history
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ultimately depended on it. He suggests that the meaning of
history was "explored more directly and more deeply in the
prophets than in the actual historical narratives; the
collective memory [was] transmitted more actively through
ritual than through chronicle". (p.14/15)
Yerushalmi says that in Rabbinic (post-biblical) Judaism
historiography came to a long halt even while belief in the
meaning of history remained (p.26). If the Rabbis were no
longer interested in mundane history, this indicates nothing
more than that they felt no need to cultivate it. They
obviously felt that they had all the history they required"
(p.21). Certainly, their ahistorical if not anti-historical
posture "did not inhibit the transmission of a vital Jewish
past from one generation to the next. Judaism neither lost its
link to history nor its fundamentally historical orientation"
(p.26).
Yerushalmi says that during the Middle ages Jewish memory
moved through ritual and liturgy, and in Rabbinic custom and
law. He identifies four characteristic vehicles of medieval
Jewish memory (p.45 ff): selichot - penitential prayers
inserted into the liturgy; Memorbucher - community memorial
books; second Purims which commemorated deliverance fron
danger; and special fast days which recalled those occasions
when there had been no deliverance. He argues that these modes
of memory, together with the modes of spiritual creativity
open to Medieval Jewry - Halackah (jurisprudence), kabbalah
and philosophy - subsumed all possibilities of history.
Quoting Maimorrides' famous formulation, he concludes that for
Mediaeval Jewry, the study of history was at best a diversion
and at worst 'a waste of time' (p.52).
In his third chapter, Yerushalmi recounts how the sixteenth
century saw a short-lived resurgence of Jewish historical
writing in response to the traumatic expulsion of Sephardi
Jewry from the Iberian peninsular. Yet, how, once again, as in
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the era following the destruction of the Second Temple, the
writing of Jewish history came to a halt. Gnostic myth, and
not history, provided the extra strength that Jewish memory
needed to survive its latest catastrophe. Yerushalmi explains:
"Clearly the bulk of Jewry were unprepared to tolerate history
in immanent terms. It is as though, with the culminating
tragedy of the expulsion from Spain, Jewish history had become
opaque, and could not yield a satisfactory meaning even when,
as amongst most of the historians, it was viewed religiously.
Patently, however, Jews were spiritually and psychologically
prepared for that which Lurianic Kabbalah afforded them - a
mythic interpretation of history that lay beyond history"
(p.74).
It is in the last part of the book, entitled "Modern Dilemmas:
Historiography and its Discontents", that the problematic
relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory is
articulated most sharply. Partly, this is for objective
historical reasons, in that "modern Jewish historiography
began precipitously out of that assimilation from without and
collapse from within which characterized the emergence of Jews
out of the ghetto. It originated, not as scholarly curiosity,
but as ideology, one of a gamut of responses to the crisis of
Jewish emancipation and the struggle to attain it" (p.85).
But, partly this is because, as Yerushalmi 's confesses, his
subject constitutes a painful and personal problem. For, he
recognizes, that as a professional Jewish historian, he lives
"within the ironic awareness that the very mode in which he
delves into the Jewish past represents a decisive break with
that past" (p.81) He acknowledges that he is not the heir
either of rabbis or kabbalists but rather of Leopold von Ranke
and Barthold Niebuhr. Thus, he works within a discipline
which, according to Harold Bloom, of all the modern
disciplines practised by Jewish scholars is necessarily the
most gentile (1989).
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Yerushalmi paints a troubling picture. It is one of rupture,
discontinuity and apparent irreconcilability between Jewish
collective memory and modern historiography. He describes how
modern Jewish historiography, having been secularized, was and
is compelled to repudiate the premises that were basic to all
Jewish conceptions of history in the past - "the belief that
divine providence is not only an ultimate but an active causal
factor in Jewish history, and the related belief in the
uniqueness of Jewish history itself" (p.89). He explains how
Judaism has been historicized by historiography, in that it
can no longer be viewed either as something absolutely given
or, consequently, as normative. It is inseparable from its
evolution through time, from its concrete manifestation at any
point in history" (p.92). Finally, he demonstrates how in a
time which has witnessed a sharp break in the continuity of
Jewish living and with Jewish group memory in ever growing
decay, history has become "what it has never been before - the
faith of fallen Jews. For the first time, history, not a
sacred text, becomes the arbiter of Judaism" (p.86) and this
substitution has yielded chaos. He concludes that "for the
first time, [there is] a Jewish historiography divorced from
collective memory and, in crucial respects, thoroughly at odds
with it" (p.93).
In the last few pages of the book Yerushalmi considers the
role the Jewish historian might play in a Jewish community
which has been traumatized by modernity and where the majority
of Jews have 'fallen', in the sense that the contents of
Jewish tradition or the commonplaces of Jewish memory are no
longer meaningful to them. He argues that those who would
demand of the historian that he be the restorer of Jewish
memory attribute to him powers that he may not possess.
"Intrinsically, modern Jewish historiography cannot replace an
eroded group memory which, as we have seen throughout, never
depended on historians in the first place. The collective





faith, cohesiveness, and will of the group itself,
transmitting and recreating its past through an entire complex
of interlocking social and religious institutions that
functioned organically to achieve this" (p.94).
Yerushalmi believes that "for the wounds inflicted upon Jewish
life by the disintegrative blows of the last two hundred years
the historian seems at best a pathologist, hardly a
physician". "The historian does not simply come in to
replenish the gaps of memory. He constantly challenges even
those memories that have survived intact. Moreover, in common
with historians in all fields of enquiry . . . . no subject is
potentially unworthy of his interest, no document, no artifact
beneath his attention. We understand the rationales for this.
The point is that all these features cut against the grain of
collective memory. Certain memories live on; the rest are
winnowed out, repressed, or simply discarded by a process of
natural selection which the historian, uninvited, disturbs and
reverses. The question remains whether, as a result, some
genuine catharsis or reintegration is foreseeable" (p.95).
Thus, Yerushalmi concludes, while "the burden of building a
bridge to his people remains with the historian, I do not know
for certain that this will be possible... .Those who are
alienated from the past cannot be drawn to it by explanation
alone; they require evocation as well" (p.100).
Beyond Yerushalmi
It has been necessary to quote so extensively from
Yerushalmi's work because it does unquestionably constitute
the prevailing orthodoxy with regards to Jewish historiography
and Jewish memory (see, for example, Weiseltier 1984 and
Mendes-Flohr 1987). Additionally, by quoting so liberally from
it we will hopefully have conveyed how intensely and
personally felt are the issues at its heart. This is an
important point. For, although it might be said that we should
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separate discussion of the historical sections of the book
from its more confessional parts, we want to argue that its
earlier discursive chapters play a rhetorically important role
in setting up the more personal conclusions that follow.
Central to Yerushalmi's argument is the claim that "in
Rabbinic Judaism, historiography came to a long halt, even
while belief in the meaning of history remained" and while a
vital Jewish past was being transmitted from one generation to
the next (p.26). For by successfully affirming this position
he both sharpens the sense in which "the unprecedented
explosion of Jewish historiography in modern times" appears to
depart from earlier Jewish cultural practice, while also
emphasizing the degree to which historiography is unsuited to
the transmission or healing of Jewish memories today.
Without doubt, this is a weighty and well supported argument,
but recognition of its substance should not blind us to the
way in which it is shaped by a number of rhetorical devices.
For example, in setting up a contrast between modern
historiography and pre-modern apprehension of the past,
Yerushalmi has necessarily established a particular definition
of historiography against which he can measure other attempts
at writing history; and this is suspect for a number of
reasons. First, because at no point in these lectures does he
go beyond providing a somewhat nebulous formal definition of
historiography as "the actual recording of historical events".
Second, by taking historical thinking to be identified - in
practice - by the writing of histories in a manner which is
more or less synonymous with modern historiography he has
created a rather meaningless and self-selecting distinction
which enables him to characterize the traditional Jewish world
as involving patterns of thought which if not anti-historical
are then at least ahistorical.
This is disappointing, since historiography is clearly not the
only form that historical consciousness can take. As
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Funkenstein has argued, "even if historiography hardly existed
at all in the sphere of traditional Judaism, and if the
midrash constituted an archetypal pattern for completely
ahistorical interpretations, a well-developed historical
consciousness existed elsewhere - namely, in the halakhic
interpretations". "Here we find clear distinctions of time and
place throughout: distinctions regarding customs according to
period and location, exact knowledge of the place and time of
the messengers and teachers of halakha, the estimated value of
money mentioned in the sources, the significance of
institutions of the past". Thus, "if normative Judaism did not
preserve a continuous record of political events in the form
of chronicles or historical studies - it did preserve a
continuous and chronological record of innovations in the
halakha". (op cit). Of course, this is not a historiographic
tradition in the limited sense of the term, but it is no less
symptomatic of a highly developed historical consciousness.
Ivan Marcus has shown how by making assumptions about what
historical writing should look like one can ignore the
historiographical creativity expressed by "texts that look
like history" (1990). "Heroic stories of founding, conquest,
rescue and self sacrifice do not contain historical details,
because collective memory 'is based on a collective forgetting
of everything but one considered theme; the spotlight requires
a deliberately blacked-out stage" (ibid). It is therefore
inappropriate to characterize the societies which produced
these texts as ahistorical when for strong functional reasons
historiography did not meet the particular requirements these
texts served. Myth making, from this perspective is not less
historical than historiography, rather, it is a different way
of reconstructing the past, for a different set of purposes
and according to a different set of rules.
Lionel Kochan (1977) has made a similar point. He argues that
because medieval Jewish historical writing tended to look to
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the future rather than the past, and in many cases sought to
locate the present in typological frameworks, this does not
mean that Jewish culture was devoid of historical thinking.
Function should not be confused with character. Jewish
historiography was predicated on a notion of history as praxis
rather than spectacle, and this resulted in a highly ambiguous
enterprise. Although this enterprise may have been driven by a
set of objectives which at times look more eschatological than
historical, it was nevertheless informed by a sensitivity to
historical change or to differences between past and present
which would be quite at home in 'normal' historiography.
All of this means that Yerushalmi may have set up what is
either an exaggerated or a false tension between Jewish memory
and Jewish historiography. If Jews did not write
historiography it was not because they were antagonistic to it
or because they were disinterested in history. It was because
they had no immediate need for it. Therefore, if today, there
is a tension between the practice of professional
historiography and the transmission of collective memory, this
cannot be read back on societies for whom historiography was
neither a necessary nor a significant option. Yerushalmi, for
example, attributes importance to the fact that in the Bible
"Israel is told only that it must be a kingdom of priests and
a holy people; nowhere is it suggested that it become a nation
of historians" (p.10). This is surely misleading. As
Yerushalmi himself points out historiography is the most
recent of a number of alternative ways in which human beings
have apprehended the past. Arguments from biblical silence
hardly provide grounds for establishing antipathy towards
historians or historiography, it merely highlights the
recentness of widespread professional historiographic
practice.
A second rhetorical difficulty within Zachor to which
attention should be drawn concerns the way in which Yerushalmi
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depicts the tension between Jewish historiography and Jewish
memory. This comes across so strongly because it is presented
as a painful and personal problem. Yerushalmi goes so far as
to admit that "there are times when I myself question the
value of studying the past, disturbing thoughts that
come.. .occasionally during the day" (p.98). No doubt, as
Robert Chazan has commented, many modern Jewish historians
have seen themselves in the manner depicted by Yerushalmi,
yet, as Chazan continues to argue, that does not mean that
there are no other ways of conceiving of the role of the
Jewish historian in contemporary Jewish society (1986).
Yerushalmi 's eloquently expressed anxieties should not smother
criticism of his thesis, since, to put it crudely, the tension
he depicts may only be as real as his sense of it.
What then do we make of Yerushalmi's claim that the modern
turn to historiography has caused the first real rupture
between Jewish memory and Jewish history ? Is the
contradiction between historical criticism and historical
continuity irreconcilable ?
In the first place, it does seem that Jewish continuity is
indeed in grave doubt. As Leon Wieseltier affirms, "The
historical attitude, to be sure, has returned many resources
to Jewish culture .....No generation of Jews knew more about
the past than our own. But no generation of Jews was less a
part of it" (op cit). There is also plenty of demographic
evidence to suggest that the majority of Jews do seem to have
'fallen', in Yerushalmi's sense that the past is no longer
present for them (eg, Kosmin 1991). The problem is in
determining what has been and what might be the causal
relationship between Jewish historiography and the erosion of
Jewish collective memory.
Yerushalmi 's conclusions are pessimistic, though,
surprisingly, not in the sense that he finds history
particularly injurious to memory, rather in that he portrays
the historian as a somewhat marginal figure. It is significant
that he characterizes the historian as a pathologist rather
than a physician for the wounds inflicted upon Jewish life by
the last two hundred years. The historian, it seems, can not
intervene to help the patient, he can at best diagnose his
condition. Nor, in fact, according to this paradigm, can he
hasten the patient's demise, as was intended by some German-
Jewish historians of the nineteenth century, who in Morris
Steinschneider's fateful words sought, through historiography,
"merely to give Judaism a decent burial". This is, no doubt,
why Yerushalmi takes issue with Rotenstreich's claim that "the
rise of historical consciousness in Jewish thought bought
about a weakening of the bonds of tradition" (op cit).
Yerushalmi says that "this is a causality that seems to be the
reverse of what had initially transpired" (p.144). In other
words, he can not accept that actual historical research and
writing had or could have anything more than a meagre
influence on collective Jewish self-understanding.
Paradoxically, this is not a view shared by many of those who
have written positive -if not adulatory reviews of the book.
For example, in an admittedly extreme case, Stiller writes
that "while Yerushalmi suggests that modern Jewish
historiography can never substitute for Jewish memory 3 his
[Yerushalmi's] work spans both. Zachor is an imaginative
enterprise,.. .its discoveries akin to that of the Benzine
Ring. Yerushalmi is a poet as well as a historian" (1987). The
point, more prosaically made by others, is that in writing an
historical study which doubted whether criticism could meet
the needs of a living culture, Yerushalmi has himself created
a metahistorical myth that can in fact be collectively
meaningful to modern Jews (cf. Bloom op cit, Patai 1983,
Schwarz 1984). According to this point of view, Yerushalmi's
work, despite its sanguine conclusions, may contribute
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significantly to the creation of a new Jewish tradition that
is capable of being collectively shared.
An alternative approach to the issues Yerushalmi raises is to
set out to narrow the gap between memory and history. This can
be done by working in from one of two directions. On the hand
this can be done by pointing to the way in which the 'great'
Jewish historians, like Graetz, Dubnow, Scholem and Baron
"evolved a modern equivalent. . .of the biblical injunction to
remember the covenant. . . in order to prompt Jewish
consciousness" (Davidowicz 1983). In other words, it can be
shown that historiography can serve as a surrogate for
collective memory, if a distinction is drawn between those
historians for whom "the study of Jewish history has become
merely an academic pursuit, no different from the practice of
any other branch of history" and the 'great' Jewish historians
who enjoyed large popular followings because, although they
maintained appropriate professional rigor, they were also
driven by a commitment to Jewish survival which animated their
work (ibid). In short, this is to adopt the 'nationalist'
paradigm of historiography which we discussed above and to
apply it to a Jewish context.
On the other hand, coming from another direction, it is
possible to limit the gap between history and memory by
looking for, what Geoffrey Hartman calls, "middle terms or
significant links between them" (1984), that is, memorial
genres which might be regarded as history. He finds examples
of these in the way we have memorialized the holocaust and
particularly in the production of memoirs and yizker-bikher
(memorial books for Jewish communities destroyed in the
holocaust). He notes Yerushalmi's caution that these works
cannot be regarded as historiography, but argues that they
constitute a popular and restitutive genre which nevertheless
can be characterized as history. In that sense, and contrary
to Yerushalmi's thesis, they demonstrate that even if memory
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and history are not commensurable, they also do not "stand in
radically different relations to the past".
One further way of engaging with Yerushalmi's argument is to
accept its basic thesis that the historian is engaged in what
is essentially a critical and untraditional enterprise. Yet,
rather than regard this as being ultimately corrosive of
Jewish memory, one can see it as a means to the consequent
regeneration of new shared Jewish traditions. In short, this
is to apply a different valuation to the outcomes Yerushalmi
describes, as well as to take a longer view of them. This, in
Chazan's phrase, is to regard the historian as an agent of
'analytic healing'. "The modern Jewish historian is charged
with the task of dredging up discarded realities, to challenge
a group memory that, because of its narrow focus, no longer
serves effectively in the maelstrom of modernity" (op cit).
Through criticism, Chazan is saying, the historian can play a
culturally constructive role in the regeneration of Jewish
memory.
This is a notion with some pedigree. Arguably, it goes back to
Scholem's conception, with which we started, of the historian
as someone "who ensures that our tremendous tradition is
brought up and made a problem of". We had originally portrayed
this as a somewhat iconoclastic notion, but hopefully it will
now be apparent that it is more dialectic than destructive.
Scholem himself describes how he rediscovered a sense of
identification with Judaism and the Jewish people following
his 'discovery' of Graetz's History of the Jews (Scholem
1980). Historiography, for him, therefore, does clear away
existing or decaying memories, and it does involve
confrontation with discordant and disturbing realities, but
this is a necessary step in the direction of any future
health, in that historiography contributes towards the
formation of new and as yet unformed metahistorical myths.
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Interestingly, there is another way of conceiving of the
relationship between history and memory which is only
tangentially considered in Zachor. Yerushalmi refers to
history as "becoming the faith of fallen Jews", in terms of
its content appearing to be more meaningful or truthful than
traditional scripture. In fact, which ever way history's
content is conceived, it is notable that, in formal terms,
history-as-practice has acquired a new position in Jewish
culture. By this we mean that in the realm of Jewish cultural
practice history has been reified and has assumed a new
symbolic status. Nowadays, Jews locate or express their
identification with Jewish collective memory by studying
history, not by locating it within the content of what they
are studying. It seems possible that just as many orthodox
Jews fast on days which commemorate ancient events for the
sake of fasting not remembering, so, today, they study history
for the sake of studying, not in order to find out about the
past. The Jewish history study groups and institutes which
have proliferated in certain parts of the Jewish diaspora
might, therefore, be regarded as constituting secular Batei
Midrash - houses of study - where study is still 'sacrament',
but where the text is not of biblical origin.
Reaching Conclusions
It will be difficult reaching conclusions about the
relationship between Jewish memory and Jewish history. This is
because historiography itself is a culturally ambiguous
practice as much as because Jewish historians and Jewish
historiography have for so long been treated with ambivalence
by Jewish society.
History is too protean to promise a predictable set of
outcomes (Tholsen 1977). This, as Jacob Katz has put it, is
because "people react to the challenge of the past in
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different ways". Katz has argued that the past will inevitably
have consequences for the present, but, he maintains, it is
another matter altogether, if the historian sets out to
produce or predict those outcomes, a priori (1983). To do so
is to slide towards a dangerous manipulation of the past, in
which the people of the past end up being described in ways
which emasculate them of the very features which made them
human beings - foremost among which was their capacity to
choose freely.
These difficulties are complicated further when we consider
that from a post-modernist perspective the assumptions on
which our discussion was founded are highly suspect. From this
perspective there are few grounds for regarding historiography
and collective memory as epistemologicaly distinct.
Historians, it is said, do not uncover truths or criticize
myths; they offer narratives or ironic redescriptions -
'useful' rather than 'truthful' accounts, which, functionally,
are little different from myths (Rorty 1989, Jenkins 1991).
For all of these reasons it -is unlikely that we can reach
conclusions about the relationship between history and memory
which could be translated effectively into an educational
context. Perhaps, though, this is too much to expect from
philosophy. It can in fact be said that philosophy is not so
much about reaching answers as it is about understanding
questions better, and, hopefully, our discussion does make
some of the questions here clearer. If, however, we are
looking for answers (or at least guidelines for action), then
perhaps we should look to another discipline wherein we might
better examine the encounter between history and memory. That
is why we propose turning to psychology.
CHAPTER THREE
A Psychological Approach to Thinking in History.
From Proposal to Critical Survey.
Dickinson and Lee have asserted that "only the willfully
ignorant could afford to ignore recent research into
children's thinking in history" (1984 p.145). As far as they
are concerned, this is for obvious reasons. Teaching which is
not informed by available evidence about children's ideas will
involve building educational structures on shifting
foundations. It will result in practice that will be
inappropriate to the capacities and interests of students and
will fail to address the ideas, assumptions and tacit
understandings pupils are operating with (Lee 1991).
We want to suggest that when it comes to reflecting on the
consequences of Jewish historical study the price of willfully
ignoring research into children's thinking about history will
be doubly severe. First, and more obviously, there are good
grounds for expecting that the results of research into
children's thinking will be of relevance here. After all, it
would be difficult to argue that Jewish history is so
radically unlike all other history, that research into
children's thinking does not shed some light on thinking about
Jewish history 1 . Secondly, though obviously far from the
minds of Dickinson and Lee, it is possible that the processes
of research into children's thinking about history might also
serve research into the study of Jewish history. By this we
mean that the terms, techniques, expectations and assumptions
of research into children's historical thinking may provide an
analytical and reflective framework within which to confront
some of the causes of ambivalence about Jewish history and
Jewish history teaching.
1 Radical as it may be, this view is held by significant sections of the Jewish educational
community, and it will, therefore, be later examined.
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We argued earlier that ambivalence about the critical study of
Jewish history is one of the major influences on the ambiguous
state of Jewish history teaching. We suggested that this
ambivalence revolves around chronic uncertainty about what
effect critical history has on tradition; for example, whether
history undermines collective Jewish memories and myths or
whether it recovers a Jewish past which might otherwise be
forgotten; whether history is the implacable foe of tradition
or whether it is an unreliable friend.
Yet, as will also have been apparent from our earlier
analysis, it is evident that ambivalence about Jewish history
teaching is rarely a consequence of serious reflection about a
balanced set of educational or curricula considerations
relating to the subject. It might conceivably derive from the
ambiguous conclusions reached by abstract philosophical
speculation in the style of the previous chapter. But more
likely, it is inspired by popular conceptions of the ways in
which history undermines faith, or by cliches about historians
ending up as heretics. Certainly, it is not based on empirical
observation of the psychological demands made by or consequent
on the study of Jewish history.
This much is clear from the fact that, on the one hand, a
comprehensive literature search has failed to produce even one
example of research into the ways in which Jewish children
think about Jewish history. On the other hand, there appears
to be widespread ignorance within the Jewish educational
community about the existence let alone conclusions of
research into children's historical thinking in general. Thus,
a 1990 bibliography of "select materials" intending to serve
Jewish history teaching as part of a broad social studies
programme contained 54 entries of which only two may be said
to reflect any attempt to organize teaching around
understanding of the development of childrens' ideas and
thinking in history (Hessel 1989). Recently developed
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curricula, like Winnipeg Board of Education's Jewish history
programme (1984), invariably show their indebtedness to older
virtues like content and chronology rather than to more
psychological considerations. In Britain, Jewish history
teaching is like a world that time forgot. The two textbooks
which are currently in widest use - Kiapperman's (1961) The
Story of the Jewish People and Isaac's (1970) Our People.
History of the Jews - have not been updated for more than
twenty years. Significantly, they are both used
indiscriminately in primary and secondary schools, across a
chronological age span of more than ten years.
A Hypothesis and a Plan for Research.
It is our hypothesis that the research into children's
thinking which Dickinson and Lee talk about, as well as that
carried out by those who have adopted what are variously known
as intentionalist, constructivist or cognitive approaches to
the study of teaching and learning (Armento 1986), may provide
a means towards beginning to deal with ambivalence about the
character and consequences of Jewish history teaching. By this
we do not mean that an advance in knowledge about the findings
of research would directly and positively influence attitudes
towards and practice of Jewish history teaching. Teaching is
not such a rational business. There is no necessary
relationship between knowledge, attitudes and action (Morine-
Dershimer & Valance 1976, Yinger 1977). Besides, the
traditional orientation of Jewish history around subject
matter concerns rather than student attributes is evidently
rooted in principle rather than apathy or naivety. What we
mean to propose is that the whole process of research into
children's historical thinking (and not just its findings)
might make possible a change in the quality of reflection
about the practice of Jewish history teaching by creating a
setting for informed contemplation of the way Jewish students
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engage with history, and by enabling us to explore, in
particular, how students experience the encounter between
tradition and history.
Obviously, it would be inappropriate to advance research
according to an agenda which expected a consequent
amelioration of ambivalence about the teaching of Jewish
history. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that such
ambivalence cannot even be treated without (more solid)
information about what happens to Jewish students when they
are asked to think critically about Jewish history. It is our
contention that it would be legitimate to set out with the
intention of adding to that information. Certainly, we are
entitled to expect that whatever the conclusions of our
research, by exploring the encounter between tradition and
adolescent thinking about it, and between collective memory
and history, we will, at least, contribute (substantially or
otherwise) to an ever extending field of research into the
relationship between the "record of the past" and the "second
record" of historians and their audiences (Hexter 1972).
it is our intention in this chapter, therefore, to arrive at
some idea of what it is possible to know about children's
thinking in history. By critically surveying the current state
of research in the field we intend to mark out the frontiers
of knowledge about children's historical thinking as well as
the means by which such knowledge can be gathered. For,
hopefully, this process will enable us to proceed towards
developing a research strategy appropriate for investigating
Jewish adolescent experience of the encounter between Jewish
history and Jewish collective memory.
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Jewish History: Absolutely Different or lust Different ?
First, there are two questions we should try to answer if we
are not to leave unexplained some of the basic assumptions on
which this quest is based. After all, it might be said that
the kind of thinking required by Jewish history bears no (or
little) resemblance to the thinking required by history in
general and, therefore, that the methods used and findings
produced by research into children's thinking are not relevant
to reflection about Jewish history teaching. This, for
example, is the position of Jewish schools whose
"rejectionist" ethos involves adherence to a traditional
conception of history which is predicated on a radical
distinction and absolute separation between Jewish and secular
1 earni ng.
For those bound (absolutely) by tradition Jewish history
possess'intrinsic features which make the qualities and
demands of Jewish historical study different from those of
"critical" history. It is also what makes the concerns and
conclusions of research into children's thinking about history
irrelevant to practitioners of Jewish history teaching.
In what follows, however, we have made two assumptions. First,
that if it is either held that Jewish history is not
absolutely different from secular history or that all
historical study should not be carried out according to the
tenets of Jewish tradition, then Jewish history will share
some features in common with critical history. For if there is
held to be some generic similarity between the processes of
Jewish and general history, no matter how limited, then the
methods used and findings of research into children's
understanding of historical concepts or into
any other aspect of the process of history will have relevance
to reflection about the ways in which young people think about
Jewish history.
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Given this attitude our second assumption may be unexpected,
but it should explain our decision to invest effort in
research into thinking about Jewish history rather than remain
content to translate wholesale the findings of already
existing research to a Jewish context. For, we suggest that
because of the centrality of "history" in the self definition
of post-Holocaust diaspora Jewry 2 , Jewish, and especially
orthodox Jewish students do not think about Jewish history in
the same way that any student thinks about any history. In
other words, we hold that though Jewish history shows generic
similarities to history in general, it is subject to a
particular set of influences which make it a species in its
own right.
We take our lead here from research which points to the
influence of "affective-entry characteristics" (R.Austin et a7
1987), substantive beliefs (Shemilt 1987) or convictions on
reasoning and judgement in history. We are also influenced by
the findings of generally science-based research which point
to the significant role played by "implicit theories" (eg.
Conners 1978; Munby 1983) or preconceptions (Roth 1985) in
shaping learning and thinking. In light of this work we assert
in the form of an operating assumption, which may itself be
proven empty by our own research, that Jewish thinking about
Jewish history is sufficiently distinctive to merit research
of its own, but that in its overall shape is sufficiently
similar to thinking about history in general to utilize (and,
hopefully, enrich) the processes of research into that field.
The Ori g ins of Research into Children's Thinkin g in History
The work which we have repeatedly referred to as "research
into children's historical thinking" may appear somewhat
2 This asert,on is less bold than it appears. A number of analyses have argued that Diaspora
Jewry, because of its separation from the influences of land and autonomous culture, is
unusually dependent on "artificial" constructs like history (cf. Greenberg 1991).
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subject-specific and parochial. It is, however, predicated on
a view of students which has significant implications. For, in
regarding students as active learners "who can and do think
effectively in history" (Dickinson & Lee op cit), it makes
students accountable for their role in learning. It is for
this reason that it may promise the possibility of examining
in an empirical manner the ways in which the beliefs,
background knowledge and attitudes of Jewish students mediate
thinking about Jewish history; and in turn the ways in which
thinking about Jewish history moulds those beliefs and
attitudes.
Research into children's historical thinking has only properly
taken shape over the last twenty-five years in the wake of the
first detailed surveys of the field by E.A.Peel (1967),
Michael Honeybone (1971) and Donald Thompson (1972). It has
emerged as part of what has been, in the fullest sense of the
analogy, a Copernican shift in the way teachers have thought
about and researched into improving history teaching. This has
involved a dramatic relocation of the centre of the subject's
teaching universe, from seeing better teaching as largely
depending on the development of better teaching techniques to
a sense that it is dependent on knowing better the nature of
the subject and its students (Booth 1986a). It has resulted in
a "move to a concept of history that emphasizes the
methodology of the subject and requires the extensive and
developing use by pupils of sources as evidence from which
they reconstruct a picture of the past" (Thompson 1984). It
has also led to "a concern with analysing the development of
central aspects of the pupils' thinking and understanding in
history based on how they respond to and comprehend actual
historical situations" (ibid).
The shift in thinking about history teaching has been
evidenced in a number of ways. Most immediately, one can point
to a change in the focus of titles of books published for
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history teachers, from a concern with "teaching" the subject -
that is, the ways in which the teacher should operate in the
classroom - to a concern with the "learning" of it - to
matters related to the nature of the subject and its students
(Booth 1986a) 3 . More notably, there is evidence of a
significant relocation of the starting point for thought about
what should be taught in school history. In 1952, Ministry of
Education Pamphlet, Number 23: Teaching History argued that
"the first problem of the history teacher is the making of his
syllabus, and that he is confronted at the outset with a major
problem of selection - what to leave out, even more than what
to put in." Already by 1971 Coitham and Fines in their
influential pamphlet on Educational Objectives for the Study
of History were interested first of all in "what a learner can
do as a result of having learned" (their emphasis) and in
measuring the student's attitude towards the study of history.
Today, in an educational world dominated by National
Curriculum attainment targets, the perception of learning in
history as the accumulation of developing but always
legitimate cognitive and psychological attributes may well
have reached its apotheosis.
When Peel, Honeybone and Thompson marked out the perimeters of
what they called "the psychology of history teaching" the
situation was different. They surveyed a field which was
almost entirely made up of attempts to measure historical
thinking according to what were called "global criteria,
transcending subject matter", and which, more acerbicly, we
could describe as the criteria of a Piagetian framework of
cognition. This field had mainly yielded pessimistic
conclusions about the capacities of young children and
adolescents to think historically (eg. Hallam 1966, 1970, de
Silva 1969) and had, thereby, reinforced G.R. Elton's widely
quoted and highly influential speculations on the doubtful
3 rhus Dickinson and Lees first book was titled Histor y Teachin g and Historical Understanding
while their seguel was titled Learnin g History.
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appropriateness of teaching "serious" history to "immature"
schoolchildren (1967, 1970).
If more recent research has resulted in a quite different
estimation of children's capacities and has induced a more
tolerant response to them it still conforms to the
methodological typology established twenty-five years ago. In
1972 for example, Thompson prescribed the inclusion of three
aspects in the psychology of history teaching . First, "an
examination of specific factors within the subject which may
effect the pupil's attitude towards it". Second, a
"consideration of the kind of thinking and understanding that
the study of history at school level demands and how this is
related to the pupil's intellectual development and capacity"
Thirdly, an investigation of "the most suitable means for
assessing the extent to which the objectives of history
teaching have been achieved" (1972 p.18).
Each of these of these realms has pretty much maintained its
shape over the intervening period while at the same time
stimulating a diversity of research. The second aspect,
regarding how children think with reference to historical
material, has, however, attracted a disproportionate degree of
interest and it is the area that is of most relevance to us
here.
Typically, work in this field has involved taking two steps:
First, a decision about what is meant by historical thinking
(whether that is derived from philosophical or psychological
premises). Secondly, once the particular nature of the
discipline has been determined, a decision about the kind of
tests that could be devised so as to stimulate a wide range of
responses which might indicate different levels or types of
historical understanding (Thompson ibid).
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Invariably, there have been three directions in which the
first step has moved. First, towards locating historical
thinking within a Piagetian framework of cognition. Secondly,
towards identifying historical thinking with cognitive
structures that are specific to the discipline. Thirdly,
towards placing historical thinking within non-Piagetian
(global) theories.
Because so much of the inspiration behind the beginnings of
research into children's historical thinking came from
Piaget's work in developmental psychology it is not suprising
that the earliest attempts at research in this field
characterized historical thinking according to categories
taken from Piagetian theory and identified stages in
historical thinking which corresponded to Piaget's
characterization of the growth of logical operations. Research
projects sought to develop models of ratiocination, dealing
with the logic wherewith students operate upon history,
exploring, for example, the "growth of logical thought in
history" or "the relationship between developing reasoning in
mathematics and history" (see, Hallam 1975, Lodwick 1972, Peel
1967). They produced findings which portrayed historical
understanding as a formal operation developed in late
adolescence and as comprehensible according to psychological
conceptions taken from thinking in the physical sciences.
Over the last fifteen years, however, scholars have come
increasingly to question whether the Piagetian system provides
an appropriate cognitive model for describing (all of)
historical learning (Downey and Levstik 1988). Either because,
like Booth (1983), they start with an altogether different a
priori conception of the nature of historical knowledge, or
because like Kennedy (1983) their "Piagetian" research has
produced discrepant findings which have led them to question
the correspondence between the development of historical
thinking and Piagetian stage theory, or because, like Shemilt
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(1980), despite feeling "optimistic about the application of
Piagetian epistemology to children's learning in history",
they feel that "as presently constituted, the system (is)
divorced from the stuff and substance of children's ideas
about history".
As we have said above, there have been and are, logically, two
broad alternatives to conceiving of historical thinking within
a Piagetian framework. They are, either, to identify
historical thinking with cognitive structures that are
specific to the discipline, or, to locate it within the
framework of non-Piagetian (global) theories. Though it is
dangerous to generalize about research, it seems to us that
even when the existence of exceptions is admitted, there are
grounds for crudely arguing that research based in Britain has
tended, under the influence of Paul Hirst's work, to adopt the
former subject-specific position, while research in the United
States has tended to adopt the latter and more global
approach.
The Research Consequences of Epistemological Positions.
Of central importance to our own concerns is what has been the
experimental corollary of staking out epistemological
positions of this nature regarding the nature of historical
thinking. For if we intend to set out the limits of what can
be known about children's historical thinking, then the
relationship between epistemological positions, experimental
decisions and research findings will be one of the central
axes around which our work will revolve.
A survey of major exemplars of British "post-Piagetian"
research shows that epistemological decisions provide not only
the starting point for research, but that they supply the
content for experimental categories and criteria, as well as
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setting limits on what researchers determine to find out 4 . In
other words 1 such a survey demonstrates that the limits of
what can be known about children's historical thinking are as
much determined by philosophical questions as they are by
experimental or methodological ones.
This can be demonstrated through reference to two very
different examples of research.
Over the last five years Peter Knight has been involved in a
research project based at St. Martin's College, Lancaster. The
starting point for research has been an explicit
epistemological decision that "History's central feature is
the attempt to understand people in the past in (what is
called) a differentiated manner" (198 gb). Knight explains that
"the view of history underlying the research is that it is the
study of people in different cultures". "History", he says,
"resembles all other attempts to understand people (ancient
and modern) who are only known at second hand" (1989a).
These quite definite and it must be said rather unhistorical
sounding premises have been translated into a tightly
sequenced experimental methodology which has developed
"historical equivalents of items used by other researchers
into interpersonal understanding" (ibid). It has led to the
development of an experimental methodology which tests
children's capacities in five clearly identified
"subcomponents within the understanding of others" (ibid).
These include their capacity to recognize that their
perspective is not another's, their capacity to describe
another's perspective, to explain a character's action, to
predict endings and to handle equivocal information.
4 rhe	 exemolars we refer to are those research projects that (a) include the fruits of
work which go beyond the requirements of producing a single masters or doctoral thesis and
which (b) have been reported in more than one monograph or journal article. If these Sound
like trivial requirements, they do nevertheless identify any work of substance carried out in
a field which even very recently was described as 'still being in its infancy" (Lee 1991).
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Knight reports that his work has produced the following
findings: First, that "elements of understanding people in the
past.. .are first observable at different ages, are more or
less pronounced according to children's ability and are
consolidated at different paces" (1987). Secondly, and more
generally, that "a differentiated view of children's
understanding of others [is] sustained by empirical studies"
(ibid).
Alric Dickinson, Peter Lee and Rosalyn Ashby have conducted
research into children's historical thinking for more than
twenty years (and in various personnel combinations). Their
earliest research confined its attention to a limited part of
children's historical thinking which was selected for largely
strategic purposes from a multifaceted and essentially
holistic conception of the discipline's character. Research
sought to explore "that part of historical explanation which
involves understanding why some agent acted as he did"
(Dickinson & Lee 1978). It was not intended to examine
historical thinking in general since, citing Dray, it was
acknowledged that explanations in history are a "logically
miscellaneous lot" (Lee 1978).
Research was based on pencil and paper tests which produced
"evidence of how children worked out their solutions to
certain kinds of historical problems". This evidence was
analysed according to categories of children's understanding
of individual action which in turn produced statistical data
regarding, for example, how successfully children could
"qualify an historical agents actions or differentiate between
his view of the situation and that of a historian" (Dickinson
& Lee ibid).
In their later research, however, Dickinson, Ashby and Lee
have adopted a quite different "experimental" approach, based
on video recording small group discussion about an historical
problem. Significantly, it does not seem to be predicated on a
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prior decision about the precise nature of historical
thi nki ng.
Dickinson and Lee offer a number of reasons why their more
recent methodology has been preferred. Few of these are
strictly theoretical. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue
from their accompanying silence about how they conceive of the
nature of historical thinking that there is a fundamental
reason for this shift in experimental methodology. In short,
it seems that their espousal of a more ethnographic approach
reflects their skepticism about and reluctance to establish
firm epistemological experimental criteria for measuring
historical thinking.5
Most of the reasons they in fact give for the adoption of an
alternative methodology are phrased in terms of the deficiency
of their previous approach, for example, that while written
tests can provide data on children's conclusions, they provide
few clues as to how children got there (Ashby & Lee 1987a).
More positively, they explain that video-generated data offers
a chance to begin to see some of the ways in which children
cope with the (apparently) strange behaviour of their
ancestors, and to see in detail their initial reactions, the
strategies they employ to make sense of a past way of life,
the way they use evidence and their own experience, etc
(Dickinson & Lee 1984).
In many ways, this is precisely the kind of "data" their
research has produced. It may not be susceptible to
statistical analysis, but it does nevertheless reveal how
children "actually behave when confronted with the
'strangeness' of the past" (ibid). In recent incarnations,
following the collection of "hundreds of hours of tape", data
5Their motivation is perhaps made most explicit in Lees critiaue of Shemilts discussion of
levels in childrens construction of historical narrative. There, he notes that a problem
with this kind of approach 'is the tendency for particular philosophical accounts to begin to
play a normative role in the assessment of children's understanding, when those accounts are
still contested (Lee 1983). (Our emphasis)
74
has been interpreted according to specific sets of categories
like, for example, "the development of children's conception
of evidence" (ibid 1987b). Yet, the most notable feature of
even this most recent research has been its "tentative and
preliminary" nature (ibid 1987a), its "provisional" character
and its presentation as the basis for future discussion rather
than for decisive conclusions (Ashby & Lee 1987b).
These expressions of tentativeness or vagueness are
significant. For in a sense Dickinson and Lee's research is a
photographic negative of Knight's. Where Knight started from a
position of epistemological certainty, has developed a highly
focussed experimental methodology and has produced hard and
reliable data, his research has not told us very much about
children's thinking in history. While on the other hand, the
less explicit Dickinson and Lee have been about the precise
nature of historical thinking and about the relationship
between the many components they see as making up historical
thinking, the less focussed their methodology has become but,
at the same time, the more meaningful 6 has been the data it
has produced.
Part of this phenomenon will have been predictable. The
inverse relationship between the reliability and
meaningfulness of experimental data is not an unknown one
(see, for example, Shemilt 1983). Similarly familiar is the
way in which uncertainty about the precise content of
epistemological criteria necessitates a withdrawal from
setting out firm categories of experimental measurement and an
inclination towards a less evaluative and more ethnographic
approach (eg. Gage 1984). However, what is not always so
explicit in cognitive research, and what both these examples
demonstrate graphically, is the way in which research findings
about children's thinking in history are limited as much by a
6We follow Shemilt (1983) in adjudging the meaningfulness of research according to its
capacity to illuminate beyond the findings of an original experiment.
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priori decisions about the character of historical thinking as
they are by the reliability or validity of research
methodologi es.
A Map of Research into Children's Thinking about History.
What, then, does this mean in substantive terms ? Or, to put
the question differently, what has the adoption of a
philosophical position which identifies history as a discrete
form of knowledge, together with any contingent experimental
decisions, allowed us to know about children's historical
thinking and what might they allow us to know ?
We intend to argue that "post-Piagetian", "subject-specific"
research into children's thinking about history can be
effectively classified according two sets of criteria. First,
according to whether it is interested in ideation or
ratiocination, that is, according to whether it is interested
in the premises pupils bring to history or whether it is
interested in the logic wherewith they operate upon it.
Secondly, according to whether it is concerned with what might
be called history as craft or with history as comprehension;
in other words, whether it is concerned with questions
relating to the foundations of historical knowledge and of the
historian's method or with questions raised by an
incomprehensible past.
1. Ideation about history-as-craft
As we said above, a major stimulus towards research into
children's historical thinking was provided by the move
towards a conception of history as a distinct form of
knowledge and by subsequent interest in introducing students
to and even inculcating them in its particular forms. The
pages of Teachin g History, the journal of the Historical
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Association, bear witness to the explosion of interest
(especially during the early 1980's) in precisely
characterizing the activity of the historian and in deciding
how best to introduce students to his craft.
It is not surprising (given that interest in bringing
historical evidence into the classroom was central to the new
teaching orientation) that the findings of research which are
by now most broadly established are those which explore what
Shemilt variously calls children's "ideas about how historical
knowledge is based and founded" (1980) or "ideas about the
nature and uses of historical evidence" (1987). For, even if
the achievements of research are relative ones, it cannot be
denied that there has been a significant convergence among a
number of differently framed projects in creating a picture of
the development of children's ideas about evidence and about
what historians do.
This convergence -is notable because the research methods which
underpin it have all utilized different methodologies. They
have included (a) Dickinson, Gard and Lee's a priori
categorization of "logical phases in the handling (or
conceptualization) of historical materials" (1978), (b) Denis
Shemilt's use of phenomological interviews with samples of
pupils following Schools Council Project "History 13-16" or
traditional examination courses, so as to enquire into "the
constructs adolescents use to render the conceptual apparatus
of the historian personally accessible and intelligible"
(1987), and (c) Ashby and Lee's analysis of video-recordings,
generated in an ethnographic manner, of small groups of
students set historical problems for discussion (1987b).
Separately these projects could not claim to have generated
findings which are other than tentative. For example,
Shemilt's work as well as Ashby and Lee's has required
interposing a controversial if necessary strata of
hermeneutics between interview or video transcripts and the
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classification of pupils ideas. Yet it is significant that
after having adopted independent approaches to research these
projects nevertheless have arrived at conclusions about t!i
kinds of premises which students bring to their conception of
historical method and of the basis of historical knowledge all
of which bear a striking resemblance to one another.
The exact details of the picture they develop are perhaps not
so important. It will suffice to report that they depict the
growth of the child's conception of the nature of historical
knowledge from something that is given and known by the
historian as "memory man" (Shemilt ibid), in which the past is
treated as if it is present (Ashby & Lee ibid); through a
conception of historical knowledge as something that has to be
worked out by rational process, by the historian working in
the manner of an "historical detective" (Shemilt ibid); to
something which is derived from complex interpretations of
evidence within the framework of history as a public form of
knowledge (Dickinson, Gard and Lee ibid).
That there is little correspondence between the transects cut
through the ideational topography which each of these projects
map is probably not of great significance. As Shemilt points
out, while transects may refer to genuine developmental stages
in the natural history of adolescent ideas they have,
nevertheless, been arbitrarily fixed. They are certainly not
intended to correspond to invariant stages in the growth of
operational intelligence (Shemilt ibid).
2. Ratiocination about history-as-craft
This kind of composite (and, possibly, reliable) picture
cannot be built up from the findings of research into the sort
of logic with which students operate on historical evidence.
This is because research has divided in depicting this logic
either as analytical (we might say, deductive) or as
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"adductive" (Booth 1983), that is, involving the construction
of imaginary webs around related events.
(a) The influence of Piaget on the first position is self-
evident, even if the research itself has moved on from
depicting thinking about historical evidence in terms taken
directly from those which refer to the manipulation of
physical objects, or where the evidence required for the
solution of a problem is "all in".
The leading exponent of this position is Donald Thompson,
although his research has neither been reported in many places
nor been very fully described. His starting point is a
recogni ti on that "the fi rst and vital stage in research into
how children think in history should be a careful examination
of what is meant by historical thinking" (Thompson 1972). Yet,
he argues that "it is possible to accept that there are major
differences between the subject matter and procedures of
science and those of history . . .without rejecting the value of
the respective frameworks that Piaget and Peel suggest" for
analysing and categorizing students thinking (ibid 1984).
This dualism has led Thompson to depict the logical processes
by which children treat historical evidence in a way that is
heavily influenced by Peel's (1971) distinction between
"content-dominated" (describer) and "possibility invoking"
(explainer) thinking. He has never set out a model of what
different levels of thinking would look like according to
these categories, but has proposed an analytical framework
with which to distinguish between different levels of thinking
about evidence.
The bare bones of this framework consist of a distinction
between thinking which is restricted by concentrating on
immediate information and evidence and thinking which,
appreciating the limitations of historical information, goes
through and beyond immediate evidence in a disciplined manner
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(ibid). The problem is that while this analytical framework
possesses a certain theoretical appeal, in substantive terms
it does not (currently) seem capable of telling us more about
children's thinking than is already suggested by the
framework's own abstract epistemological categories.
(b) Ironically, many of the findings produced by Martin
Booth's research seem to be limited for similar reasons,
despite the fact that Booth has consciously set out to develop
a research methodology which reflects the unique nature of
historical thinking. As he says, "Historical knowledge and the
thinking it demands have certain features... To assess these
by means of an a priori framework evolved in the first
instance from children's language and thinking when dealing
with problems in the natural sciences. . .would seem to be
misguided." (Booth 1980 p.247).
The a priori framework he uses is taken first of all from
Collingwood's depiction of historical thinking as the
construction of an imaginary web around a set of fixed
historical points (Booth 1978a). His specific terms of
reference are derived from two, more contemporary, sources.
First, from D.G. Watts's description of historical thinking as
"a form of speculation, directed imagination or vicarious
living", something Booth characterizes as inductive thinking
(Booth 1978b). Secondly, (and more latterly) from D.H.
Fischer's notion of "adductive thinking" which, Booth says,
"emphasizes the drawing together of related events to a common
centre" (1983).
He has applied this framework to a rich body of research
accumulated over many years so as to explore, among other
things, "the development.. .of concepts and skills and the
change in attitudes of children (and) the processes by which
children conceptualize in history" (Booth 1978b). He has
measured changes in pupil's ability to handle primary
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documentary evidence, deduce from written cues key concepts
covered by (their history) course" as well as changes "in
attitude to history as a subject and to national or racial
groups and situations with which the syllabus dealt" (1983).
At the heart of Booth's research, and in many ways the most
innovative feature of it, has been his empirical investigation
of children's capacity to engage in inductive historical
thought (Booth 1980), or, to use the classificatory terms with
which we have been operating, his investigation of the
inductive logic with which children work on historical
evidence. He has used the results of this research to
exemplify the development of inductive thinking, by
distinguishing between thinking which makes use of "abstract
inductive concepts", which is not based on immediately
observable features of the evidence and thinking which makes
use of "concrete inductive concepts", which is less
adventurous, creative and imaginative (Booth 1978b).
However, while Booth has reported widely on the sophisticated
components in and the results of his long running research,
there is a sense in which he has not gone any further than
Thompson in charting the characteristic operations of
children's thinking. For though he may have provided evidence
of the kind of "creative, imaginative and constructionist
thinking children are capable of" as well as of the kind of
intervention which can improve the quality of this thinking
(Booth 1983), he does not provide very solid criteria for
evaluating (or measuring) inductive conceptualization. Though
he has developed a tantalysingly attractive research
methodology he has, like Thompson, posited only the basic
outlines of a framework for analysing the development of
children's historical thinking, which unless it is reenforced
by further philosophical reflection will be incapable of
revealing more about children's thinking than is already
hinted at by the categorical dyad at its heart.
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3. Ideation about history-as-comprehension
To a large extent, "thinking about evidence", or to put it
differently, questions relating to the status of historical
knowledge, provide no more than a backcloth to the real
business of history as a humanity, that is, to its quest to
make sense of the achievements, failures, strivings and
sufferings of human beings in the past. Yet, while the quest
to interpret or explain the past may be history's most
compelling feature, the precise form and content of this
feature is too much contested, and contemplated from too many
perspectives for it to be possible to make many firm
statements about its precise nature. Philosophical debate here
has spanned questions about the nature of causation as well as
about the essence of human nature, questions about
hermeneutics and about interpretation. It has involved
discussing the meaning of empathy, imagination, objectivity
and colligation. It is certainly not suprising that when
attempts have been made to map "the specific ways in which
human experience has been structured, organized and made
meaningful" (Hirst 1965) plenty of room has been left for
debate as to where history's basic structure is to be located,
or what precisely it consists of (see Bruner 1977, Hirst op
cit, Phenix 1964).
Given this epistemological chaos, the progress made by
research into children's thinking about history-as-
comprehension has been striking, particularly when this
research has been premised on the assumption that history does
possess unique cognitive structures of its own (as in the
examples we are attending to here). It is indisputable, for
example, that "subject-specific" research has made headway in
(and perhaps because it has concentrated on) exploring the
ways in which children explain either people's behaviour in
the past and/or what happened to them. To put this more
formally, there is substantial evidence that research has
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profitably concentrated on investigating thinking about
motivation and about causation, when this has been in terms of
the premises children bring to such thinking.
(a) Significantly, there has been a good deal of agreement
about the development of children's ideas about the behaviour
of people in the past. Sometimes this has been obscured behind
discussion about whether the object of research is empathetic
explanation (Shemilt 1984), empathetic reconstruction or what
knight calls "a differentiated understanding of people in the
past" (198gb). Sometimes, and more importantly, it has been
obstructed by disagreement over whether empathy is a power
(Coitham & Fines 1971), an achievement (Ashby & Lee 1987a), a
process or a disposition (Sutherland 1986)
In fact, the work which has generated evidence about
children's ideas about (what is involved in understanding)
other people's behaviour •in the past has been diverse. It has
included (a) Dickinson and Lee's pencil and paper "Jutland
test" 7 which sought to investigate the way children understood
why some agent acted as he did, and how students coped with a
series of actions which they at first found hard to make sense
of (1978), (b) Denis Shemilt's use of phenomenologically
oriented interviews, as part of the evaluation of Schools
Council Project History 13-16, to advance a model of
adolescent construction of people in the past (1984), (C)
Dickinson and Lee's (more recent) attempt "to discover more
about the ways in which children actually behave when
confronted with the strangeness of the past" by making video-
recordings of small groups of children attempting to
understand Anglo-Saxon oath-helping and Spartan education
(1984), (d) Ashby and Lee's use of a similar "ethnographic"
technique to "explore children's ideas about what is involved
in understanding other people's behaviour in the past, as
7 rhe researchers identified Jellicoes turn away during the battle of Jutland as being
particularly suitable for probing chi'ens understanding of individual action.
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manifested in their attempts to make sense of alien
institutions and actions" (1987a), and (e) the work of Booth
et al with the Southern Regional Examination Board to develop
a model of "differentiated historical empathy" (1986b).
Notably, despite the reasonably diverse character of research
there has been a significant convergence in the findings
generated and the conclusions reached by it. Taken together,
these produce a picture of children's thinking about people in
the past which begins in a state of confusion and contempt
(Dickinson & Lee 1984), in which past actions are
unintelligible (Dickinson & Lee 1978, Ashby & Lee 1987a) and
in which the people of the past are seen as being mentally
defective (Ashby & Lee ibid) and/or morally inferior (Shemilt
1984). Thinking, it seems, turns into an attempt to understand
the people of the past by reciprocating positions with them
(Shemilt ibid), by understanding action in modern terms, with
no distinction made between how we see it and how
contemporaries would have seen it (Ashby & Lee ibid). In its
most sophisticated incarnation it comprises an attempt both to
explain action by reference to the distinction between the
agent's view of the situation and the historian's, as well as
to set action in a wider context of beliefs and values (Lee
1978, Ashby & Lee 1987a).
As we said earlier, it is doubtful whether, individually, any
of these findings could claim to be anything other than
tentative. Ashby and Lee, for example, report that they have
not yet been able to develop tests that pick out important
indicators with any degree of sophistication (1987a). Booth's
S.R.E.B. work has also been criticized for making use of
inappropriate indicators (Lee 1991). Ultimately, however,
because the findings produced by pencil and paper tests,
phenomological questions and ethnographic recordings tend in
the same direction their outcome attracts some confidence, but
this should not camouflage the fact that many particulars of
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experimental methodology are subject to private as well as
public criticism.
(b) The attempt to make sense of human behaviour is a part of
the historian's wider endeavour to understand why things
happened in the past as they did. Motivated action is one
(albeit significant) part of the picture the historian will
draw of the interrelationship between events in the past.
However, because the concept of cause is so much contested in
philosophy, research in to children's thinking about causation
has been limited and its conclusions disputed.
What evidence we have comes almost entirely from the work of
the School's Council Project History 13-16 and especially from
Denis Shemilt's evaluation of it. This work produces a picture
of children's understanding which develops from a position in
which historical narrative is seen as lacking inner logic
(Sansom 1987) and where change is seen as coming about through
a discontinuous eruption of events. It passes through a level
at which events are presumed to conform to an austere logic in
which everything is thought to be connected (Shemilt 1983,
1984), and develops finally into a set of assumptions which
include the idea that different rates of change may occur at
the same time in different aspects of human affairs (Lee
1991).
It must be said though, that when an account of the
development of an aspect of children's historical thinking is
based on a single original experimental source (as in this
case) there are good grounds for taking note of Peter Lee's
warning about the tendency for particular philosophical
accounts to begin to play a normative role in the assessment
of children's understanding, when those accounts are still
contested (Lee 1991). Lee's caution is stimulated precisely by
those problems he finds with Shemilt's analysis of thinking
about causation, when the concept of cause is itself so much a
contested one philosophically. As he notes, what may be
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philosophical nonsense in a Humean account of causation may be
perfectly sensible in another philosophical context.
4. Ratiocination about history-as-comprehension
The sort of logic with which students operate on questions
regarding either why people in the past acted as they did or
why events happened as they did is something of an unknown
quantity. The epistemological chaos we described above has
largely preempted research into questions of this sort,
because, as we have said, it would be hazardous to posit
developmental levels for a form of thinking already subject to
intense philosophical debate.
At most, it can be argued that Peter Knight investigates the
development of the logic with which children operate on some
aspect of history-as-comprehension with his attempt to explore
the sub-competencies necessary for the understanding of others
(Knight 1987, 1989a, 198 gb). However, Knight's research does
not conform to the normal architectonic of research into
ratiocination since it looks at the acquisition of different
sub-competencies rather than at the development of one
particular competency.
On the one hand, the findings and conclusions of his research
are seductive. His depiction of the way in which children
develop the capacity, for example, to recognize that their
perspective is not another's or to explain another character's
action is vitiated by being rooted in general psychological
literature on the understanding of others. On the other hand,
the meaningfulness of research as an investigation into
historical thinking is limited because it is premised on a
conception of historical understanding which is
indistinguishable from general psychological conceptions of
how people understand others. As a result, research is impeded
86
at a number of points by the attempt to separate the process
of history from its content.
Summary and Conclusion.
We have extensively surveyed research into children's thinking
in history which starts from a premise of history's
distinctiveness as a form of knowledge. We have found that
this research offers a mixed legacy. In substantive terms it
has produced what are probably reliable accounts of the ways
in which children think about historical evidence as well as
of the way they think about the behaviour of people in the
past. It has, however, only offered tentative suggestions
about other aspects of historical thinking.
In methodological terms we have seen that while there may be
difficulties with individual research methodologies, for
example with the arbitrariness of phenomenological questioning
or the indecisiveness of ethnographic recordings, these
approaches when taken together with highly focused
"psychological" tests may offer access to a rich vein of
evidence about children's thinking.
The question now is how far this research and its findings can
help in the examination of the relationship between Jewish
history and Jewish memory. This will be our first concern in
the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR
Towards an alternative psychological research methodology
We begun the last chapter by quoting Dickinson and Lee's
(1984) assertion that "only the willfully ignorant could
afford to ignore recent research into children's thinking in
history". The last part of that chapter surveyed the notable
collection of findings generated by this research.
Unfortunately, however, while this research seems to promise
the possibility of producing rich insights into many of the
questions which are of concern to us, its methodology is
probably constructed in such a way as to make it irrelevant to
our particular research purposes.
On the one hand, by successfully managing to focus on distinct
questions regarding, for example, ideation about history-as-
craft or history-as-comprehension, this research does appear
to hold out the possibility of investigating individual points
of encounter between memorial and critical-historical views of
the past. These points could include questions regarding the
status of historical evidence, the intelligibility of the past
and the nature of historical causation - precisely the
questions which delimit the boundary between memorial and
critical history.
On the other hand though, there do appear to be a number of
weighty reasons why neither the tools nor findings produced in
answer to these questions will be valid for our purposes. In
the first place, this is because research is grounded in
epistemological terms which are predicated on a certain view
of the nature of history which prevents a valid comparison of
traditional and critical interpretations of history.
For example, it is evident that the categories which are both
inductively and deductively constituted by research as
symptomatic of immature or undeveloped historical thinking are
themselves valued features within memorial conceptions of
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history. Thus, categorical forms of historical thinking such
as "a conception of the unintelligibility of past actions" or
"a conception of knowledge of the past as being given", which
in the critical epistemology reflect undeveloped or immature
thinking are very much desired attributes in a non-
historiographical orientation towards the past.
In general terms, one might say that the problem here is that
the account of historical knowledge which underpins post-
Piagetian, subject specific research into children's
historical thinking lays claim to a normative status which it
does not merit. In fact, its origins in an uncertain mixture
of Piagetian psychology and Hirstian philosophy make it
singularly inappropriate for reflection on the form or content
of non-historiographic thinking about the past (Herbst 1985).
To complicate matters further, it should not be forgotten that
this epistemological difficulty is only one side of an
experimental step which can be queried for different reasons.
As we have said, there are strong grounds for querying the way
in which research makes use of particular philosophical
theories in the attempt to translate children's behaviour or
verbalizations into stable cognitive terms, as data about how
children think. Yet, it is also proper to question the
reliability and validity of that process of translation in and
of itself because of the way it mediates between what children
are seen doing or heard saying and what they apparently think.
As we said in the last chapter, there are numerous obstacles
that lurk between a child's explanation of why something
happened in history and somebody else's analysis of that
child's conception of causation in history; and these largely
hermeneutical obstacles make it difficult to accept that the
conclusions reached by research into children's thinking are
either reliable or valid. Therefore, while it might be argued
that most children cannot provide a sensible account of the
concepts that make up their historical thinking, we would say
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that it is still not legitimate to claim to investigate the
premises and logic which shape childrens' historical thinking
by subjecting their talk about history to the mediation of
dubious interpretative conjecture.
Less damning, but still relevant to the particular concerns of
our own work, it can be argued that even if this research had
been grounded in valid normative and interpretative terms it
would promise us little help, since by focussing on particular
or limited aspects of history as craft or comprehension it is
too mechanistic or artificial to allow meaningful insights
into traditional thinking about the Jewish past (see Egan 1983
who criticizes Schools Council research for similar reasons).
This notion of meaningfulness is of great importance, for it
provides a reminder that while research methodologies can
produce findings which show something happening, or show the
student doing (or even thinking) different things at different
times, these findings do not necessarily mean anything in real
terms (Neisser 1976). In this case it can be argued that the
distinction made, for example, between changes in the child's
conception of the nature of historical evidence and changes in
their conception of causation in the past, is irrelevant to
any characterization of traditional thinking in Jewish
history, where (strictly speaking) the historian does not
exist separately from the events of the past or his sources.
In memorial history, it is meaningless to separate the content
of history from its procedures, for the procedures of
traditional Jewish history are consequent of its special
content.
In Search of an Alternative Research Tradition
Given these criticisms, we have been encouraged to look to a
different research tradition from within which to examine
Jewish children's conception of the Jewish past. For while we
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recognize the significant contribution made by recent research
into children's historical thinking, both to our knowledge of
how children relate to and think about the past as well as to
the subsequent realignment of curricula priorities in history
teaching, we have decided to pursue an alternative research
methodology in the hope of finding, first, a "neutral" tool
which will allow us to compare critical with non-critical
thinking about history without having to make judgements
regarding the superiority of one over the other. In a sense,
this is to be led by the same concerns which encouraged
Dickinson and Lee to adopt what we earlier called a more
ethnographic strategy for examining children's thinking - that
is, a strategy which does not depend on taking prior decisions
about the precise nature of historical thinking.
At the same time, we have decided not to adopt Dickinson and
Lee's video-centred strategy itself, since it appears to go
too far in not establishing firm epistemological categories
with which to talk about historical thinking. It seems to have
thereby created a different kind of problem by not providing
any kind of criteria with which to draw conclusions about
children's thinking from the way they behave or verbalize
things. While the ethnographic narratives it generates are
rich in implication and substance they are both too fluid and
too much removed from data which would provide the basis for a
focused comparison of different forms of historical thinking.
Our aim, then, is to find a research tool that is, on the one
hand, epistemologically neutral but which, on the other hand,
is capable of revealing even subtle differences in the ways
that children think. It should accommodate cross-cultural
comparisons, without being entirely empty of analytical
criteria itself. It should take account of the difficulties
children have talking about their thinking, but should still
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provide evidence about how children think, without depending
too heavily on the mediation of hermeneutics.
It is this taxing set of requirements which has drawn us
towards a tradition of research into children's thinking which
is more closely connected with the field of cognitive
psychology than to one which is the joint product of Piagetian
psychology and Hirstian philosophy. Of course it could be said
that in so doing we have traded one set of debatable
assumptions for the equally dubious assumptions of another
particular form of psychology. However, even if this is close
to the truth, we can say with confidence that cognitive
psychology does promise at least one great advantage, in that
though it does not treat thinking about history as a cognitive
category in its own right, it does, nevertheless, avoid
setting up valuative distinctions between critical and non-
critical thinking in history.
The Basic Assumptions of Cognitive Psychology
It is axiomatic in a cognitive view of learning that the
organism's covert manipulations occupy a central role in
determining its responses to incoming stimuli (Holley &
Dansereau 1984). Learning, from this point of view, is more
productively studied as an internal, cognitively mediated
process than as a direct product of the environment, people or
factors external to the learner (Wittrock 1978). Indeed,
theorists and researchers have posited the existence of a
number of such cognitively mediating processes, including
motivation (Bar Tal 1978, Wang 1983), attention (Duell 1974,
Willows 1974), memory (Newell & Simon 1972, Lindsay & Norman
1977) and cognitive structure (Ausubel, Novak & Hanesian 1978)
to cite a few.
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As Anderson (1990) argues, while theories of cognitive
psychology involve the inference of structures that cannot be
directly observed, theories of internal structure make
understanding human beings significantly easier, much in the
same way as a theory of atomic structure serves as a useful
heuristic for research in physics. This assertion is
particularly apposite to those theories which have been
developed under the influence of information processing
theory. These theories, which involve tracing a sequence of
mental operations and their products in the performance of a
particular cognitive task (ibid), have resulted in the
creation of powerful models describing how information is
stored in memory, how transformations of this stored
information may occur and how stored information is retrieved
for use in further learning and problem solving (Stewart
1985).
Common to most of these models are three structures - a
sensory register, a short-term memory and a long-term memory -
as well as a set of processes involved in the transfer of
information from one structure to another. Where models
significantly differ is over how exactly information is stored
in long term memory, or to put it differently, over what they
conceive to be the basic units of memory. Quillian (1966), for
example, suggested that human memory may be organized as a
semantic network composed of ideas or concepts (nodes) and the
named relationships (links) between those concepts. Closely
connected with this network model are those models based on
propositional structure (eg, Anderson & Bower 1973). In
general, these represent the relationship between information
units as elemental grammatical propositions, that is two or
more linked concept labels, although in Anderson and Bower's
model, propositional representation is regarded as being non-
linguistic and as being constructed on the basis of visual
information as well as verbal inputs. Emerging from a related
tradition is the work of schema theorists like Rumelhart and
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Ortony (1977) and Schallert (1982) who have posited the
existence of schemata - abstract structures that represent
what one generally holds to be true about the world (ibid).
These structures encode properties which are typical of
instances of general categories and omit properties which are
not typical of categories (Anderson op cit).
In contrast to network models such as these, which are mainly
concerned with representing the storage of information, a
number of 'set theoretic' models of semantic representation
have also been developed in order to explain how we comprehend
quantified statements like 'all S are P' or 'some S are P'
(see, for example, Meyer 1970 or Smith et aT 1974). In these
models each concept is represented as a set of elements,
including its descriptive features and properties, and the
name of its supersets and subsets. Concepts which share any of
these elements form intersecting sets, or may be included one
within another. - Ultimately, however, it is not possible to
comparatively evaluate set theoretic models such as these with
network models of semantic memory, because they are not always
distinct from each other, and because some are more detailed
and specific than others (Cohen 1991 pp.28-42)
The great efforts invested in developing models of how
knowledge might be stored in memory reflect the power inherent
in the notion that information stored in long-term memory (or
cognitive structure) is important in determining how
individuals interact with their environment (Stewart 1980).
While few have unreservedly espoused Ausubel's (1978) dictum
that "the most important single factor influencing learning is
what the learner already knows - ascertain this and teach him
accordingly" (see, for example, Novak & Gowin 1984), there is
little doubt that the cognitive position and the conception of
memory that goes with it have vitiated research into
children's thinking in general. For, when research is premised
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on the assumption that learning is a process of interaction
between the learners current knowledge organization and the
content to be learned, it becomes theoretically possible to
chart subtle changes in children's thinking, to identify the
causes and effects of meaningful learning or to explore the
relationship between existing knowledge structures and the
structure of new subject matter. Quite simply, when research
is premised on cognitivist assumptions, 'it is no longer
possible to ignore or even underestimate the student's role in
his own learning, for, crucially, it is the student's thinking
which mediates learning and achievement.
The Representation of Knowledge
Inevitably, the successful exploration of student learning
from a cognitive perspective has been contingent on the
ability of researchers to obtain external structural
information about internal representations of knowledge, that
is, the cognitive structures of students. As Naveh-Benjamin et
al (1986) stress, -in this respect it is not sufficient just to
measure knowledge of concepts (as has always been attempted in
classroom tests), it is necessary to show how concepts are
related to one another - that is, to measure the structure of
students knowledge.
Over the last twenty years several probes of knowledge
structure have been developed (see Champagne et al (1984) and
Naveh-Benjamin et al (op cit) for a discussion and
comparison). Primarily, they can be characterized as being
either low-inference or high-inference depending on how much
further interpretation they require by the researcher (Elbaz
et al 1986). High-inference probes have made use of word
association techniques (eg, Shalveson 1974), graph-building
(eg, Shalveson & Stanton 1975), modified clinical interviews
(eg, Pines et al 1978) and tree construction tasks (eg,
Rapoport 1967) and then subsequently applied di-graph
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(directed graph) analysis to the data produced (see Rudnitzky
1976). As Elbaz et a! (1986) have reported, these techniques
typically (1) produce representations in the form of a
clustering or spatial arrangement of a given set of concepts;
(2) apply mathematical procedures to proximity matrices, which
were obtained either directly or indirectly from the subject's
responses, to produce these clusterings; and (3) lack subject
labels or explanations.
In contrast, low-inference probes require much less
interpretation because they are predicated on propositional
versions of semantic memory theory. Thus, given the assumption
that propositions represent atomic units of meaning in long-
term memory, these techniques work towards yielding
representations which are in the form of propositional
networks from which cognitive structure characteristics are
obtained, thereby minimizing or avoiding the need for
inference leaps.
Without question, the variety of low-inference probes which
are presently in widest use are those which belong to the
concept mapping family (see Al-Kunifed & Wandersee 1990).
Concept maps are claimed to serve as a metalearning strategy
during individual study (eg, Leahy 1989) and as a heuristic
device during classroom instruction (eg, Novak & Gowin 1984),
as a strategy for formulating instructional design (eg,
Cliburn 1986), as a tool for textbook analysis (Ahlberg op
cit) and to assess and evaluate learning (eg, Moreira 1979).
Most important, as far as we are concerned, they have been
used in various guises to probe and reveal cognitive structure
and conceptual change in students and teachers, over long
periods or following brief interventions (eg, Fensham, Garrard
& West 1982, Champagne et a! 1981, Wallace & Mintzes 1990).
Stuart (1985) reports that a number of ways of producing maps
have been described in the literature. They may be constructed
from concepts given to the respondent, either as labels to be
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arranged in a suitable order (Stewart 1979, Champagne et al,
op cit) or as a list built up as an increasingly specific
concept map as more information is added to it (Fensham,
Garrard & West op cit). Some workers ask students to construct
their maps de novo, being given only a set of rules for
drawing concept maps, and a key word or words such as
'nutrition' or 'school' (Edwards & Fraser 1983, Stuart 1983).
Additionally, schedules may involve individual interviews,
self-regulated activities or group administration (Hoz, Tomer
& Tamir 1990).
It seems reasonable to adjudge that all of these techniques
originate in one of two research traditions. On the one hand,
in Stewart's (1979, 1980) critique of associative mapper
techniques, which in turn was stimulated by the work on
semantic networks in memory carried out by Lindsay, Norman and
Rumeihart; or, on the other hand, they derive from Novak's
(1980) work in metacognition which itself was rooted in
Ausubel's cognitive learning theory (Ausubel, Novak & Hanesian
1978). Either way, all of these techniques make use of the
same basic method so as to obtain representations of cognitive
structure. This involves the learner putting concept labels on
a page and linking them where appropriate with lines to show a
relationship between concepts. Additionally, according to
Stuart (op cit), it has now become accepted that more
information can be elicited from a concept map if these
relationship lines are labelled with a suitable linking word
or phrase that reveals the proposition(s) that the learner
sees as linking the concepts. . . . [sinceJ once the relationships
are described the implication is that the construct (cognitive
structure) is one in which the relationships are specific,
numerous and context specific.
Stuart fails to mention two important distinctions in her
brief survey. First, that it is a matter of some discussion as
to whether internal representations of knowledge in memory are
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primarily declarative - that is, consisting of knowledge about
facts and things (as in Anderson 1982); whether they are
procedural - that is, consisting of knowledge about how to
perform various cognitive activities (as in Winograd 1973) or
whether they are somehow a combination of the two (as in
Greeno 1978). Inevitably, the position taken on this question
determines which genre of meaning researchers presume concept
maps to reveal in presenting external structural information
about internal representations.
Secondly, a sharp distinction should also be made between
concept mapping approaches which are submitted either to
structural or to semantic analysis. This is not merely a
second order, empirical rather than theoretical question, for
invariably the form of analysis used by any researcher is
ultimately determined by a particular theoretical conception
of the way in which knowledge is organized in memory.
The structural approach (prominently exemplified by the work
of Novak (1981) and modified by others like Cronin et al
(1982)) produces scores for structurally different aspects of
the concept map like hierarchy, branching, grouping, concept
recognition, integration and more (see, for example, Wallace
1989). These categories take their meaning from a group of
theoretical principles that originate in Ausubelian learning
theory, of which the most important are (1) that cognitive
structure is hierarchically organized and (2) that concepts in
cognitive structure undergo progressive differentiation or (3)
integrative reconciliation. At the same time, these categories
also derive their significance from node-link models of memory
that emphasize the organization of concepts over the
particular meaning of semantic links.
The semantic approach is best exemplified by Champagne and
Klopfer's (1981) Concept Structuring Analysis Technique -
ConSAT - and subsequent revisions of it (eg, Hoz et al 1984).
Though this methodology has been used to generate data about
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structure and conceptual organization, it appears to be more
closely tied to an analysis of the propositional meaning of
cognitive structure, through, for example, semantic analysis
of bi-concept links, analysis of the meaning of individual
concepts and an investigation of the overall meaning of
concept groups measured according to different criteria like
homogeneity, structure and title-fit. While Elbaz et al (1984)
acknowledge that this methodology is influenced by Novak's
technique, it can be characterized as resting on fundamentally
different theoretical assumptions, in being so much influenced
by J.R.Anderson's work, and in particular his propositional
model of memory (Anderson & Bower 1973). From this
perspective, it is the meaning of propositional links in
cognitive structure that are of greater significance than the
geographical organization of concepts.
First Considerations of the Application of Concept Mapping to
an Investigation of Children's Knowledge in History
After a survey such as this it still seems necessary to ask
just how well concept maps do represent what students know and
how they organize their knowledge; in particular, how well
would they provide external structural representations of
children's thinking in history. On the one hand, does their
cognitivist orientation truely avoid having to depend on
children's ability to explain sensibly - even philosophically
- how they think about concepts ? Have they provided release
from depending on the shifting mediation of interpretative
conjecture ? On the other hand, if concept maps do surmount
this experimental obstacle, can they really be said to be
equivalent to a learner's cognitive structure (representing
the way concepts are stored in the mind) when these
"ideosyncratic" constructions have been made in response to a
particular stimulus (Cronin, Deckers & Dunn 1982, Stuart
1985) ?
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We would argue that questions such as these reveal that there
is a danger of overestimating or even of misinterpreting the
claims made by concept mapping research. For, those who have
carried out the research are themselves most circumspect about
it. Hoz, Tomer and Tamir (1990) characterize the cognitive
maps produced by interviewees as strongly resembling a
propositional network. Concept maps yield representations in
the form of propositional networks from which cognitive
structure characteristics are obtained (Mahler et al 1990). As
Wallace and Mintzes (1990) report, concept maps attend to both
what students know and how they organize their knowledge. It
is not claimed that they produce a snap shot of the internal
representation of knowledge in memory. They produce rich
representations of conceptual organization (cognitive
structure) (ibid) and it is this data that is especially
valuable in documenting the "intellectual journey 1t taken by
students as they restructure their understandings.
Nevertheless, a worrying set of questions still remains. For,
it appears that the concept mapping literature contains
absolutely no reference to any atttempt to investigate
children's thinking about history. The vast majority of
concept mapping research has been applied to knowledge
structures about subject areas from the natural and physical
sciences. This leads one to wonder whether the conceptual
structures of the social sciences and humanities are too
protean to be the subject of a stable cognitive study. Indeed,
one could ask whether there are historical concepts as such -
that is, concepts which are not really borrowings from other
subject areas. This certainly seems to be the case as far as
the concepts of Jewish history are concerned.
If we are rigorously to examine the possibilities of using a
concept mapping methodology to explore children's knowledge of
Jewish history, these are the kinds of questions we will first
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have to answer and it is to these questions that we turn in
the next chapter.
CHAPTER FIVE
In theory, would it be legitimate to produce conceptual representations of
historical knowledge?
In the course of preparing the previous chapter's survey of
concept mapping literature we conducted three large-scale
computer searches; one of dissertations indexed by
Dissertation Abstracts International, one of publications
indexed by ERIC (Educational Resources Information Centre) and
one of literature referenced by psycLll (Index to
Psychological Literature). Altogether, we found 49
dissertations which, in the period January 1982 to March 1992,
reported the use of concept mapping methodologies for
didactic, evaluative, curricular or managerial purposes. We
discovered, however, that none of these references related to
the representation of concepts which can be characterized as
historical. Within the ERIC listing, there were 82 references
(in the same period) to the use of concept mapping in
educational settings. Again, we could not find one reference
which reported the application of concept mapping to
historical concepts. PsycLIT (1974-1992) contained 39
references to the use of concept mapping methodologies in
teaching, research and programme planning. Although two of
these were located in social science contexts, it appears that
none involved the organization or representation of historical
concepts.
The paucity of attempts to represent the conceptual
organization of historical knowledge is striking. Certainly,
it needs to be explained if our proposal to apply a concept
mapping methodology to the examination of historical knowledge
is to have any credibility. This is particularly so given that
some of the explanations which might be suggested for the
dearth of 'historical' research do themselves point to the
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implausibility of reliably or validly mapping the conceptual
structure of historical knowledge.
For example, it could be said that there are a number of
fundamental differences between physical or natural sciences,
on the one hand, and history, on the other, which impede the
successful application of concept mapping to historical
knowledge as opposed to scientific knowledge. Thus, it can be
argued that because all history is contemporary insofar as the
past is necessarily grasped by persons in the present,
historical knowledge cannot therefore attain a true (or
scientific) 'objectivity' which would enable it to be reliably
represented by a concept mapping methodology.
Secondly, even if it is shown that historical knowledge is
analogous if not equivalent to scientific knowledge, it might
still be said that because in history, there are not networks
of concepts which are peculiar to the discipline, as there are
in science (Rogers 1972), it will not be possible to construct
concept maps which would be adjudged to represent knowledge
which is either characteristically or essentially historical.
Lastly, and most subtly, it might be possible to argue that
however we resolve the above problems, historical knowledge
will still not be validly represented by a mapping
methodology. This is because concepts in any historical
narrative are organized in a manner which is linear or
chronological rather than spatial or multidimensional. Concept
maps, therefore, will neither represent the substance of
history as historica rerum gestarum - the narration of things
that happened - nor will they be sensitive to changes in that
substance.
These three claims all raise significant questions about the
suitability of a concept mapping methodology to the
exploration of questions about historical knowledge (let alone
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to the examination of the relationship between critical
historical knowledge and collective memorial knowledge).
In their own right, these arguments have generated lengthy
philosophical discussion about what have more commonly been
referred to as the origins, content and form of historical
knowledge. We do not intend to treat them comprehensively as
such, but we propose, instead, to consider them from a
perspective which emphasizes their empirical implications,
that is, in terms of what they imply would be the theoretical
reliability and validity of concept maps which claim to
represent historical knowledge.
Of course it could be said that there is an altogether less
significant reason behind the non-application of concept
mapping methodologies to the representation of historical
knowledge. This derives from the fact that concept mapping
approaches were originally applied to educational questions by
scholars working in scientific or mathematical subject areas
(for example, by Novak in biology and chemistry (cf. Novak
1984) and Champagne and klopfer in geology (1981). It is
possible, therefore, that because educational research can
become ghettoized within a limited community of people or
publications that historians or social scientists may simply
not have been aware of the existence of this methodology or of
its possible applications in their field. This, for example,
may account equally well for the paucity of attempts to map
concepts in geography or modern languages.
Unfortunately, this is not very credible. Reports of concept
mapping have appeared in journals which are by no means the
exclusive domain of scientists or science educators (see, for
example, Trochim 1989). More suggestively, the proliferation
of attempts to apply Piaget's assumptions and methods to
research into cognition in history (by Hallam and Peel, for
example) amply demonstrate how aspects of research in
cognitive psychology are capable of being translated from
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scientific to humanistic contexts, regardless of their final
outcome. If there have not been any publicly reported attempts
to apply concept mapping to historical knowledge or historical
concepts, it is likely to have been for more significant
reasons, all of which we must confront.
Is Historical Knowled ge too Subjective to be Mapped ?
History, as Schwab has put it, is the most protean of
disciplines (1964). Sometimes, it seems as if there are as
many histories as there are historians. In crude terms, this
is probably because history is not the past. No historical
account can ever correspond precisely with any actual past
made up of a body of fixed and irrevocable facts. Equally
important, and in one of Collingwood's most significant
insights, this is also because history is concerned neither
with the past in itself nor with what the historian thinks
about it. it is concerned, rather, with the relation between
the two (1946). This appears to mean that history does not, as
an organized body of knowledge, possess a logical conceptual
structure independent of the psychological structures of
individual historians. It seems, to use Oakshott's phrase, as
if "history is the historian's experience" (1933).
In 'experimental' terms this will have major consequences.
First, it is unlikely that conceptual maps of historical
knowledge will have either psychometric validity or
reliability - where psychometric refers to the examination of
between-individual differences (Carver 1974). For, if
historical knowledge is incorrigibly subjective, it will not
be possible to establish reliable or valid criteria with which
to compare the organization of historical knowledge within
different people's cognitive structures. We would not be
comparing like with like, that is, we would not be comparing
different conceptions of history, but, rather, what in real
terms are different histories.
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Secondly, it means that conceptual maps of historical
knowledge are also unlikely to possess either edumetric
validity or reliability - where edumetric refers to the
examination of within-individual growth (ibid). This is
because it will be difficult to judge what any changes in
historical knowledge signify or correspond to; whether they
correspond to changes in an individual's knowledge of the past
or to changes in what Hexter refers to as their 'second
record' - that is, everything else they bring to their
encounter with the record of the past (Hexter 1972).
Taken together, these arguments appear to suggest why no
publicly recorded attempt has been made to create cognitive or
conceptual maps of historical knowledge. It seems that
historical knowledge is too closely bound to the historian's
own personal preferences, as well as to the presuppositions of
his or her age.
The problem with this position is that it is founded on two
contested -if not dubious assumptions. First, that historical
knowledge is intrinsically subjective, and, second, that
historical knowledge is (therefore) unlike scientific
knowledge, which, in contrast, has been successfully and
widely subjected to concept mapping methodologies.
Moreover, these assumptions are linked within a series of
sprawling and sometimes heated debates about the nature of
historical knowledge and its relation to other disciplines.
Collingwood's previously quoted position, for example, was
sharpened in opposition to nineteenth century champions of
'positivist' history who thought that they could exclude all
imagination and even any 'idea' from historical work.
Famously, they claimed that the facts of the past would speak
for themselves (cf. Acton 1895). In turn, Collingwood's own
'intuitionist' thesis was inspired by Croce's earlier argument
that "history is the knowledge of the eternal present"
(Gardiner 1959) - that the moment that historical events can
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be constantly rethought, they are no longer 'in time', that
is, in the past.
In many respects, the debate about the subjectivity of
historical knowledge is now somewhat passe (Jenkins op cit).
First, because it has come to a standstill by shifting its
focus from concern with the substantive content of historical
knowledge towards discussion about the historian's procedures
and methods. Secondly, because it has been overtaken by
developments in the philosophy of science that have made
scientific knowledge seem less 'objective'. Thirdly, because
debate about history has, as a whole, moved on to a different
cultural register, in terms of the rival merits of modernism
and post-modernism and history's place within them.
1. Arguably, E.H. Carr staked out, some time ago, what has
become the dominant position regarding the subjectivity of
historical knowledge. He claimed that the dispute over whether
"history was the result of an objective compilation of facts"
or "the subjective product of the mind of the historian" was a
reflection of the problematic nature of man. "Man, except
perhaps in earliest infancy, and in extreme old age, is
not... .unconditionally subject to his environment. On the
other hand, he is never totally independent of it and its
unconditional master" (1987 p.29). Carr thereby implied that
debate about the factity of history would be interminable and
irresolvable. History's centre of gravity was neither wholly
in the past nor in the present. He thus concluded that while
no historian can claim for his values an objectivity beyond
history, an 'objective' history can be written by an historian
"with a capacity to rise above the limited vision of his own
situation in society and history" (p.72/3). We might say he
meant that an objective history is possible if, paradoxically,
it is founded on the historian's recognition of history's
provisional and subjective nature.
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R.W. Davies (1987) notes that although Carr's critics objected
to this and defended the traditional view that the objective
historian is one who forms judgements on the basis of the
evidence, despite his own preconceptions, Carr's argument has
largely prevailed. In France, it has been approvingly echoed
by the disciples of Marc Bloch who himself pregnantly defined
history as "the science of men in time" (1954). Le Goff, for
example, has argued that objectivity in history is not a
matter of pure submission to facts, but is achieved through
the ceaseless revisions of historical work. If history's
content cannot attain true objectivity, then at least its
procedures guarantee that it is intersubjectively valid and
verifiable. In Le Goff's own words, "history is indeed the
science of the past, if it is acknowledged that this past
becomes an object of history through a reconstitution that is
constantly questioned" (Le Goff op cit). To quote Le Goff's
mentor, Lucian Febvre: "History [can be described] as a
scientifically conducted study, not a science" (cited by Le
Goff ibid).
This is an extremely useful formulation, since it points to
the way in which non-positivistic notions of history's
objectivity have, on the one hand, been predicated on a notion
of the intersubjectivity of history's procedures, while on the
other, they have depended on continually postponing the
prospect of discovering historical truth. According to this
line of argument, the substance of history can never be truly
objective. In the social sciences, subject and object belong
to the same category, and interact reciprocally on each other
- history is the historian's reconstruction. Nevertheless,
because historical knowledge is always provisional it does not
mean that nothing at all is agreed. Methodological rules and
procedures cut down interpretive flux, such that if there is
no point in asking if something is right - because that kind
of truth does not exist in history - there is certainly some
point in enquiring whether certain things are wrong. As Rogers
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puts it, "sensible disagreement between historians is only
possible at all because of agreement as to the criteria and
procedures which must be followed and satisfied if a narrative
is to be classed as history" (op cit).
This is the way in which debate about history's subjectivity
has played itself out. Claims that it is possible to discover
'objective historical truth' have been worn down along with
those which propose that history has an infinity of meanings
(Golob 1980). The 'subjective dimension' in all historical
accounts has been admitted (Marwick 1970), but this admission
has been tempered by a notion of intersubjectivity which "is
constituted through the judgement of others and primarily that
of other historians" (Momsen 1978). To use the language we
introduced in chapter two, we might say that notions of
history as reenactment or as representation have stalemated in
a notion of history as reconstruction, that is, a dialectic
encounter between past worlds and present words which is
arbitrated according to a paradoxical mix of provisional but
professional norms.
2. While debate about the objectivity of historical knowledge
was playing itself out, the disputants were transfixed by what
many held to constitute the paradigmatic human activity -
science, or more precisely, natural science. Today, if the
cause of science may have fewer supporters, some philosophers
(and most of the general public) have remained faithful to
Enlightenment principles and have continued to insist that
natural science does discover truth (Rorty 1989). Thus, as
Blake has put it, "when questions of objectivity are raised,
scientific statements are only too easily pointed out as the
very paradigm of impartiality and indifference to time and
place" (1959).
In a context such as this, it is inevitable that any
conception of history which admits to an interdependence
between knowing subject and object known cannot but fail to
109
meet generally prevailing standards of epistemological
respectability. Moreover, if attempts are made to represent
the conceptual organization of knowledge, then from this point
of view, science will succeed precisely where history fails
because scientific knowledge is conceived as being logically
grounded, formally framed and universally applicable; while
historical knowledge is none of these.
Earlier, we intimated that it was this conception of
historical and scientific knowledge which explained the
application of concept mapping methodologies to scientific
rather than historical knowledge. History's contingency
undermined what science's certainty supports. Ironically,
however, as Hayden White has pointed out, although this may be
the conception of science against which many historians
measure their own practice, it is no longer the philosophy of
science which currently prevails within the scientific
community (1978). For, once again, as Carr noted more than
thirty years ago, natural scientists no longer see themselves
as establishing universal laws by induction from observed
facts, but, rather ., as engaging in discoveries through the
interaction of hypotheses and facts. Valid scientific
hypotheses do not necessarily possess the capacity for precise
prediction which is often attributed to them; in some natural
sciences they closely resemble the generalizations of
historians. Thus, in Carr's own words, "the resemblances
between method in history and the natural sciences prove to be
greater than the difference between them" (op cit p.61).
The trend towards seeing scientific knowledge in
intersubjective terms has steadily increased over the last
fifty years, even if it has not entirely filtered though to
popular certaintist conceptions of science. For example,
Polanyi 's notion of personal knowledge while densely
formulated has been influential in articulating the notion of
the "personal participation of the knower in acts of
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understanding" (1958). From this perspective, knowledge in
general cannot be separated from commitment. Kuhn's analysis
of paradigm shifts in scientific thinking has also undermined
notions of scientific objectivity, by historicizing it (1970).
More generally, developments in modern physics have
relativized notions of scientific truth and have founded
scientific knowledge on contingency rather than certainty. If,
therefore, scientific method once appeared to lead ineluctably
towards the formulation of universal laws while history's
dubious subjectivity produced statements of doubtful
reliability, today both history and science might be conceived
of as analogous routes to different dimensions of an elusive
reality.
3. Changes in the relative status of historical and
scientific knowledge are not only the consequence of
developments in the philosophy of science, they reflect what
has been happening in philosophy as a whole. For, arguably,
the course of debate about the nature of historical knowledge
is merely symptomatic of a much larger discussion about the
relative merits of modernism and post-modernism and about the
extent to which historiography if not all forms of humanistic
discourse can be absorbed into literary and aesthetic domains
(Zagorin 1990).
In this context, interesting questions about historiography do
not concern how objective historical knowledge is. This has
become a purposeless discussion following what White describes
as "the discovery of the common constructivist character of
both scientific and artistic statements" (op cit). Rather,
they are concerned with discussions about the kind of
linguistic constructions histories are (Ankersmit 1989). Thus
White's analysis of "the deep structure of the historical
imagination" in Metahistory (1973) in being predicated on a
notion of history as a "purely rhetorical form" - a poetic act
- is framed by concerns from the theory of literature,
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linguistics and rhetoric rather than epistemology or
hermeneutics (Mandelbaum 1980). More pointedly, Paul Ricouer's
discussion of what he describes as "the reality of the
historical past" (1984) is not concerned with the extent to
which the past can be known but rather with the character of
historical statements or 'configurations'. Despite the title
he gives to his discussion he is interested far more in the
linguistic form than the ontological content of historical
knowl edge.
Obviously, White and Ricoeur have not gone unchallenged nor,
admittedly have they been alone in locating history in a
context which is framed by literary theory. The point we are
making is that debate about the relative solidity of
historical and scientific knowledge has been overtaken by more
all-encompassing questions concerning what Steiner calls "the
relationship between the word and the world" (1989). At a time
when there is ongoing discussion about whether all modes of
thought - including historical and scientific ones - can be
reduced to the common condition of writing (Zagorin op cit),
it seems petty to start drawing distinctions between
historical and scientific knowledge which suggest that one is
more objective than the other. Certainly, we can say that, if,
as we found, historical knowledge has not been subjected to
conceptual mapping, then it cannot be because history is
somehow epistemologically deficient when scientific knowledge
is not. From this perspective, history is neither the poor nor
unreliable relation of science, it is more usefully described
as an equal partner in a generally unstable and extended
fami 1 y.
re There Historical Conceots ?
If concerns about history's contingency do not then prevent
the application of concept mapping methodologies to the
representation of historical knowledge, there still might be
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other reasons why it is not possible to construct concept maps
which would be adjudged to represent knowledge which is either
characteristically or essentially historical.
For a start, there appear to be few if any concepts which can
be identified as historical. Historians employ substantive
concepts like revolution, democracy, industrialization and
immigration but these are neither categorically nor
essentially historical (Lee 1983). As has been widely noted,
history, in contrast with the physical sciences, is continuous
with, not distinct from general human experiences (see, for
example, Becker 1932, Hexter op cit, Rogers op cit). The
language it uses is, therefore, the language of everyday
experience but within a temporal dimension.
Closely related to this (and in fact to rephrase an argument
which goes back to Aristotle's Poetics) there is an additional
problem. Because history is preoccupied with the unique or the
singular (an event or series of events, or figures who appear
only once) the language of history does not appear to be
generalizable; it is composed of particulars rather than
categorical concepts. At most, as Kitson Clark has put it,
history provides instances which give concepts their concrete
content (1967). Certainly, history cannot be reduced to a
series of concepts, since to do so would be to empty it of
that which makes it history - its temporality and its
corporeal i ty.
Thus, when it comes to producing conceptual representations of
historical knowledge there appears to be a two sided problem.
On the one hand, because historical language is not framed in
categorical terms, concept maps will probably not constitute
valid representations of historical knowledge. On the other
hand, because historical language is indistinguishable from
other forms of talk, it will be difficult to identify
conceptual representations of knowledge as being historical
rather than anything else.
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Arguably, as in the previous section, what appears to be
problematic here may in fact be the consequence of attempting
to make history conform to a particular and probably
anachronistic conception of natural science. For, from the
perspective of a traditional view of natural science, genuine
historical knowledge must be founded on an inductive
methodology which involves collecting historical facts from
which one can derive universal laws or statements of
statistical probability. In other words, from this point of
view, it is assumed that genuine knowledge is conceptual(ized)
knowledge. However, as we have already argued, this is not
appropriate. Historical language need not be the language of
positivistic science.
Right or wrong then, that still leaves two questions. First,
whether it is nevertheless possible to produce conceptual
representations of historical knowledge. Secondly, as regards
what the content of alternative non-conceptual cognitive maps
will be.
In this regard, there appear to be two approaches which we
might adopt, even if they are taken from contexts different
from our own. One involves conceiving of historical knowledge
in terms of its second order structural concepts. The other
requires looking for ways in which elements in 'normal'
historical language might function as concepts.
The first approach is exemplified by the work of the Schools
Council Project 'History 13-16' in its attempt to identify the
structure of history as a discipline, or in Hirst's terms, as
a 'form of knowledge' (1965). This work was founded on the
notion that real historical knowledge is predicated on
knowledge of the nature of the historical enquiry itself and
that history in education must therefore include an
introduction to the historian's methods as well as something
of the 'logic of history' (Shemilt 1980).
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Cynically, one might say that this was merely a retreat from
the difficulties involved in finding the structure of history
in its substantive concepts. In other words, it might not be
fueled by philosophy but by "fear that there can be no
intrinsic historical criteria for the selection of historical
content in schools" (Lee 1983).
Either way, the attempt to identify the key concepts with
which historians work has been instructive. For, while it has
productively changed the emphases of history in education
towards concern with concepts like 'evidence', 'cause',
'empathy', 'change' and 'time', it has not made it
significantly easier to talk about, let alone examine,
historical cognition. First, because concepts like those just
listed are not transparent (or categorical) in and of
themselves. Cause or empathy, for example, can be understood
in a variety of equally legitimate ways depending on the
philosophical or psychological theory within which they are
framed. Secondly, because structural concepts such as these
are no more historical than are substantive concepts like war
or famine. Therefore, any ability to give an account of them
will not in fact indicate historical knowledge but something
else instead, which in this case will be more like
philosophical knowledge.
Our problem therefore persists. Semantic memory theories
presume that knowledge is made up of propositional or more
elemental conceptual networks. Historical knowledge, however,
at both substantive and structural levels, is constituted by
concepts which are either borrowed from other disciplines or
which are the practical concepts of everyday life. Thus, the
only special historical concepts which the Schools Council
Project 'History 13-16' could identify were those of the
primary and secondary source. This appears to mean that in
cognitive terms historical knowledge is no more than a
pretence. It consists of other forms of knowledge made up in
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the shape of the past. Presumably, therefore, attempting to
map it would be a wholly invalid and unreliable exercise.
Again, we would argue that this troubling conclusion is
significantly effected by conceiving of historical knowledge
in terms which are taken from other disciplines. For this
reason alone, it is worth exploring the second approach
referred to above, that is, by looking for elements in
historical language which function as concepts, since this
seems to work outwards from the language of history towards
categories of cognition rather than moving in the opposite
direction from theory to history, as is more commonplace.
Admittedly, the approach we refer to is not really an
approach. It is a collection of tantalizing suggestions which
point towards a particular way of conceiving of names and
labels in history, which regards them as analogous to concepts
in other disciplines and other forms of discourse.
In most discourse the following appears to be assumed. That
words are conventional or socially shared symbols each of
which represents a unitary object, situation, concept, or
other symbol in the physical, social and ideational worlds
(Cassirer 1957). Proper names (like Peterborough, Patrick and
Passover) are regarded as words which are employed as the
individual designation of a single and particular place,
person or event. Concepts, meanwhile, (like pet, peace and
party) have names, like particular objects or events, but
consist of the abstracted criterial attributes that are common
to a given category of objects, events or phenomena, despite
diversity along dimensions other than those characterizing the
criterial attributes shared by all members of the category
(Ausubel et al 1978). Concepts are therefore conceived of as
regularities in events and objects while proper names are
supposed to refer to singular events and objects.
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If these are the commonplaces of ordinary discourse, there are
reasons for suggesting that they do not apply to history, even
though, as we argued earlier, historical language does share a
strong family resemblance to everyday language. According to
A.D. Edwards:
"The historian's concern with the particularity of past
events leads him to use a large vocabulary of proper
names for that huge cast of characters and panorama of
scenes which he must identify and label. 
...[However] the
apparently specific names are often condensations of many
'smaller' events, and when used at a certain point in a
historical narrative [names like Marston Moor] may
'index' very different details to those who encounter
them.... Even the proper names in historical narratives
tend to have a wide range of potential denotation; in the
more dramatic episodes, they have powerful and diverse
connotations too (like the Black Death, the Peterloo
Massacre. . . )" (1978 p.57)
Edwards thus argues that proper names in history possess two
distinctive if not unusual features, despite their familiar
appearance. In the first place, as a result of the accretion
of meaning and interpretation around them, the meaning which
they convey is not that with which they are associated in
normal discourse. This is partly because in history the
meaning of labels and names is never given but predicated on
and constituted by the mediation of interpretation, but it is
also because proper names in history accumulate a weighty
baggage of associations through their repeated narration. As a
result, they come to possess a range of connotations which are
both richer and perhaps more ambiguous than would be the
denotative norm in everyday present-focused discourse.
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Additionally, as Edwards continues to argue:
"Despite the historian's alleged preoccupation with the
unique, many of his names are overtly categorical. They
draw together a number of narrative or biographical
instances - the Scramble for Africa, the Little
Englanders - and their frequent capital letters indicate
their status as temporally limited generalizations"
(lb Id).
This is a significant formulation. For, with this Edwards goes
beyond saying that proper names in history merely 'end up'
having a wider range of connotation than those in normal
discourse. He is suggesting instead that even when referring
to particular events or people historical language is
intrinsically categorical even if there are few formal
historical concepts as such.
His argument might be expressed in the following way: The
historian's interest in the particular creates a multitude of
details which can only be meaningfully manipulated through the
utilization of generalizations or categorizations. Thus, to
use a frequently cited example, the name 'the French
Revolution' does not refer to one single event. It is a label
referring to a series of associated events which allows the
possibility of talking sensibly about them with reference to
their shared features (without committing oneself to a precise
determination of what constitutes the event referred to by the
label). As a proper name, 'the French Revolution' may appear
to refer to a single or particular object, but in fact its
function is similar to that of a superordinate concept in
normal discourse, in that it organizes the criteria]
attributes of a multitude of instances in accordance with a
common and unifying notion. Indeed, these particular instances
might have been meaningless in historical terms if some
criteria] attribute had not been abstracted from them and
labelled in this way.
118
This, we would say, is very much like Carr's argument that
history is not really concerned with the unique but with what
is general in the unique (Carr op cit). For, in Edward's
terms, proper names are historically meaningful only in so far
as they draw together a range of categorically associated
instances. They are meaningful only in so far as they function
as concepts.
Edwards does not actually point to any particular influence on
his thesis. Nevertheless, it is difficult not to associate it
with Walsh's earlier and much discussed notion of colligation
in history and the role of what he calls 'concrete universals'
within it.
For Walsh, colligation is the central explanatory act in
history. Colligation means to explain "an event by tracing its
intrinsic relations with other events and locating it in its
historical context" (1967). 'Colligatory concepts', like war,
revolution and industrialization, are abstractions which are
constituted by a pattern of relations or regularities. They
consist of the criterial attributes of colligations. What he
calls 'concrete universals' are temporally limited colligatory
concepts. Thus, the Renaissance, the Punic Wars and the
Industrial Revolution, all marked with the definite article,
refer to regularities or patterns of association but are
confined by particular, concrete (that is, temporal) limits.
They look like the names of historical individuals rather than
concepts but, as Lee has argued, "when fitted together in a
temporal framework, they provide the structure of history at
the substantive level in a way that concepts do not" (op cit).
They act like concepts by anchoring propositional networks in
history but they are not concepts themselves because they are
linked to particular events, objects or persons.
This is precisely the point we have been trying to develop. In
that, although historical knowledge may not be composed of
specifically historical concepts, it is nevertheless organized
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around linguistic components which do function like concepts
and which are intrinsically or essentially historical. We have
been trying to suggest that these components largely consist
of proper names or, in Walsh's terms, concrete universals.
For, proper names in history do not simply refer to discrete
entities. They are related instead within propositional
networks where they not only convey criterial attributes but
where they also temporally locate the substance of the whole
propositional network. Indeed, they are what make these
propositional networks historical.
Of course historical knowledge does also consist of concepts
which may possess either historical or non-historical meaning.
The point is that the precise historical meaning which these
concepts may or may not posses can be determined, but not by
directly transferring analytical constructs from scientific
disciplines to another one. Rather, they can be viewed
according to stable criteria appropriate to history, for
example, according to the nature of their relationship with
concrete universals - or proper names in history - as well as
by the extent to which they possess colligatory attributes of
their own.
Drawing on this line of argument, we want to suggest that
although historical knowledge does not consist of specifically
historical concepts 'it might be represented in conceptual
terms if there is cognizance of its distinctive features. We
suggest that it should be possible to conceptually map
historical knowledge if, on the one hand, it is recognized
that the categorical components of history can take quite
concrete forms, while on the other, it is acknowledged that
the conceptual components of historical knowledge do not
necessarily express historical content.
Ironically, the sometimes ambiguous and shifting nature of the
components in historical knowledge may ultimately result in
interesting consequences. For, although our examination of
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concepts in history was originally stimulated by doubts about
the validity or reliability of mapping the cognitive content
of historical knowledge, there are grounds for anticipating
that the changeable nature of concepts in history may in fact
make a concept mapping approach particularly appropriate for
comparing traditional with critical approaches to the study of
history. If the meaning of historical concepts is so much
determined by their relationship with other concepts and
names, in that they rarely possess formal historical content
of their own, it is possible that different arrangements of
the same concepts will represent significantly different
conceptions of history. Paradoxically, then, the protean
nature of concepts in history could make them highly sensitive
indicators of change in cognition because the same
'historical' concept is capable of meaning so many different
things in so many different propositional contexts.
Is History Linear Unlike Maps ?
Before we run too far ahead of ourselves with our enthusiasm
for the application of concept mapping methodologies to
historical knowledge, there is one further difficulty which we
have to consider which may itself account for the paucity of
research in this field so far.
Essentially, this difficulty revolves around doubts about the
feasibility or validity of translating historical knowledge
from its linear or temporal form into an apparently analogous
spatial or hierarchical representation. In the simplest terms,
we might say that while history is chronological and linear,
scientific knowledge may be regarded as "fairly nonlinear,
hierarchical and weblike" (Wandersee 1990). While history
operates within a single, temporal dimension, moving from past
to present, or in the opposite direction, science is
paradigmatic - abstractly drawing together a number of
dimensions. Thus, for precisely those reasons that concept
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mapping seems appropriate to scientific knowledge, it seems
inappropriate for the representation of historical knowledge.
Maps, after all, cannot be translated into strings of text.
They are abstractions, analogous to rather than reproducing
reality. They are schemas which reduce reality in a way that
is quite alien to history.
Arguments such as these have been expressed in a number of
ways, but they all seem to point to the apparent
inappropriateness of cartographically representing history, as
opposed to other disciplines. Thus, Mink, for example,
distinguishes between what he calls theoretical, categoreal
and configurational modes of comprehension. In the theoretical
mode different objects may be comprehended as instances of the
same generalization, in the categoreal mode as examples of the
same category, while in the congfigurational mode as elements
in a single and concrete complex of relationships. He suggests
that these modes are roughly associated (in turn) with types
of understanding characteristic of natural science, philosophy
and history (1970).
The relevant point here is that although "there is nothing -in
principle which cannot be brought within each mode", they are
themselves "irreducible to each other or to any more general
mode" (ibid). Thus, historical narratives, modes of
comprehension which consist of elements in a single and
concrete complex of relationships, cannot be translated into a
set of categories, that is, a conceptual framework which
exists as an alternative and incommensurable system for giving
form to experience. In our terms, this appears to mean that
history cannot be directly translated into a concept map.
A similar conclusion is reached on the basis of an equivalent
distinction which Bruner formulates. Bruner differentiates
between, what he calls, the paradigmatic and the narrative
(1984). Sacks discusses these categories in relation to one of
his patients - Rebecca - who was "defective in the world of
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the conceptual and the abstract" but "fully the equal of any
'normal' individual in her powers of concrete and symbolic
apprehension" (1986).
The thrust of this argument is familiar. It suggests that
there are different ways of making sense of the world. In this
case, either through abstract and paradigmatic thought or
through symbol and story. Narrative, it is argued, embodies a
concrete reality which cannot be adequately translated into a
conceptual schema. Again, therefore, it appears that we must
conclude that an historical view of reality cannot validly be
conceptually represented as is attempted in concept mapping
methodologies.
These arguments and other similar ones do appear to support a
powerful case against the application of concept mapping
methodologies to historical knowledge. Nevertheless, there may
still be grounds for suggesting that such a conclusion is
flawed -in a subtle but significant way. For, while it would be
hard to dispute that different disciplines or different
approaches to reality are founded on and operate according to
different and incommensurable logical modes, it does not
follow that their psychological form is similarly
incompatible.
What we are trying to say is that it is important to make a
distinction between maps which are held to represent the
logical structure of any body of knowledge - what Novak and
Gowin call 'concept maps' - and those which are supposed to
represent the psychological structure of knowledge - what they
call 'cognitive maps' (1984). The point is that cognitive maps
do not set out the logical relationships between the
components of different forms of knowledge or modes of
comprehension. They are constructed by individuals and
represent idiosyncrasies held by individuals (Mahier et al
1991). Therefore, even when they are held to possess a high
degree of disciplinary validity they nevertheless represent
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the ways in which knowledge has been transformed by
psychological or cognitive processes.
We want to argue that the psychological structures that
represent different forms of reality are not necessarily
incommensurable. Of course, we do not intend to ignore
arguments or evidence which points to "different forms of
thought and mind" (Sacks op cit), whether these are labelled
as paradigmatic and as narrative or as something else.
However, we would contend that although historical knowledge
can also be articulated and conceived of through symbol and
story, it can also, as we argued above, legitimately be
reduced to elemental propositional components. In
psychological terms this form is not alien to history since
this is how all bodies of knowledge are organized in memory
according to semantic memory theory.
Because history is elementally constituted as much by concrete
particulars as by concepts and propositions, it should not
automatically be assumed that concept maps will therefore be
insensitive to history's temporal dimension. An assumption
such as this stems from conceiving of the psychological
structure of history in terms taken from the logical structure
of science. In this case, it appears to be assumed that
because the conceptual structure of science is hierarchical
(resulting in increasingly comprehensive rules or concepts)
the conceptual representation of history could not therefore
be sensitive to history's linearity, since that would also be
constructed along a vertical dimension. Our point is that
there is no reason why the psychological structure of
historical knowledge should be necessarily hierarchical or why
the insensitivity of conceptual representations to history's
temporal dimension should automatically be assumed. In each
case these so called problems are more appropriately regarded
as fascinating questions on which our proposed research might
shed light. They are certainly not foregone conclusions.
124
Concluding Remarks
Having started with skepticism about the appropriateness of
applying concept mapping methodologies to historical
knowledge, we have reached a point where we are suggesting
that it would not only be legitimate to elicit conceptual
representations of historical knowledge but that it would be
fruitful to do so.
To sum up: We have proposed that history's apparent
subjectivity is not an obstacle to the generation of reliable
or valid representations of historical knowledge, since we
found that historical knowledge is neither radically
subjective itself nor any more contingent than scientific
knowledge, which has been productively mapped. Secondly, we
suggested that the apparent absence of specifically historical
concepts from historical discourse would not be an obstacle to
research, since we identified other components in historical
language which make up its propositional and conceptual
structure. Finally, we argued that suggestions that history's
narrativity was irreducible to cartographic representation
were powerful but not relevant to our concerns, since in
proposing to elicit cognitive representations, we are not
concerned with the logical structure of historical knowledge
but rather with its psychological structure, to which
conceptual representation is not alien.
Having thus failed to establish any significant reasons why we
should not attempt to produce cognitive maps of historical
knowledge, we can and must turn to a more positive set of
questions, in terms of how we apply this methodology to our
particular concerns, that is, to the investigation of the
relationship between critical Jewish historical knowledge and
collective memorial knowledge.
CHAPTER SIX
Towards a practical proposal for the conceptual representation of Jewish
historical knowledge.
The last four chapters exemplify the dictum that it easier to
criticize than to construct: We set out to determine whether
critical historiography is necessarily antagonistic towards
the forms of consciousness which have sustained traditional
Judaism. We have ended up, however, not only dismissing as
inconclusive a sustained philosophical examination of this
question, but we have condemned as inappropriate research
approaches framed within an influential psychological
tradition. Most recently, we have even rejected well
established doubts which could have been raised about an
alternative research methodology.
The question now is whether we can formulate a convincing
approach of our own. For, if, as we found, it is not invalid
to attempt to elicit the external representation of internal
representations of historical knowledge, then we must say how
in practice we would expect this to work. To be precise, we
must explain how exactly we would use a concept mapping
methodology to investigate the impact of critical historical
knowledge on collective Jewish memorial knowledge.
At first, this will involve proceeding fairly tentatively,
since, as we have argued, there have not been any previous
attempts to apply concept mapping methodologies either to
history or to Jewish history. We suspect that the presentation
of a defensible research methodology will first require some
consideration of what the conceptual content of Jewish history
might theoretically consist of, so that we can, at least,
establish the substantive parameters of research. Then, less
broadly, it will involve contemplating which kinds of concept
mapping approaches could be suited to examining historical
knowledge in general. Finally, it will entail the detailed
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specification and justification of a particular research
strategy aimed at investigating identified dimensions in the
relationship between Jewish historical knowledge and Jewish
memorial knowledge.
Of what does the Conceptual Content of Jewish Histor y Consist?
In the previous chapter, we argued that historical knowledge
in general was founded on propositional or conceptual
networks. We explained how this worked, despite the scarcity
of either substantive or structural historical concepts, and
pointed to components in historical knowledge which functioned
as concepts in combining to provide the structure of history.
It is tempting to argue that these general findings can be
directly applied to a consideration of the conceptual content
of Jewish historical knowledge. In other words, we might say
that because Jewish history provides a localized example of
historiographical practice in general, its conceptual content
will not be any more tightly prescribed than that of history
in general. It will be made up of an unspecified mix of proper
names, 'concrete universals' and colligatory concepts which
would serve just as appropriately in determining the content
of any number of historical narratives with little or no
Jewish point of reference. Thus, according to this line of
argument, the contents of Jewish historical knowledge will not
significantly differ, either in categorical or substantive
terms, from the propositional components of either Roman,
Risorgimento or Russian history.
The consequences of this position for the external
representation of historical knowledge are straightforward. It
suggests that we can expect concept maps of Jewish historical
knowledge to differ neither in structure nor content from maps
which represent any other variety of historical knowledge.
For, according to this line of thinking, differences between
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historical topics do not reflect significant differences in
their conceptual structure.
The problem with this position is that it is founded on an
assumption which is not necessarily compatible with the basic
presuppositions of Jewish memorial knowledge. For, although
the assumption that Jewish history is essentially similar to
history in general has served as an explicitly articulated and
guiding premise for many professional Jewish historians (see,
for example, Baron 1952 and Katz 1983, p.193 ff.), it clashes
with some of the most distinctive features of Jewish memorial
knowledge, where, for example, assumptions about divine
involvement in Jewish history profoundly influence all aspects
of conception of the Jewish past. Research into the
relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory which
regarded Jewish history as a localized case of history in
general would probably, therefore, be insensitive to the
characteristic representations of Jewish memorial knowledge.
Of course, taking the opposite tack will not make it any
easier to establish criteria for examining the conceptual
content of both historical and memorial knowledge either. It
could, for example, be argued that both the substance and
structure of Jewish historical knowledge are different from
historical knowledge in general and that research should
therefore be predicated on this distinction. After all,
structural concepts in history like change, time, evidence,
empathy and cause are either absent from or transformed by
non-historiographic (memorial) conceptions of the Jewish past.
From a traditional perspective, Jewish history is not the
reconstruction of a serial diachronic past. It is the
recollection of an enduring past, where chronology is hardly
of significance (Mendes-Flohr 1980). There is little notion of
evidence in Jewish collective memory either, since the
historian (or recorder of history) does not exist separately
from his sources. Causation in theistic conceptions of Jewish
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history is also ultimately impenetrable, since the historical
reality of the Jewish people either mirrors their relationship
with God or is a reflection of the deepest mysteries of being
(Scholem 1971).
One can also expect the substantive concepts of Jewish
memorial knowledge to differ from those of Jewish historical
knowledge in one small but significant way. For, although
memory and history do share the same set of referents - that
is, the people and events of the past - they are sharply
distinguished by the presence of what one might call
'noumenal' concepts in certain forms of traditional Jewish
memory. Critical historical knowledge certainly has no room
for a God concept or for anything like it, whereas in certain
forms of memorial knowledge it is concepts like this which
serve as 'concrete universals' or superordinate concepts in
'anchoring' entire propositional networks.
In strictly conceptual terms, then, it appears as if the
propositional content of Jewish history does significantly
change depending on whether its context is critical or
memorial, and that it will probably therefore be difficult to
formulate a single and comprehensive notion of Jewish
historical knowledge which sensitively mirrors the different
ways in which Jewish history can be conceived. In research
terms, this means that we are unlikely to formulate a concept
mapping methodology which can reliably map both critical and
memorial knowledge without having to rely on some form of
linguistic gymnastics.
Before we rush towards such a pessimistic conclusion, it is,
however, worth reconsidering the line of argument which
brought it about. We have concluded that the conceptual
content of critical and memorial knowledge of Jewish history
are different from one another and have attached great
significance to this. Yet, this is no more than a tautology.
129
For, if critical and memorial knowledge were not different in
this way there would have been no difference between memory
and history in the first place.
Essentially, we have focussed on the differences between
critical and memorial knowledge when the real question here
concerns the extent to which there is commonality between
them. It is this question which will determine whether we can
formulate a single comprehensive notion of the components of
Jewish historical knowledge and whether, in turn, we are able
to construct a research methodology which validly represents
both critical and memorial knowledge without too much
distorting the necessary differences between them. - And from
this perspective there are grounds for optimism.
It must be said, first of all, that it is somewhat idle to
assume that because Jewish history is merely a localized
example of historiographical practice in general that it is
not possible to prescribe at least to some degree what its
conceptual content may consist of. Although it has been
influentially argued that one cannot determine a priori
whether some historical phenomenon is 'Jewish', just as one
cannot dogmatically say what the essence of Judaism is
(Scholem 1973), there must surely be certain stable criteria
according to which Jewish history is regarded as Jewish rather
than something else. For, without these criteria one would not
be able to talk sensibly about Jewish history at all. What we
mean to say is that although it is unreasonable to prescribe a
set of necessary components in Jewish historical knowledge,
there must surely be some components whose presence (alone or
collectively) is sufficient to make some body of historical
knowledge Jewish. In other words, if Jewish history is no more
than a localized example of historical practice in general we
may nevertheless be able to identify a number of conceptual
signposts which consistently signal that locality's
Jewi shness.
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A related conclusion is reached if we work in from the
direction of Jewish memorial knowledge. For, although it is
evident that the procedures of Jewish memory are indeed
different from those of Jewish history, 'it is also apparent
that there are not such extensive differences between the
substantive components of Jewish history and Jewish memory. Of
course, the substantive content of Jewish memorial knowledge
is frequently constituted in terms of its relationship to some
God concept - unlike critical historical knowledge - but this
should not overshadow the extent to which Jewish memorial
knowledge generally shares the same substantive referents as
critical historical knowledge.
All of this means that it should be possible and legitimate to
conceive of a limited number of substantive concepts, concrete
universals and proper names which not only make up most of the
necessary conceptual core of Jewish memorial knowledge but
which also serve as sufficient constituents of Jewish
historiographical knowledge. These, we suggest, could then be
used to locate the conceptual parameters of research into
different cognitive representations of Jewish history.
The problem is how to do this without sliding into an
'essentialist' trap wherein we claim to prescribe, a priori,
the conceptual content of Jewish history. In an attempt to
avoid precisely this danger we have been attracted by
Rosenak's notion of the commonplaces of Judaism (1987) which
is derived, in turn, from Schwab's conception of the 'topics'
or 'commonplaces' of a discipline (Schwab 1964 and 1971).
Schwab defines commonplaces as "foci of attention within an
area of interest which fulfill two conditions: (a) they demand
the attention of serious investigators; (b) their scrutiny
generates diverse investigations and consequent diversities of
definitions, doctrines and emphases" (Schwab 1964: pp.5-6). In
a different formulation, he explains that they are "a set of
factors.. .which. . . in effect represent the whole subject matter
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of the whole plurality of enquiries of which each member-
theory reveals only one facade at best, and usually only, one
facade seen in one aspect" (Schwab 1971).
Rosenak wants to suggest that Jewish religious tradition is
constituted by "five key terms". These are Torah, Messianism,
Am Yisrael (the People of Israel), God of Israel and Eretz
Yisrae7 (the Land of Israel). He argues that these terms are
commonpl aces because
"(a) the tradition cannot function without these terms
and they are therefore the language of the tradition's
transmission; and (b) the specific content of each
commonplace is ambiguous until it is related to a
specific historical, theological-ideological, or
normative-halakhic context" (Rosenak op cit p.102).
"Each commonplace, when it must be defined or explained
outside a specific legal, historical context (ie, in
abstract theological terms), can only be explained or
defined relationally" (ibid).
"Theologically, all commonplaces are indispensable for an
understanding of Judaism, even though they may be
variously graded in different ideological understandings"
(p.103).
"The terminology of relationship among the commonplaces
is generally (and classically) theological; for example,
Israel was 'chosen' by God. However, because of the
cultural dimension of Judaism, the terms may be related
in historical-existential ways" (ibid).
Fox warns that commonplaces can only be discovered and
developed by long and meticulous scholarly work (1985). There
is little doubt that Rosenak's argument fulfills these
requirements, coming at the heart of a meticulously crafted
and carefully articulated philosophy of Jewish education.
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These concepts have not only been defined in such a way as to
demonstrate their 'formal' quality as well as their particular
Jewish content, they have also been presented within the
context of their different potential interrelationships.
We want to suggest that this notion of the commonplaces of
Judaism can be adopted as a useful heuristic device in the
course of investigating the conceptual representation of
Jewish historical knowledge. For, as Rosenak explains,
although these concepts are commonly conceived of in terms
which are largely theological, they can just as validly be
regarded as points within a network of secular-historical
concepts.
Indeed, we want to suggest that one of the implications of
Rosenak's argument that all theologies and ideologies of
Judaism are conceived in relation to these terms, -is that all
philosophies of Jewish history are likewise grounded in the
same set of concepts, whether they are critical or memorial.
Of course, this does not mean that it is therefore possible to
reduce all of Jewish history to a set of stable concepts, say
in the manner of Graetz's famous conception of the structure
of Jewish history (1975). To attempt as much would be to miss
the thrust of Rosenak's and ultimately Schwab's argument. The
point about commonplaces is that they serve as a tool with
which to identify the differences between a plurality of
theories, ideologies or philosophies. They are categorical
terms which, in Fox's words "enable us to map a field and to
compare different theories in one discipline to see how they
treat a specific subject matter" (Fox op cit) [emphasis
added].
This is exactly how we hope the commonplaces of Judaism might
help us. To rephrase Fox, we hope that they will enable us to
map different conceptions of Jewish history in such a way as
will allow us to compare different representations of
historical knowledge. Admittedly, this might appear surprising
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in that it is hard to see how a set of concepts which include
Torah and God of Israel can possibly determine the content of
any critical philosophy of Jewish history. However, to
reiterate what we have already argued, and to quote Rosenak
again, these terms are "idiosyncratic enough to be translated
into secular-historical terms" (op cit). They are formal terms
whose content is neither necessarily theological nor
historical.
Consciously, or otherwise, critical Jewish history does always
relate to these terms. In all cases this is because critical
history must provide an alternative to memorial or traditional
conceptions of Jewish history where these terms do possess
explanatory authority. Critical history can, thus, be
conceived of as a rewriting of Jewish memory, where
theological concepts are either translated into secular
alternatives or relegated to positions where their meaning is
determined by their relationship with secular concepts (Kochan
1977). Additionally, it can be argued that critical history
generally relates to these terms because the subjects of
Jewish history do themselves frame their lives in relation to
ideologies grounded in these concepts, and it is the acts and
ideas of such people which the historian (however critical)
must explain.
One further doubt about the appropriateness of using
commonplaces of Judaism in the analysis of Jewish historical
knowledge may still linger. It might, after all, be said that
these concepts do not seem or sound very historical, and that
they simply look like theological concepts relocated to a
historical setting. Here, we suggest that an earlier argument
is relevant. For, as we explained in the last chapter, few
substantive or structural concepts in history are themselves
explicitly or specifically historical. The propositional
content of history is made up, instead, of a mixture of proper
names, 'concrete universals' and colligatory concepts. The
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commonplaces of Judaism do not look very historical but they
too are made up of a mixture of proper names and concepts, and
as such can provide Jewish historical knowledge with
appropriate elemental components in a way which is directly
equivalent to the founding of historical knowledge in general.
Of course, the commonplaces of Judaism do not by themselves
constitute the conceptual content of Jewish historical
knowledge. They will always be located within a network which
consists of concepts and names which, like the components of
historical knowledge in general, are taken either from
everyday discourse or from other disciplines. The point is
that it would nevertheless be reasonable to base research into
the relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory on
the heuristic assumption that Jewish historical knowledge
(whether critical or memorial) is characteristically
constituted by these terms.
What Kind of Concept Mapping Methodology Mi g ht Best Suit
Research into Historical Knowledge ?
If this argument holds and if we have successfully identified
a way of conceiving of the content of Jewish historical
knowledge which is faithful both to its critical and memorial
representation, we can move towards considering the kind of
concept mapping methodology which might best allow us to
examine historical knowledge. Thereafter, we can proceed to
the formulation of a detailed research strategy for
investigating the relationship between Jewish history and
Jewish memory.
Obviously, there are a number of kinds of concept mapping
methodologies which have been developed. Indeed, as we showed
in chapter four, concept mapping is, in generic terms, an
alternative to a variety of other methodologies for probing
knowledge structure. We earlier explained why concept mapping,
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because it minimizes the need for inference leaps, has
increasingly been preferred to other methodological traditions
like associative-mapping techniques. Nevertheless, the
question still remains as to which type of concept mapping
methodology is best suited (in both theoretical and empirical
terms) to the examination of historical knowledge in general.
During our survey of concept mapping methodologies we found it
useful to distinguish between approaches which are submitted
either to structural or to semantic analysis. At the time we
did not fully spell out the implications of using such
categories, but now it is worth pointing out that one
important consequence of making such a distinction is that it
signals how that the way in which maps are generated is
probably secondary to the way in which they are analysed. When
we talk, therefore, of identifying concept mapping probes
which are most appropriate to the representation of changes or
differences in historical knowledge we do not really refer to
the ways in which maps are elicited but to the ways in which
they are analysed.
In this context, and as we argued in chapter four, it is
largely a matter of choosing between the relative merits of
maps which follow a structural approach and those which follow
a semantic approach. What this involves is comparing
analytical approaches which take their meaning from the
theoretical principles which originate in Ausubelian learning
theory (cf. Ausubel et al, 1978) with approaches which, under
the influence of i.R. Anderson's semantic memory theory, are
more closely tied to an analysis of the propositional meaning
of cognitive structure (Anderson & Bower 1973).
The structural approach, exemplified by the work of Novak (eg.
1981), was not only the first sort of concept mapping probe to
be developed, it was and still is the more widely used.
However, the problem with this approach is that it has been
designed to produce data which is meaningful in terms of
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categories which are not only insensitive to the distinct
nature of historical knowledge, but which are actually
antipathetic to its characteristic configurational structure.
Thus, its categories derive their significance from node-link
models of memory which emphasize the structural organization
of concepts over the particular meaning of their semantic
links. Similarly, its view of cognitive structure, is taken
from principles in Ausebelian theory which hold that cognitive
structure is heirarchically organized, progressively
differentiated or integratively reconciled. And, as we
suggested in the last chapter, these are constructs which are
only likely to make sense in terms of the development of
scientific concepts and theories. They do not correspond to
the narrative content of history or to its tendency to relate
concepts to one another without hierarchically subsuming them
under one another.
In contrast, the semantic approach exemplified by Champagne
and Klopfer's (1981) Concept Structuring Analysis Technique
promises to be more sensitive to the distinctive features of
historical knowledge. For, although this methodology and
adaptations of it have been used to generate data regarding
the structural features of cognitive maps, they are more
closely tied to an analysis of the propositional meaning of
cognitive structure, through, for example, semantic analysis
of bi-concept links, analysis of the meaning of individual
concepts and investigation of the overall meaning of concept
networks. We suggest, therefore, that this approach is likely
to be more sensitive to the character of historical knowledge
because it more accurately reflects the way in which the
propositional content of historical knowledge changes, not so
much because of changes in the structural organization of
concepts as because of changes in the meaning ascribed to
concepts which, as we have argued, are not formally historical
in and of themselves.
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In a semantic approach, although issues relating to the
structural organization are not ignored, analytical emphasis
is on the meaning given to propositional links within
cognitive structure as opposed to the geographical
organization of concepts. This is why it promises to suit the
examination of historical knowledge so well. In a theory of
history as reconstruction, the development of historical
knowledge does not consist of the acquisition of new concepts,
but rather of the reorganization or redescripition of already
'known' concepts. A concept mapping methodology which is
attuned to changes in propositional meaning is therefore more
likely to indicate changes in historical knowledge than a
methodology which focuses on the differentiation or
integration of changing numbers of concepts.
How to Apply a Semantic Mapping Approach to the Examination of
Jewish Historical Knowled ge ?
If in general, then, a semantic approach to concept mapping
promises to be most sensitive to changes in historical
knowledge, we can begin a detailed consideration of the
particular semantic methodology which will enable us to
examine changes -in Jewish historical knowledge, and especially
the relationship between Jewish memorial and historical
knowledge. We can, in other words, begin to set out what we
have conceived of as a defensible research methodology for the
examination o-F the relationship between Jewish history and
Jewish memory. This is what we propose to do in the next phase
of our work.
CHAPTER SEVEN
CODA: Description of a pre-pilot exercise in the representation of historical
knowledge in cognitive structure
The problem with setting out a thesis in the way that we have
done so far, is that it minimizes both the disorder and
anxiety which are integral parts of any research process. In
this case we have begun with the statement of a problem - the
ambivalent attitude shown by Jewish schools towards Jewish
history teaching - and have worked towards the identification
of a research strategy with which to examine and treat some of
its dimensions.
With the benefit of hindsight everything fits relatively
neatly into place. We began with a 'problem situation', we
proposed a diagnosis of this problem in terms of the ambiguous
relationship between Jewish history and Jewish memory and then
determined to subject this relationship to an analysis of some
rigor. Having found that a philosophical approach did not
allow the possibility of drawing firm conclusions about the
relationship between critical history and Jewish tradition, we
argued that the problem might benefit from being recast in
psychological rather than philosophical terms. Consequently,
in subsequent chapters, we have moved towards identifying a
psychological research tradition which might make possible the
examination of significant dimensions in the relationship
between history and memory. Having identified semantic memory
theory as such a tradition we have begun to discuss the
appropriateness of applying empirical methodologies from
within that tradition to the investigation of the relationship
between Jewish history and Jewish memory.
One might call this the Whig approach to research. It is a
narrative which begins in confusion or pain and ends with the
triumph of reason over chaos. In reality, of course, and as is
typical of much research, there have been a number of
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different things going on in this project at any one time, all
of which have been at different stages of development. And
while it is true that the more theoretical discussions in
previous chapters have each in their own way enabled us to
proceed towards the formulation of a definite research
strategy, it would be misleading to presume that they have
directly led from one to another in the way we have described
or that we, therefore, did not make any attempt to produce
cognitive maps of Jewish historical knowledge before reaching
the theoretical terra firma of the previous chapter.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is not an unusual
phenomenon, if only because most efforts at research involve
preliminary phases in which researchers familiarize themselves
with the use of new or unfamiliar tools in the field (Bell
1987). Certainly, it is rare that researchers wheel out fully
articulated and original methodologies which are ready for use
without some prior tinkering.
One suspects that researchers rarely report this preliminary
phase, partly because it tends to be somewhat primitive and
partly because it is usually of private significance only,
enabling the researcher to master a particular methodology
rather than to generate public data with it. tn our case,
although this preliminary phase was useful for precisely these
'private' reasons, it does also possess a more public
significance and it is for this reason that it merits being
reported.
As we have frequently repeated, there are no other existing
examples of research into the conceptual representation of
historical knowledge. Our discussion of the possibilities for
generating cognitive maps of historical knowledge would have
therefore been conducted in a debilitating vacuum if we had
absolutely no sense of what the external representation of
Jewish historical knowledge might look like and only a very
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limited idea of the kinds of analytical categories which might
be applied to it.
Thus, some time before we had properly developed a notion of
what the conceptual components 0f historical knowledge looked
like and before we had identified the possibilities promised
by the notion of commonplace Jewish concepts, we endeavored to
conduct a pre-pilot exercise which might help in identifying
the kinds of questions concept mapping would allow us to ask
about Jewish historical knowledge as well as the kinds of
strategies that would bring those questions into focus.
In some respects this may not seem very legitimate, since it
places the consideration of means before the identification of
ends. It portrays an attempt to generate cognitive maps of
Jewish historical knowledge as part of an effort to establish
what might be reasonable and valid research questions to ask
from the external representation of historical knowledge. From
some perspectives, this will seem like an inversion of proper
research procedures, or, at best, a case of taking two steps
back in order to take one step forward.
We have nevertheless chosen to report this episode. First,
because it provides an important insight into the evolution of
our research proposal, when it might be in danger of suffering
from the absence of an empirical counterpoint. Secondly, and
more significantly, because it is faithful to an integral part
of all research, where means and ends are indistinguishable,
and where there is continuing interaction between theory and
practice (Dewey 1964). Hopefully, therefore, it will
demonstrate the way in which research is conditioned as much
by what is hypothetically posited as by what is empirically
possible.
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Description of the Pre-Pilot Exercise
History: The pre-pilot exercise was initiated once we began
to develop a sense that a semantic approach to concept mapping
might be appropriate to the representation of historical
knowledge. It was regarded as providing an opportunity for
examining the consequences of translating a preexisting
semantic mapping procedure to a possibly alien 'historical'
context, even if, beforehand, we did not have a very clear
sense of the kinds of categories we would use in order to
analyse the maps produced.
Subjects: The subjects were six 13 to 14 year olds on the
three month Givat Washington programme in Israel. They came
from one of two Jewish schools in England, where they had
received a regular though not intensive Jewish education. Many
of them had never studied Jewish history before, while none
had studied it in a way which mirrored the seriousness of
their general historical studies. Although these students
attended schools which were orthodox in their Jewish ethos,
none of the interviewees themselves came from orthodox or
committed Jewish families.
Item selection:	 12 'concepts' were selected for mapping
since this was a number which previous researchers found had
supported a rich network of propositions without overwhelming
the interviewee (Hoz 1991, in conversation). These were:
SURVIVAL, INDEPENDENCE, SURRENDER, DEFIANCE, HISTORIANS, JEWS,
JUDAISM, G-D (spelled in a traditional Jewish manner, so as
not offend the sensibilities of any of the interviewees),
RABBIS, TEMPLE, DESTRUCTION and ROMANS.
With hindsight one can see that the 'concepts' selected
contained a mixture of concrete universals like ROMANS and
JEWS; colligatory concepts like G-D and JUDAISM, as well as
other concepts which are either commonplace in everyday
discourse like SURVIVAL and DESTRUCTION and/or which could
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come from another discipline, as in the case of INDEPENDENCE
and SURRENDER. All could be classified as substantive
concepts, apart from HISTORIANS, which reflects an attempt to
introduce a reflexive element into the map which, it was
hoped, might expose some conception of the procedures or
structure of history.
At the time, item selection was not shaped by the more
theoretical arguments we have developed in chapters 5 and 6,
but rather, and over and above all, by an effort to select
concepts for mapping which might represent the different ways
in which the Jewish past could be conceived. Thus, an attempt
was made to select concepts which related to a topic in Jewish
history where conflict between memorial and critical knowledge
might be sharpest or at least explicit. To be precise, we
selected the concepts TEMPLE, DESTRUCTION and ROMANS because
we were hoping that they would trigger a response which
pointed to different ways of conceiving of the destruction of
the second temple by the Romans, since from both a critical or
memorial historical perspective, this was a watershed moment
in Jewish history.
Interview and mapping procedure: Given our, at the time
unsubstantiated, sense that external representations of
historical knowledge would be best elicited through a mapping
approach which focused on the propositional aspects of memory
we decided to adopt (with minor alterations) Mahier et al's
(1991) revised ConSAT schedule for interviewing subjects [See
Appendix 1]. In our case, this involved five phases, as
follows:
The interview was "administered individually, and require[d]
about 45 minutes to complete (for a set of 10-13 concepts from




1. "A short training session with [eight] daily concepts for
demonstrating to the student the employed procedure and the
kind of expected product (ie, a cognitive map with all the
possible links made and labeled).
2. The interviewee [was] asked to classify the list concepts
that [were] printed on small cards, as either familiar or
unfamiliar.
3. The interviewee [was] asked to define (or explain) verbally
each familiar concept. The definitions [were] written down by
the interviewer.
4. The interviewee [was] asked to construct a map of concepts
by spatially arranging the familiar concepts' cards on the
table so that the arrangement would reflect the relations
among the concepts. When the student [was] satisfied with his
or her arrangement it [was] copied by the interviewer on to a
large sheet of paper. The interviewee [was] further asked to
express verbally the most meaningful relations he or she
con s id erfed] among the concepts or groups of concepts, which
[were] recorded by the interviewer on the line[s] connecting
the concepts. The interviewee [was] allowed to modify the map
until he or she [was] satisfied. The interviewee [was] also
asked to provide a title for the whole map and to explain the
nature of the groups (in cases where linked clusters were
produced).
5. The interviewee reinspect[ed] the unfamiliar concepts and
[was] allowed to add such concepts to the map, along with the
appropriate links. Also, he or she [was] allowed to add
concepts that he or she [felt were] related to those in the
list" (ibid).
6. A neat and final copy of the map was then produced, with
help from an audio tape recording which was made of the entire
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interview. (All maps shown hereafter are photographic
reproductions of these final copies.)
In categorical terms, one might describe this schedule as
combining a number of virtues. On the one hand, it presented a
closed set of concepts which all interviewees had to respond
to, but, on the other hand, it contained an open element which
enabled the interviewee to supplement the map with whatever
concepts he or she chose. Thus, this approach promised the
possibility of some kind of psychometric analysis in which the
maps produced by a number of different subjects could be
compared, but it also left room for more natural responses in
which the subject could strongly influence the conceptual
content of his or her own particular map.
The schedule may also be characterized as emphasizing the
semantic content of cognitive structure representations. This
is not only evident from the way in which the interviewee is
specifically asked in phase four to "express verbally the most
meaningful relations among concepts" but it also emerges from
the fact that interviewees are asked in phase three "to define
(or explain) verbally each familiar concept". This is
significant since subjects are prompted to conceive of
concepts in propositional terms before they regard them
relationally, that is, in terms of their relationship with
other nodes in the map. We contend that this does not cause
the contents of the map to be overshadowed or overwhelmed by
prior definitional attempts, since in the context of a
propositional network concepts always take on a different and
invariably richer meaning. What it does mean, however, is that
subjects will already be tending to conceive of concepts in
propositional terms when they begin to frame their maps and
this should therefore help in clarifying or sharpening their
semantic content.
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Outcomes: The interviews resulted in the generation of six
concept maps all of which took between approximately 10 and 20
minutes to produce and describe, following the introductory
three phases. Two examples are presented in figures 1 and 2.
(All the maps are included in Appendix 2.)
As we explained earlier, the pre-pilot was not really intended
to generate public data. Its main purpose was the provision of
evidence with which to fill a vacuum of information concerning
the appearance of cognitive structure representations of
historical knowledge, not to mention the kind of analytical
constructs that might be applied to them. Thus, before we
carried out this exercise we did not know whether to expect
all representations of historical knowledge to be linear or
chronological. Similarly, because all previous concept mapping
research had looked at scientific or semi-scientific knowledge
we could not be sure whether concept maps would provide
representations which could be explicitly characterized as
critical, memorial or some other form of historical knowledge.
The examples presented in figures 1 and 2 (on the following
pages) will hopefully demonstrate the ways in which this
exercise was helpful in diminishing these unknowns, even if,
in experimental terms, they are reasonably limited if not
flawed themselves. We have presented what are probably two
extreme examples of the kinds of maps which were produced in
this exercise, in that while Josh#1 is thick with semantic
detail, Anna#1 contains very little elaboration concerning the
relationships between concepts.
Discussion: In the first place, these maps show the
tantalysing nature of the data produced by concept mapping
probes. Thus, while Anna #1 is primitive in its efforts to
link concepts, and limited in its description of propositional
links, it does raise a host of intriguing questions about the
representation of these concepts. For example, one can ask why



















































































































(hy have two groups of concepts been separated and not even
:onnected ? Does this correspond to a distinction between concepts
ihich are conceived as relating to the past and those which are not
Intriguingly, when asked if the concepts were connected in any
rays other than those she had described, the subject said that she
as sure that they were, but couldn't say how. It certainly makes
ne wonder whether a representation which looks as spartan as this
Lctually reflects laziness on the part of the interviewee rather
han revealing anything significant about their cognitive
tructure.
osh#1 raises a similar range of pregnant questions. For example,
ne might ask whether its avoidance of a vertical or linear
tructure means that it is not really an historical representation
r whether it means that the structure's historicity reveals itself
n other ways, thereby indicating a certain distinctive form of
istorical knowledge ? Most significantly, one wonders whether the
ense or wordy nature displayed by all the propositional links here
ndermine the map's status as a cognitive structure representation
r whether they in fact enhance it ? It is also worth considering
hether, given that there are altogether 17 propositional links in
he structure, we could say that the 'concept' JEWS occupies some
entral status in the map, being a part of 6 propositional links,
hereby indicating a certain conception of Jewish history ?
nevitably, there are an almost unlimited number of questions which
ne can ask about maps like these. Indeed, that appears to be one
f the outstanding virtues of the graphic representation of
nowledge, in that it seems to invite much more analysis than would
prose-like string of propositions concerning the same subject
atter.
erhaps the most important issue here, and a large part of the
ationale behind the pre-pilot exercise, is whether these maps
ffer clues as to how different forms of cognitive structure can be
istinguished through representation of knowledge probes and
ccording to which kinds of analytical categories. Here a number of
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features seem to emerge. For example, it is evident that although
only two 'concepts' (HISTORIANS and ROMANS) were signally or
essentially historical, the maps nevertheless consist of structures
vhich represent knowledge which is almost certainly historical. On
the one hand, it seems that the grammatical tense used when framing
oropositions might be of significance. Thus, one can distinguish
Detween propositions which are framed in the present tense (as are
Darts of Josh#1) like "JEWS only believe in one G-D" or "JEWS'
nortal leaders on earth are RABBIS", and those propositions which
re framed in some kind of past tense, as is all of Anna#1 (eg,
'Some JEWS had to SURRENDER" or "The RABBIS worshipped G-D") and
nost of Josh#1 where a number of relationships are described as
iaving happened "throughout the years" or as having happened "over
i me".
)n the other hand, it seems - in impressionistic terms, at least -
s if conceptual structure is not by itself a reliable indicator of
iistorical knowledge. Thus structures which look quite different
an convey quite similar historical meanings, as, for example, in
:he apparently different treatments of HISTORIANS, ROMANS,
)ESTRUCTION and TEMPLE in Adam#1 and Nicky#1 (See Appendix 2). At
:he same time, structures which look quite similar can actually
epresent significantly different historical conceptions, as in
nna (Liverpool)#1 and Poppy#1, where the similar arrangement of
oncepts disguises what are two quite different interpretations of
Jewish history.
:n contrast again, it does seem as if individual concepts can take
n significantly different meanings in different maps, serving as
iseful indicators of cognitive dissimilarity. Thus, G-D can exert
luite a strong influence on some maps, initiating distinctive
istorical chronologies as in Anna(liverpool)#1 which expresses the
otion that "G-D made the JEWS who were told to study JUDAISM" or
Iicky#1 which articulates how "G-D chose the JEWS to have his
•orah. The JEWS have survived through thousands of years", etc.
'et, in other contexts, the same concept seems to be no more than a
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passive referent of other more important concepts which are not
necessarily part of historical networks, as in Anna#1, Josh#1 or
Adam#1. Thus, while in some representations the concept G-D is used
to initiate a theistic conception of the Jewish past, in others it
is used to make what might be characterized as a sociological point
which does not impinge on historical narrative.
Of course, this exercise has also shown that there are other
concepts which consistently seem to have little to do with history
and which would be poor items to select for inclusion in a mapping
methodology. This is especially the case with INDEPENDENCE which
seems to occupy an artificial role in almost all the networks here.
The concepts HISTORIANS and RABBIS have, meanwhile, taken on a
range of different and in some cases interacting roles. Thus, in
certain instances they seem like rival sources of authority.
Compare, for example, Anna(Liverpool)#1 - "Modern day RABBIS teach
JUDAISM to kids" and Nicky#1 - "JUDAISM is explained by RABBIS"
with Josh#1 - "HISTORIANS have always tried to find out more about
the Jewish people/JUDAISM" or Arina#1 - "When the TEMPLE was
destroyed the HISTORIANS found it out". In other cases, the use of
HISTORIANS seems in and of itself to reveal something about
different conceptions of historical practice. Thus, in Poppy#1,
"HISTORIANS know a lot about the ROMANS", whereas in Nicky#1
"HISTORIANS can't defy [probably, define] what things are when they
find them". Likewise, in some maps HISTORIANS "find out about"
ROMANS (Adam#1) while in others they "find out more about JEWS"
(Josh#1). In all these cases there are grounds for arguing that
these concepts prompt a variety of propositions which can serve as
indicators of significantly different conceptions of Jewish
hi story.
Conclusions: As we hinted earlier, there is a danger in holding
too much store by the patterns which we have described here. At
this stage we have not established either the empirical validity or
reliability of this methodology. We have not discussed whether it
would be capable of comparing different people's cognitive
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structures or whether it might be able to chart changes in an
individual's knowledge of history. In a sense, we have recorded
what is no more than an exercise in empirical improvisation while
hoping that a number of themes which emerge will enrich a more
composed piece of research.
From this highly tentative perspective, it is possible to be
reasonably confident about only very few things. These might
include, first, the notion that concept mapping probes do generate
a rich diversity of response, which in turn probably promise a
range of often subtle insights into the representation of Jewish
historical knowledge in memory. Secondly - and perhaps as a
consequence of this diversity - it is likely that only analytical
approaches which aspire to be comprehensive and even holistic will
adequately explore the range of dimensions within the internal
representation of historical knowledge. Lastly, and this is most
tentative given the limited sample here, this exercise may have
revealed something of the different gravitational systems which
exert their influence on both the internal and external
representation of Jewish history. Thus, we have seen all-
encompassing historical chronologies beginning with G-d and ending
in the present (as in Anna(Liverpool)#1), present-focussed
representations of Jews and Judaism which are strongly informed by
historical components (as in Josh#1), and some quite fragmented
structures, made up of separate chronologies (as in Anna#1),
competing ahistorical and historical components (as in Adam#1) as
well as less easily classified propositional mixtures (as in
Poppy#1).
rguably, this looks like an inconsequential set of findings which
ay not merit the space we have given them. We would suggest,
owever, that seen as the outcomes of what was no more than a pre-
ilot exercise they might exert a moderately significant influence
n the development of our research. They have undoubtedly
ultivated a sense of what concept mapping might be capable of if
ore care was taken in the selection of conceptual items and if we
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were to have a clearer sense of the ways in which the form and
content of cognitive structure representations indicate differences
in Jewish historical knowledge. If we worked with an older and more
articulate group of subjects, the data produced might be quite
enl i ghteni ng.
It is the preparation of such a research project which we intend to
describe in the next chapter, as we step back into the flow of our
earlier narrative, informed now not only by the theory which we
developed in previous chapters but also by the practice which we
have just described.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Determining the scope and establishing procedures for the generation of
cognitive structure representations of Jewish historical knowledge.
Until now we have made much of the difficulties caused by the
paucity of existing research into the cognitive structure of
Jewish historical knowledge. Indeed, it is this very scarcity
which provided the rationale behind the previous chapter,
where we sought, albeit in somewhat primitive fashion, to fill
part of the vacuum created by this deficiency.
Henceforward, some of the advantages which accrue from the
absence of direct precedents for our concerns will hopefully
become increasingly apparent. For, not only does the scarcity
of previous research mean that there is a surfeit of questions
waiting to be explored, it also suggests how, from the outset,
we can be reasonably confident about identifying a number of
preliminary enquiries which will have to be built in to any
research strategy we formulate. It is evident that any
research design we produce will have to include components
which try to establish both the empirical reliability and
validity of cognitive structure probes when applied to
historical knowledge, since that is largely unknown at this
stage.
Until now, our discussion has been conducted in generalities
and has arrived at formal rather than substantive conclusions.
We have talked about examining changes in Jewish historical
knowledge and about investigating the relationship between
Jewish memorial and critical knowledge. We have proposed that
semantic mapping methodologies may help in exploring these
questions and have intimated how in general this might work.
However, a defensible empirical study will have to be framed
in much more precise terms. It will have to be predicated on a
clear statement of experimental intention and empirical scope
and will have to detail steps taken to affirm the credibility
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of the procedures being described. - This, we suggest, will be
our main concern over the next pages.
Establishing Goals
From the outset, we have tried to signal how we are primarily
interested in exploring the relationship between the critical
study of Jewish history and memorial knowledge of the Jewish
past. It was the ambiguities in this relationship which, we
suggested, proved to be so unsettling to the processes of
effective educational decision making in Jewish schools. This
concern is, however, inevitably made up of a number of other
smaller and not so small issues, some of which we have hinted
at in the course of developing earlier arguments. Thus our
original interest in the relationship between history and
memory could encompass a host of educational, developmental,
sociological and psychological questions, considered together
or in their separate parts.
We have already gone some way towards limiting the scope of
our concerns by proposing to frame them in psychological
rather than, for the moment, any other terms, but that still
leaves an exciting if not bewildering array of questions to
consider. For example, one could break down our original
question into its vertical and horizontal dimensions. These
would then include, in the first case, questions that relate
to changes over time in an individual's conception of Jewish
history and the influences upon them. Alternatively, and
looking along a different dimension, they might relate to
questions about differences in the way different people
conceive of Jewish history.
In fact, we have limited the scope of our interests still
further by looking to cognitive structure probes as
appropriate research tools for examining the relationship
between Jewish history and Jewish memory rather than turning
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to the kind of ethnographic methodology which in chapter three
we described Dickinson and Lee as using. This is significant,
for, it has meant making an important distinction between
thinking and knowledge in history, in that it has involved
focussing on the meaning and structure of knowledge, rather
than on the processes and procedures of thought which generate
or manipulate knowledge. Again, this means looking at the
representation and organization of concepts rather than at the
ways they are used.
Of course, by focussing our interests in this way we are not
signalling that our chosen questions or methodologies are
therefore more central to an understanding of the relationship
between critical history and collective memory than those we
have not adopted. We are, rather, making what is really a
calculation about the progress we might expect to make from
using any methodology in a doctoral research situation such as
thi s.
For example, it would have been both legitimate and useful to
explore the relationship between Jewish history and Jewish
memory by framing what might be called an autobiographical
study of Jewish historians. Detailed examination of the
academic and autobiographical writings of any number of major
Jewish historians would reveal a great deal about the
relationship between the study of critical history and
collective memory. It would be fascinating to examine the work
and life of Jacob Katz, for example, since Katz represents the
unusual case of a professional Jewish historian who possesses
impeccable scholarly credentials but who has grown up in a
traditional Jewish society and continues to be a practising
orthodox Jew (Katz 1989).
One also imagines that it would be similarly profitable to
formulate an alternative strategy for research which was
founded on the premises of literary criticism. Thus, one could
mount a systematic analysis of Jewish historical writings
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which explicitly serve the strictly orthodox Jewish community
and then compare these with critical histories dealing with
similar topics or subject matter. Treatment of holocaust
history, for example, would provide access to revealing
insights •into the ways in which collective memory interacts
with and reacts to critical historiography in framing a view
of the Jewish past.
The point we are making is that these approaches should not be
regarded as having been rejected or as competing with the
concerns upon which we have increasingly concentrated. They
are no less than complementary to it, but as we have tried to
explain, there is an undercurrent behind our not having
adopted them at this moment which is influenced by
calculations concerning what it is possible to achieve in a
limited time span and with limited resources.
It is from this perspective that there are a number of
arguments which favour the adoption of an approach which looks
first and foremost at cognitive structure. For, even if, as we
have repeatedly said, there has not been any research carried
out into the conceptual representation of historical
knowledge, a range of research tools does exist within this
field which one could at least try to apply to questions
related to Jewish history and Jewish memory. Additionally,
the use of cognitive structure probes has had particularly
fruitful consequences in other subject areas where they have
influenced thinking about planning, pedagogy and assessment
(See, for example, Trochim 1989; Cliburn 1986; Edwards &
Fraser 1983). For this reason we would expect promising
consequences from the submission of Jewish historical
knowledge to similar experimental approaches.
Of course, there is also another factor influencing our
selection of strategy whose significance should not be
underestimated here or in any piece of research. For,
inevitably, our choice of concerns and of methodology does, to
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some degree, reflect where our own interests and enthusiasms
lie. Obviously, these do not blindly take our work where they
will, but their influence on a piece of work which requires
both extended commitment and intensive involvement cannot be
entirely discounted. From this perspective, too, the graphic
representation of knowledge possesses an appeal which helps in
securing its position as a foremost strategy in our research
agenda.
Determining the scope of research.
Although we have said that our interest in cognitive structure
probes has limited the scope of our concerns, it would be
misleading to presume on that basis that we had therefore left
ourselves with little room for empirical manoeuvre. It is
important to appreciate that the decision to attend to
specific dimensions in the relationship between Jewish history
and Jewish memory is not a consequence of laziness or
deficiency but rather that it is a necessary step in
sharpening the focus of research. Indeed, although we have
established that there may be meaningful consequences for our
understanding of the relationship between critical Jewish
history and Jewish memory if we use a research methodology
which comes from a cognitive mapping tradition, this does not
foreclose what that methodology should consist of or try to
do.
In point of fact, because there has been no other
psychological research into the nature and development of
Jewish historical knowledge, whether from a cognitive
perspective or any other, there is a strong argument for
adopting a research design which is as broadly conceived as
possible. For, if we can establish some general sense of the
representational nature of Jewish historical knowledge and of
how its content might change, we could then deal with more
detailed features in subsequent experimental phases.
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For this reason, it has made sense to try, in the first
instance, to examine two broad questions, each of which will
be seen as operating on a substantive and formal register. In
the first place, we have decided to explore the possibility of
identifying a correlation between the conceptual
representation of Jewish historical knowledge and other
contextual or background variables. In formal experimental
terms, this has therefore meant investigating how effectively
we could create valid categories for distinguishing between
different representations of Jewish historical knowledge.
Secondly, we have intended to investigate if and how Jewish
historical knowledge changes following an instructional
intervention, which in our case was conceived of as an
encounter with critical Jewish historiography. In formal
terms, this has meant trying to find out if and how well
concept maps can serve as valid mechanisms for documenting and
exploring conceptual change in Jewish history.
Arguably, these are not entirely complementary objectives,
since experimental designs which are sensitive to between
people differences are not necessarily sensitive to within
individual changes (Carver 1974). In other words a tool which
reliably reflects real differences between people may not
necessarily or consistently correspond to real changes within
a person. We would argue, however, that given the relatively
poor state of our knowledge concerning the sensitivity of any
experimental design towards either of these dimensions, it
will not have been particularly harmful to attempt to examine
both of these dimensions provided it has been well established
beforehand that they are not identical and that the
experimental design should try as far as possible to take this
into account.
These particular concerns as well as the more general ones we
have articulated in earlier chapters have culminated in the
construction of the following research methodology:
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Method:
Subjects: The subjects of this study were two groups of Jewish
18 year olds from England who, after graduation from school,
were based in Israel for a year's programme of study and work.
One group of six students were participants in the Bnei Akiva
scheme, a religious-zionist programme combining talmudical
study with a kibbutz experience. These young people had all
chosen a programme option which gave greater weight to study
in yeshiva than to secular alternatives. All but one of them
had attended a Jewish primary school, half of them had gone to
Jewish secondary schools and all but one of them came from
families which were highly committed to orthodox Jewish
practice. All had been members of a religious-zionist youth
group in England. [This information was elicited from
questionnaires which subjects completed. See Appendix 3 for a
reproducti on]
These six subjects were selected from a group of 30 to
participate in the research interview, but all appeared to
participate willingly.
Another group of six students were participants in the Machon
scheme, a religiously non-denominational, zionist programme
combining study of Hebrew language, Jewish history and Jewish
sociology and politics with a kibbutz and voluntary work
experience. Half of them had attended Jewish primary school,
none had gone to Jewish secondary schools but all had at some
point attended cheder, Jewish supplementary school. All came
from families who were slightly less than moderately committed
to Jewish religious practice. All had been members of zionist
youth groups in England. [This information was elicited from
the same questionnaire as referred to above, and included in
Appendix 31
These subjects chose voluntarily to participate in research
interviews.
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Experimenta7 Design: The experiment was conducted over a
period of four months. For the Bnei Akiva group this included
a round of 'pre-test' interviews, a period of instruction
consisting of five, weekly, one hour long sessions - for the
subjects together with the other 22 students on their
programme - a round of 'post-test 1
 interviews within a week of
the end of instruction, and a final round of 'post-post-test'
interviews two and a half months later.
For the machon group the experiment consisted of one round of
'pre-test' interviews.
Design of Instrument: As in the pre-pilot exercise, the
instrument which yielded dimensions of historical knowledge
compri sed:
1) a version of Mahler et al's revised ConSAT individual
interview in which a cognitive map is constructed during
interview (Mahier et al 1991). [See pages 142-3 for a general
description and Appendix 1 for the complete interview
schedule.]
2) an analysis scheme derived from other studies of cognitive
structure, as well as a scheme which we developed ourselves
for the purpose of analysing Jewish historical knowledge. [See
next chapter for a detailed description.]
Concept Selection: Thirteen 'concepts' were used in the
mapping task, with their selection generally reflecting the
thrust of the theoretical discussion from chapters five and
six, in combination with conclusions drawn from the pre-pilot
experience, as described in chapter seven. The 'concepts'
included G-D (spelled in a traditional manner so as not to
offend any of the interviewees), JUDAISM, LAND OF ISRAEL,
JEWISH PEOPLE, TEMPLE, WAR, RABBIS, ROMANS, DESTRUCTION,
SURRENDER, ADAPTATION, DEFIANCE and HISTORIANS.
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All of these 'concepts' can be classified in terms of the
typology for the semantic components of historical knowledge
which we developed in chapter five. Thus, there are concrete
universals like LAND OF ISRAEL, JEWISH PEOPLE and ROMANS;
there are colligatory concepts like G-D and WAR; there are
concepts which have been consciously taken from other
disciplines, for reasons which we will shortly explain, like
SURRENDER, ADAPTATION and DEFIANCE; and there are concepts
which come from everyday discourse like TEMPLE, RABBIS and
DESTRUCTION and finally there is HISTORIANS which is probably
a concept from everyday discourse but which might possibly be
a specifically historical one.
The rationale behind choosing these concepts is slightly more
complex. In general terms, all were selected with two
principles in mind. First, that they should facilitate any
analytical distinction between critical, memorial and other
forms of historical knowledge. Thus, RABBIS and HISTORIANS
were kept on from the pre-pilot exercise because of the way in
which they had magnified different conceptions of Jewish
history, in contrast to the concept INDEPENDENCE which did
not. Secondly, it was hoped that these concepts would be
sensitive to conceptual change which resulted from
instructional intervention. Thus, the concepts SURRENDER,
DEFIANCE and ADAPTATION were selected because they figured
prominently as a frame of reference within the programme of
i nstructi on.
There was also a range of more particular reasons behind the
selection of concepts. For example, a number of concepts were
included under the influence of Rosenak's notion of
commonplace Jewish concepts (see chapter six). For, if as we
previously argued, there are a number of concepts in terms of
which all forms of Jewish historical knowledge (whether
critical or memorial) can be understood, it seemed appropriate
to select these for inclusion in this task, since their
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presence may have made possible the articulation of
fundamental conceptions regarding all of Jewish history and
not just of the immediate point of historical reference for
the rest of the map. Indeed, Rosenak's thesis has promised the
possibility that these concepts might serve as quintessential
indicators of differences or changes in the conception of
Jewish history.
Having said as much, we nevertheless did not simply reproduce
Rosenak's five concepts in the mapping instrument. Thus, we
did not include the concept of messianism at all and we
translated the concept Torah into one of Judaism. Arguably,
this shows a failure of nerve which prevents us from properly
establishing whether these concepts possess a psychological
reality which corresponds to their philosophical role.
However, we would argue that although in Rosenak's terms these
are formal concepts which necessarily possess neither
theological nor secular content, they do probably carry
connotations in ordinary discourse which might have distorted
these sets of cognitive maps in a particular theological
direction. Judaism has, therefore, been selected because it is
both a more neutral and a less apparently theological term
than Torah but, as the pre-pilot showed, may nevertheless
serve as a synonym for it. Messianism, meanwhile, has not been
selected at all because (if it is not altogether unfamiliar to
subjects) it might, if included, give all maps artificial
eschatological connotations which do not otherwise reflect
their real content.
The concepts TEMPLE, WAR, RABBIS, ROMANS and DESTRUCTION have
all been selected with a particular reason in mind. Although,
these are not specifically historical concepts, taken
together, they signal substantive historical content. As in
the pre-pilot exercise, they have been chosen in the hope that
they trigger the representation of knowledge concerning one of
the most heatedly discussed topics in Jewish history, that is,
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the destruction of the second temple by the Romans, its causes
and consequences. As we explained in the last chapter, these
events are conceived, from both critical and memorial
perspectives, as constituting a watershed moment in Jewish
history and, accordingly, may be represented in quite
different ways within different cognitive structures.
The concepts SURRENDER, ADAPTATION and DEFIANCE have been
chosen for quite specific reasons too, in that they reflect
our attempt to examine how effectively concept maps allow the
documentation and exploration of conceptual change in Jewish
history. These terms serve as organizing concepts within the
course of instruction to which the Bnei Akiva group was
exposed. They have therefore been included in the mapping
instrument so that we might examine the degree to which
cognitive representation of Jewish historical knowledge
changes as a result instructional intervention.
Again, they are not specifically historical concepts. They
have been taken from Peter Berger's sociological analysis of
the ways in which minority groups respond to antagonistic
societies - which 'in Berger's example consists of religious
groups faced by modernity (1970, p.30-37). Thus, for Berger,
defiance involves "establishing a counter community.. .which
makes strong claims on the loyalty and solidarity of its
members" (p.33). "It entails an attitude of the stiff upper
lip, a steadfast refusal to go native, a (literally or
otherwise) pontifical insouciance about the opinions of
mankind" (p.31). Surrender, according to Berger, is "the polar
opposite of defiance". "It represents the self liquidation of
[one's ideology] and of the institutions in which the
[ideological] tradition is embodied" (p.36). "In this option
the cognitive authority and superiority of whatever is taken
to be the prevailing weltanschauung is conceded with few
reservations" (p.34). Adaptation, Berger argues, refers to a
tactic of aggiornamento. "Cognitively, this stance involves a
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bargaining process with [contemporary] thought, a surrender of
some traditional items while others are kept" (p.36). It
results in institutional modifications and "entails a process
of rethinking, the end results of which are hard to predict"
(ibid).
How these concepts shaped and emerged from instructional
material will shortly become apparent. At the moment, the
point is that these terms have been selected as experimental
items because of the instructional role they were expected to
play. Their centrality to the content of instruction made them
potentially important indicators of conceptual change.
The selection of one more concept needs to be explained: that
of HISTORIANS. Here we were particular influenced by our
experience of the pre-pilot exercise where this concept had
been usefully included as part of an effort to introduce a
reflexive element into the mapping exercise. In the pre-pilot
this appears to have been relatively successful, in that it
encouraged subjects to expose their conception of the
procedures or structure of history. Thus, we were hoping to
produce similar results by its inclusion here.
Use of mapping instrument: The mapping task was conducted in
much the same way as in the pre-pilot exercise. All interviews
were administered individually. First interviews took
approximately 45 minutes and involved a short training session
with eight daily concepts followed by a series of phases
involving the thirteen concepts we have listed above,
according to the procedure described in the pilot exercise on
pages 142-3 and in Appendix 1. Subsequent interviews tended to
take between 20 and 30 minutes and did not involve any
preliminary or training phases.
The Bnei Akiva group participated in three rounds of mapping
interviews. It was intended to compare the first pre-test
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round with a subsequent post-test, or a post-instructional
round, in an attempt to explore dimensions associated with
conceptual change in history.
A post-post-test round was conducted more than two months
later with subjects who had not yet returned to England in an
effort to establish the empirical reliability of this tool.
Subjects did not receive any planned or formal instruction in
Jewish history between the second and third rounds of
interviews, and it was hoped therefore to examine the
consistency or stability of the maps produced by interviews.
Finally, the Machon group participated in a pre-instruction
round, since it was hoped that the data generated by this
exercise could be compared with data produced by the Bnei
Akiva pre-test in an attempt to correlate differences between
maps and other background variables as well as to establish
categories for identifying differences between forms of Jewish
historical knowledge.
Audio recordings were made of all interviews. The results of
these were used in helping to produce neat and final copies of
the 21 cognitive maps ultimately produced. [These have been
collected in Appendix 5.]
Some effort was made to ensure that the experimental
methodology not only made 'human sense' to the interviewee
(Donaldson 1978) but that it should not threaten the
interviewee by seeming to seek to measure their capabilities
or attributes. To this end, each test was preceded by an
explanation and discussion about what was happening. During
this it was explained that the exercise had been developed as
part of an project which was not in fact testing how much
individual people did or did not know but which was
interested, instead, in exploring the different kinds of
education Jewish young people had received and how they had
been affected.
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Design of Instruction: Following the pre-test round of
interviews the Bnei Akiva group participated in a Jewish
history course which was provided for all those involved in
their programme. This, as we have said, consisted of five, one
hour long, units, which were collectively entitled "Reactions
to the Destruction of the Second Temple".
The instructional materials are included in Appendix 4. In
brief, we can say that the five teaching units consisted of
the following:
1. An introductory unit looking at the centrality of Jerusalem
and the Temple during ancient times.
2. A series of three units looking at three types of Jewish
response to the destruction of the Second Temple by the
Romans, including:
a) Surrender and despair
b) Defiance and resistance
C) Adaptation
3. A final unit examining how realistic this typology is, as
well its applicability to other periods of Jewish history.
Instructional materials and methods were shaped by three
principles. First, that students should see how traditional
Jewish sources can be treated from a critical and historical
perspective. Talmudical texts which might, therefore, have
been familiar from a yeshiva context, like that which relates
to the handing over of Jewish suspects to gentile authorities,
were shown to serve as legitimate historical sources, if
handled appropriately.
Secondly, the course was moulded by an effort to explain the
events of Jewish history without recourse to theological
categories. Thus, students would probably have been already
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familiar with miraculous explanations concerning the
establishment of the Sanhedrin at Yavneh by Rabban Vochanan
ben Zakai. Here, they encountered a range of explanations for
this event which were offered from a critical historical
perspective.
Thirdly, and related to this, it was hoped that students would
encounter a critical theory of Jewish history, that is, a
comprehensive explanation of developments in Jewish history
which was entirely secular and rational. It was assumed that
Berger's typology of minority responses to crisis replaced the
assumptions of memorial Jewish history with a set of
assumptions taken from the social sciences, and as such
constituted a rival theory.
Although it is possible to submit instructional materials to
critical analysis, so as to determine how well they conform to
these principles, there are bound to be uncertainties
associated with the analysis of the conceptual content of
instructional practice. We conducted the course ourselves,
which from one perspective may be regarded as advantageous, in
that instruction was carried out with careful attention to our
experimental concerns. However, from another perspective, this
is obviously problematic, in that in this situation it was
difficult to gain an objective assessment of the unintended as
well as intended messages conveyed by instruction. In
subsequent phases this is something that should be taken into
account. However, in the context of what was essentially a
pilot piece of research the advantages gained from close
familiarity with the goals of instruction will probably have
outweighed any attendant disadvantages.
From Generating Maps to Analysing Them
We would argue that the experimental methodology which we have
just described makes possible the examination of two
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hypotheses which should in turn shed light on the concerns we
have been articulating since our first chapter:
1. That there are significant differences between the ways in
which students from committed orthodox Jewish backgrounds
conceive of Jewish history and those who do not share the same
kind of upbringing.
2. That memorial conceptions of Jewish history are placed
under strain by encounters with critical or historiographical
accounts of the Jewish past.
In the next chapter we will describe the kind of instrument
with which we have intended to test these claims, as well as
the data which it has produced.
CHAPTER NINE
Analysing cognitive structure representations of Jewish historical
knowledge:
Procedures and outcomes.
What to make of the twenty-one cognitive maps generated
according to the procedures described in the previous chapter?
We have already explained that our research instrument has
been designed to investigate (a) if there is a correlation
between the conceptual representation of Jewish historical
knowledge and other variables; and (b) if and how Jewish
historical knowledge changes following an instructional
intervention. The problem is that while it has been relatively
straightforward identifying an instrument which might be
appropriate for the generation of cognitive structure
representations in Jewish history, it appears that
establishing mechanisms with which to examine or analyse these
representations will be more complicated. For, although a
number of sophisticated semantic or structural schema have
been developed in order to examine changes in cognitive
structure as a result of instruction (see, for example, Hoz et
a7 1984, Kosminsky & Hoz 1992, or Cronin, Deckers & Dunn 1982,
and Wallace & Mintzes 1990), it is difficult to see how the
categories used in these schema will meaningfully correspond
to changes or differences in the ways in which Jewish history
is represented in cognitive structure.
In many ways, this is the essence of our challenge over the
coming pages; how to establish analytical criteria with which
to produce a valid analysis of different representations of
Jewish historical knowledge ? Certainly this is the heaviest
question which will hang over us as we test out the two
hypotheses which we formulated at the end of the last chapter.
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A First Attempt at Comparative Analysis of Two Sets of Pre-
Test Maps
At the time of the pre-test interviews we were struck by the
quite different ways in which subjects from the Bnei Akiva and
Machon groups talked about Jewish history and Jewish matters.
This was not only in terms of what they said but also in the
way they talked. The Machon group were more irreverent in
conversation. Their thinking seemed more historical and less
theological. As far as it was possible to gauge, they seemed
to give a more prominent place to the Jewish people in their
maps; a place which one sensed was occupied by God in the maps
produced by the Bnei Akiva group. It also appeared that,
generally speaking, each group's thinking hinged on a
different set of central concepts.
Of course, it should be emphasized that these were very much
first and immediate impressions. At the time it was difficult
to know whether they accurately reflected experience or were
the self-fulfilling product of research expectations. It is
also difficult to know whether the more 'orthodox' responses
produced by the Bnei Akiva interviewees were influenced by
their perception of their relationship to the interviewer as
somebody who once occupied a position of authority in their
youth movement.
Nevertheless, these immediate impressions led us to try to
identify patterns of difference between the two sets of maps
produced by these groups, as well as to generate quantitative
representations of these differences. Thus, although we had
originally expected that we would have to develop sets of
categories of our own with which to compare the maps produced
by these two groups, we began our analysis by trying to apply
already existing schemas to these maps.
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We determined to examine 5 semantic and structural
characteristics which we posited might be symptomatic of
significant patterns of difference between cognitive
structures, and proposed to look at these according to
analytical specifications which we took with greater and
lesser degrees of faithfulness from pre-existing examples.
These characteristics included the identity of a central
concept in the map; the total number of links in the map; the
size of the semantic categories of the links between concepts
in the cognitive map; the extent of concept grouping within
the map; and the degree of vertical and horizontal extension
of concepts.
These characteristics were pinpointed in the following ways:
1. The identity of a central concept: We proposed to measure
this in two ways. (a) By following Hoz, Tomer and Tamir (1990)
who take this to mean a substantial concept which is part of
at least 15% of the possible links; and (b) by identifying the
concept which was connected to the largest number of other
concepts.
2. The total number of links in the map: This involved
counting up the number of propositional links in the map, even
if there was more than one link between the same two concepts.
Theoretically, in a map containing 13 concepts there were 78
possible one-way propositional links.
3. The mean size of semantic categories: Following Mahier et
al (1991), each link in the map was classified according to a
semantic category, and the total number of links was divided
by the number of semantic categories. [See Appendix 6 for the
schedule of semantic categories.] The smaller the figure
calculated the richer the variety of semantic categories. Or,
from a different perspective, the higher the figure calculated
the greater the semantic consistency with which propositions
were conceived.
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4. The extent of concept grouping in the map: This was found
by counting up the number of concepts which had been included
in subgroups, dividing this figure by the number of subgroups
in the map and then adding to this the number of concepts not
included in any subgroups. The more intensively a map was
compartmentalized into subgroups the nearer the total would be
to 1. If a map contained no subgroups the final total would be
13.
5. The degree of vertical and horizontal extension of
concepts: This was an attempt to translate Novak's notion of
hierarchy and branching (Novak & Gowin 1984) into terms which
were more appropriate to historical knowledge. A score was
calculated for temporal (vertical) extension where one point
was given for each reasonable level of extension. A score was
calculated for ahistorical (horizontal) extension and these
two figures were then presented as a quotient in which the
first figure was divided by the second. Quotients less than 1
reflect greater horizontal extension and less vertical
extension. Quotients greater than 1 and nearer to 13 reflect
greater vertical and less horizontal extension.
Results and Preliminary Discussion:
Table 1 depicts the five individual cognitive structure
characteristics that were used to evaluate differences between
two sets of maps. In substantive terms the main findings are
as follows:
1. JEWISH PEOPLE was the central concept in half of the maps,
within both the Bnei Akiva and Machon group. However, only two
maps in the Bnei Akiva group and three in the Machon group
filled Hoz, Tomer and Tamir's criterion for 'central'
concepts, that is, involvement in at least 15% of links.
173
2. The number of propositional links within the Bnei Akiva
group ranged between 16 and 25, with a mean of 20.66. In the
Machon group, the number of links ranged between 17 and 23,
with a mean of 20.16.
3. In the Bnei Akiva group the average number of links per
semantic category ranged from 2.7 to 4.8 with a mean of 3.4.
(The mean number of semantic categories into which the links
were classified was 6.3). In the Machon group the average
number of semantic categories ranged from 2.71 to 7.3, with a
mean of 3.8. (The mean number of semantic categories into
which links were classified was 5.8).
4. In the Bnei Akiva group the sub-grouping measure ranged
from 3.25 to 11, with a mean of 7.31. In the Machon group the
grouping measure ranged between 2.6 and 13, with a mean of
7 . 58.
5. In the Bnei Akiva group the quotient derived from the
relation between vertical and horizontal extension ranged
between 1.2 and 11, with a mean of 3.6. In the Machon group
the quotient ranged between 0.57 and 11, with a mean of 3.95.




Avi #1	 -- JUDAISM 5
Michael #1	 11 J.PE0PLE11
Abi #1	 7 J.PEOPLE 7




























































Juliette#1	 -- J.PEOPLE 5	 20
___________ LAND_OF_ISRAEL _______
Yair#1	 -- G-D 5	 19
Karen #1	 —SURRENDER 5	 20
TEMPLE________
JO#1	 9 J.PEOPLE 9	 20
Simon #1	 -- J.PEOPLE 6	 17
Mandy#1	 -- J.PEOPLE 6	 19
Lucy #1	 7 JuDAISM 7	 23
Daniel #1	 7 TEMPLE 7	 22
Ayal #1	 -- LAND OF Is. 5	 20
Inevitably, one is compelled to ask what these statistics are
supposed to mean. The features listed here have all be chosen
for examination because, of all the dimensions investigated in
other analytical schema, they seemed to have promised some
relevance to the testing of historical knowledge. Thus, we
presumed:
1) that the notion of a 'central concept' would reveal
something about the particular focus of each map.
2/3) that the number of propositional links and the mean size
of semantic categories might suggest how far maps were
constructed according to one dominant schema. We posited that
the smaller the number in each case, the greater the extent to
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which maps had been shaped by one overarching sense of their
content.
4) that the intensity and extent of subgrouping would point to
similar features. We imagined that a map which was strongly
historical would most likely not be broken up into smaller
subgroups.
5) that the relationship between vertical and horizontal
extension would strongly indicate the extent to which a map
was or was not historical. Maps which produced a quotient
which was less than 1 would probably reflect an ahistorical
conception.
The problem is that, other than in one dimension, there do not
seem to be consistent differences between the maps produced by
the two groups. Only with regards to the extent of variation
from the mean (the standard deviation) in the relationship
between horizontal and vertical extension does any kind of
pattern or difference emerge. In this particular case it may
imply that maps in the Machon group are either strongly
historical or strongly ahistorical but it certainly does not
point to a pattern of similarity or difference between the
maps produced by the Machon group and those produced by the
Bnei Akiva group.
What these results imply is in fact very hard to say.
Possibly, they suggest that there is actually little
difference between the cognitive structures of orthodox and
non-orthodox subjects with regards to Jewish history,
contrary, that is, to our original hypothesis and contrary to
our immediate pre-test impressions. More likely, they suggest
that the sample here is too small to produce stable or clear
patterns of similarity or difference between the groups. With
only six subjects in each group one or two exceptional maps
will dramatically distort data. Equally likely, the results
here suggest that the kind of quantitative analysis to which
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they owe their origin is not properly sensitive to real
differences or similarities which might exist between
different conceptions of Jewish history. They seem to suggest
that this will continue to be the case at least until we have
developed a set of analytical categories which are
specifically designed with the conceptual representation of
(Jewish) historical knowledge in mind.
Moving Towards an Analytical Approach Which is Sensitive to
the Form and Content of Jewish Historical Knowledge
These conclusions (and in particular the last one) have
encouraged us to pursue (actually, to devise) a different
approach to the analysis of conceptual maps of Jewish
historical knowledge. Instead of attempting to generate
quantifiable differences between maps or between sets of maps
according to criteria which are largely structural, we have
set out to explore what it is that gives each map its
particular identity and meaning, intending to return, only
later, to the issue of difference from there. We have
therefore tried to identify maps which seem to be as similar
to each other as possible and have only then tried to examine
why they nevertheless differ from one other.
The immediate consequences of this approach are striking.
First, and in the most general terms, we have found that a
significant number of maps can be matched up even though they
originate in different experimental groups. (Compare, for
example, Karen#1 or Yair#1 from the Bnei Akiva group with
Ayal#1 or Simon#1 from the Machon group). It is noticeable
that while these maps appear to be very similar in structural
and even some semantic terms, they still represent very
different ways of conceiving of Jewish history.
This impression is reinforced by two further examples. Thus,
we found that the most stable component in the Bnei Akiva pool
177
of maps was the matrix of 'commonplace concepts', that is, G-
D, JUDAISM, LAND OF ISRAEL and JEWISH PEOPLE. These were at
the core of all Bnei Akiva pre-test maps and continued to hold
together (albeit with some intriguing changes) in post-test
maps.
The interesting thing is that these same matrixes also appear
in very similar fashion in most of the maps produced by the
Machon group, even though one would probably characterize
their general representation as reflecting a different view of
Jewish history. Thus, while the form and content of the core
Jewish matrixes within the two sets of maps appear to have
been similar, the meaning of these matrixes was quite
different.
Finally, we noticed that while it is possible to identify maps
which possess almost the same general conceptual structure
(even beyond their core Jewish matrixes) these same maps
nevertheless communicate quite different meanings as a result
of the labels or titles which interviewees give to the map as
a whole (eg. Karen#1 and Mandy#1). In other words, it seems
that maps can look quite similar in both semantic and
structural terms but because of what appear to be small
semantic differences (the titles attached to them) they can
mean something quite different.
We would argue that all of this points towards a number of
important implications. First, it appears to suggest that maps
are most meaningful if treated holistically, without making
artificial distinctions between their structural and semantic
content. In other words, it is likely that any analysis which
focuses on discrete aspects of maps (whether these are
structural or semantic) will generate distorted findings which
will not reflect subtle features in a person's cognitive
structure.
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Although, evidently, structure can by itself strongly point to
completely different ways of conceiving of historical
knowledge (compare, for example, Michael#1 with Jo#1) its
significance is probably much more subtle and contingent.
This, we will hazard, is because by providing two-dimensional
representations of cognitive structure, cognitive maps are
bound to conceal as well as reveal information about the rich,
thick and tangled business which is human cognition.
Secondly, and perhaps more important, these findings seem to
affirm those semantic theories of memory according to which
knowledge is stored in long term memory in propositional
format rather than as a bare matrix of concepts. This view, as
we explained in chapter 4, has been influentially argued by
Anderson and Bower (1973) who conceive of long term memory as
a propositional structure in which elemental propositions are
organized. We would argue that this theory provides powerful
support for the kind of analysis which appears to be required
here, since it is an easy and defensible step from Anderson's
theory to argue that the representation of knowledge should be
examined according to the way concepts have been formulated as
propositions and not just in the way they have been stored or
organi zed.
In fact Andersonian theory provides theoretical support for a
further methodological position that is implicated here. In
semantic memory theory the propositional content of knowledge
is as significant as its structure. This means that the number
of variables available for the examination of the
representation of knowledge are therefore infinitely greater,
since cognitive structure will be examined not only according
to a limited number of structural and a slightly greater
number of semantic criteria but in terms of the substantive
content of each individual semantic component within a
proposition.
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In short Andersonian theory precludes the easy reduction of
the external representation of memory by quantitative
analysis. It also precludes the subjection of concept maps to
pseudo-positivistic methodologies which purport to expose
changes in individual components of cognitive structure over
time or under discrete influences. For, memory, according to
this theory, is not only structure and organization it is (no
matter how automatic) the semantic transformation of concepts
into propositions and that is a process with an infinite
number of possible outcomes.
Before we proceed to setting out the kind of analysis which we
therefore think is appropriate to the examination of cognitive
structure there is one lingering doubt which needs to be
tackled. By rejecting the notion that concept maps cannot be
used to measure discrete changes in internal human processes
or that data generated from them cannot be subjected to
quantitative analysis, we may appear to have implied that
concept mapping methodologies cannot serve as reliable
research tools. Indeed, from this perspective, concept maps
may seem to be incorrigibly idiosyncratic, changing in each
interview in a potentially limitless number of ways.
This, it cannot be sufficiently stressed, is not our
intention. In fact it is appropriate to cite here evidence we
have accumulated of the test-retest reliability of the
cognitive probe we have been using. As we explained earlier,
the main purpose behind our carrying out a post-post-test
round of interviews was in order to establish precisely to
what extent our mapping instrument produced stable and
consi stent responses.
A comparison of the last two rounds of maps produced by the
Bnei Akiva group (that is, two sets of maps produced with an
interval of more than two half months between them) reveal
extremely stable outcomes. Some interviewees produced almost
identical maps despite such an interval between interviews
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(see, in particular, Michael#2 & #3 and Abi#2 & #3). Indeed,
it is useful to note that informal conversation with the
interviewees reveals that this stability is not a consequence
of them successfully remembering what they did during the last
round of interviews but is rather because, on separate
occasions, interviewees produced maps which, they explained,
really did seem to them to be the most (or only) logical way
of representing these concepts.
Our argument is that concept mapping is capable of serving as
a reliable methodology, but like all experimental
methodologies it needs to be used for appropriate purposes and
in suitable ways. Cognitive maps allow us to attend to what
students know and how they organize their knowledge, even if
they do not reproduce a direct copy of the internal
representation of knowledge in memory. Cognitive probes like
these possess the capacity to bring to view certain processes
and structures, but we should not imagine that these
structures exist independently of the stimulus which brings
them into view. If used appropriately they might allow us to
understand better the learner's behaviour or, to be precise,
some of the cognitive processes which may underlie his or her
behaviour. This, among other things, is what we now intend to
test.
Proposing an Alternative Analytical Instrument for Examining
Differences Between Cognitive Structures
We propose that some kind of descriptive analysis is most
appropriate to the investigation of the cognitive
representation of Jewish historical knowledge. By this, we do
not mean a merely anecdotal discussion concerning a number of
different maps, but rather a descriptive methodology which is
anchored by a series of necessary categorical points of
reference which are founded both on a general sense of the
distinctive premises of semantic memory theory as well as on
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an awareness of the peculiar disciplinary features of Jewish
history.
In part, this will involve developing a language or at least a
set of concepts which will make it possible to talk about maps
with precision and meaning. However, it will probably not
involve having to create an analytical language ex nihilo
since our research methodology is not without an ancestry of
its own. We intend, therefore, to work towards developing a
descriptive language of our own by first borrowing, when
appropriate, from related lexicons in the concept mapping
tradition, even if this may lead to an initial awkwardness in
our analysis.
We propose that a descriptive treatment of the cognitive
structure of Jewish historical knowledge should consider at
least the following six features:
1. Title of Map: In many ways, this is the most underexamined
map feature raised by the ConSAT methodology. In fact, we have
been unable to find one reference which until now has made use
of this category for analytical purposes, even though the
ConSAT mapping instrument invites subjects to commit
themselves on this front. One suspects that this is because
map titles are not, strictly speaking, part of cognitive
structure. Rather, they constitute the interviewee's second
order reflection on what he or she thinks their cognitive map
represents.
Given our declared intent to treat concept maps holistically,
rather than as a collection of separate components, we suspect
that titles could serve as useful indicators of what maps as a
whole represent. Arguably, they allow interviewees to
articulate conceptions whose content is more meaningful than
merely taking a sum of the propositional parts of the map.
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We propose that analysis should, therefore, first consider
what the relationship is between the title and the rest of the
map. What, if anything, does the title add to the meaning of
the map ? Does a map's title offer any clues concerning the
general conceptual orientation behind the map ? For example,
is the map essentially about the Jewish people and/or is it
about God ? Does it have limited historical concerns or a
general theological focus ?
2. Identity of cardinal concept(s): Careful attention has been
given to the formulation of this category. The term 'cardinal'
is not intended to serve as a synonym for 'central', nor is it
supposed to be identified in the same way as central concepts
have been in other mapping traditions (see page 171 & 174
above).
We have found that although maps can contain concepts which
are part of more propositions than any other concept, often
these are not the concepts around which the rest of the map is
organized or on which a central chain of propositions hang.
This is what we intend to convey by using the term cardinal.
This category represents the attempt to identify a concept on
which the rest of the map hinges or around which it revolves.
This may be a concept which is connected to the greatest
number of propositions - but not necessarily. Our point is
that the identity of this concept cannot be identified in only
quantitative or structural terms.
3. Representation of commonplace Jewish concepts: Our earlier
argument in chapter 7 leads us to posit that the way these
four concepts are represented will provide the clearest
indication of the view of Jewish history which shapes
different cognitive structures.
In structural terms we will want to know whether they form a
self-sufficient block or whether they are dispersed throughout
the map like other concepts. Does their arrangement effect the
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shape of the map or are they merely features within a larger
system ?
In semantic terms we will want to know whether these formal
terms have been given theological, historical or some other
content. Can we construe their representation as symptomatic
of a particular theory of Jewish history or is this reading
too much into their expression ?
4. Grammatical Tense: Cognitive structure probes have not
until now paid any attention to the grammatical tense in which
propositions are framed. It is possible, however, that this
characteristic will serve as an important indicator of the
nature of Jewish historical knowledge.
In chapter two we frequently argued that critical history is
founded on a conception of history as reconstruction, and of
the past as no longer being present. We also suggested that,
in contrast, when conceived according to the terms of memorial
knowledge, the past is regarded as continuing to live in the
present or that it can at least be recaptured. It is tempting
to suggest that the grammatical tenses used to articulate
propositional structures may point to distinctions such as
these and to others. We will therefore want to know if and
which propositions have been framed in the present, the
discontinuous past or the continuous past tense.
5. Guiding Metaphors: We have been encouraged by the work of
Shulman and others on knowledge growth in teachers (cf. Wilson
et a! 1987) to develop a category for the analysis of
cognitive structure which pays attention to the way in which
propositional networks may be powerfully shaped by a guiding
metaphor. Shulman talks about the way teachers transform
subject matter into an ever widening repertoire of conceptual,
metaphoric and analogic 'representations'. We suspect that any
form of subject matter which has been mastered by anyone will
have been submitted to some major idea (Yinger 1979), master
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story (Gudmondsdottir 1988) or metaphor and that this may well
emerge during the representation of cognitive structure (and
not exclusively in the map's title). Indeed, there is reason
to suggest that the very act of producing a cognitive map is
conducive to the conscious articulation of such metaphors. As
Novak and Gowin have argued, "mapping is not merely
descriptive it is inherently formative" (op cit). Concept
mapping is an exercise in metalearning, that is, it enables
the learner to see what they have learnt; and it is frequently
at such moments that learning takes on a discernable shape
within a particular metaphor.
6. Item representation: This category constitutes the
experimental corollary of Anderson's premise that the
propositional content of knowledge is as significant as its
structure. As we have said, from this perspective, cognitive
structure should be examined not only according to a limited
number of structural and a slightly greater number of
grammatical criteria but according to the content of each
individual component within a propositional network.
Concepts were selected for inclusion in the interview
instrument on the grounds that they would sensitively indicate
differences between, or changes in, the representation of
Jewish historical knowledge. Therefore, although one cannot
expect every concept in every map to operate in this way, it
is reasonable to anticipate that analysis will be sensitive to
the way in which each single concept has been framed. This, we
would argue, is the experimental implication of Anderson's
thesis; that any (and, arguably, every) proposition in each
map has the capacity to signal something of significance about
the content of cognitive structure. Indeed, one suspects that
this is even more likely to be the case when concepts have
been chosen with as much care as they have been here.
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Using Analytical Categories to Establish Paradigms in the
Conceptual Representation of Jewish Historical Knowledge
Having established a number of formal categories with which to
anchor a descriptive analysis of cognitive structure, we
intend to preface our examination of the two sets of pre-test
maps with what we hope will be a useful elaborative exercise.
The six analytical categories which we have described have
primarily been expressed in formal terms, which makes it
difficult to imagine what they would look like in respect of
the particular content of the conceptual representation of
Jewish historical knowledge. Although it is hoped that they
will enable us to identify characteristics of Jewish
historical knowledge - since that is their raison d'etre - it
will be difficult to judge what these characterizations mean
in real terms, without first establishing analytical ideal
types of the ways in which Jewish historical knowledge appears
in cognitive structure. This is what we mean by carrying out
an elaborative exercise, for we propose to elaborate on the
content of each of these analytical categories in terms of a
number of paradigmatic cognitive representations of Jewish
historical knowledge.
We therefore propose to compare three maps which we think can
serve as suitable contexts within which to identify and
elaborate on different characteristics or dimensions of the
cognitive representation of Jewish historical knowledge. These
maps are Karen#1, Jo#1 and Simon#1 - all three of which have
been composed by articulate young people who have not only
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(i) A Theological Paradigm
Karen's propositional network begins with GOD - "There is here
a gradation from the big master to a focal point - the
Temple". However, it does not merely offer a simplified
version of a traditionalist reading of history, it is
representing something which "is a very philosophical idea".
As she explains, "JUDAISM is a theology of GOD". This appears
to be a sophisticated but faith-full way of conceiving of a
relationship normally seen as narrowly causative, as in the
case of Michael#1, for example, where "GOD commanded us
JUDAISM as a way of life" or Avi#1 - "JUDAISM came through GOD
choosing the JEWISH PEOPLE".
Karen's map is anchored by a concept of GOD as well as by a
subsequent chain made up of the commonplace concepts of
Judaism. This is paradigmatic of traditional thinking, where
concept maps start from God (as in 5 of the 6 maps produced by
the subjects in the Bnei Akiva group) and work through the
remaining commonplace Jewish concepts in a unidirectional
manner. While in some analytical traditions this kind of
unidirectional structure may be judged symptomatic of immature
or unsophisticated thinking (see, for example, Novak & Gowin
op cit) it 'is likely that this is not the case here given the
complex and imaginative organization of the remaining concepts
in Karen's map. In this example, the chain effect is almost
certainly a faithful representation of traditional conceptual
organization, where these commonplace concepts are conceived
of as flowing ineluctably one from the other.
From an exclusively structural perspective it would be
difficult to judge whether the remaining concepts in the map
have been represented in a way which is either traditional or
not. After all, it is hard to imagine how the relative
location of concepts like WAR or DEFIANCE would change as a
result of the maps generally traditional or critical
character. However, if the map's general title ("History of
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the Jews relationship to God") is recognized as having
significance, then all the remaining concepts in the map do
assume a distinctive colour which, in this case, is
essentially theological and not merely historiographic.
In this context, even the map's structure may be seen as
complementing or contributing to its generally traditionalist
character, since, one might say, that in the lower portion of
the map Karen seeks to separate off the most obviously secular
concepts in the set (WAR, ROMANS and DESTRUCTION) without
entirely surrendering the possibility that they possess some
religious meaning. To this extent, Karen's thinking provides a
tantalyzing psychological counterpart to modern orthodox
Jewish philosophy of history. It compartmentalizes the secular
from the religious, although it does not surrender the
possibility that these parts may ultimately exist in a
historical unity. Indeed, as Karen herself explains, WAR led
to "theological consequences" in the "ADAPTATION of Jewish
spiritual life to life after the DESTRUCTION of the TEMPLE".
Thus, while the map may deal with the events of the historical
past, it still views them from a fundamentally theological
perspective.
It might be argued that the place occupied by the concept
HISTORIANS jars with much of our analysis. After all, the
interviewee even suggests that this concept "encompasses
everything". However, -it can probably be argued that in actual
fact this concept possesses a second order role. It represents
a "point of view" (the interviewee's words) about the map. It
is as if it has been included as an after-thought. (Indeed, on
returning to the recording of the interview, it was found that
this literally was the case.) It does not provide a rival
centre of gravity. Instead, it stands outside the particular
conceptual universe of this map and looks in on it.
More subtle still, is the question of which grammatical tense
the interviewee has used to describe the arrangement of these
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concepts. For, an intriguing bifurcation seems to have
occurred. On the one hand, all the commonplace Jewish concepts
exist in the present tense. For example, "JUDAISM is a
theology of G-D", "Out of JUDAISM comes the JEWISH PEOPLE",
and perhaps most significantly, "The TEMPLE is the focal point
of the JEWISH PEOPLE". The remaining concepts have been
described using the past tense, with the concept TEMPLE
serving as the bridge between the past and present. Thus, "the
RABBIS were running the show in the TEMPLE", DEFIANCE came
from the RABBIS", and "SURRENDER started off as DEFIANCE",
etc.
The point is not so much that the map has been constructed
using two different tenses, but that the two have been so
sharply separated. While the part which contains the core
Jewish concepts operates in a timeless present, the other
'secular' part describes events which are entirely from and
within the past. In this way the map is an almost pristine
representation of an encounter between the different
perspectives offered by synchronic and diachronic views of the
relationship between the past and the present (de Saussure,
cited by Faur 1987) and thus provides extraordinarily cogent
exemplification of the philosophical notions we developed in
previous chapters.
(ii) A Sociological Paradigm
The map created in Jo#1 may also serve as a paradigm of its
type, since it offers a bold and articulate depiction of a
certain view of the core concepts of Jewish history.
There is little doubt here as to the concept on which the rest
of the map hinges. It is not just that JEWISH PEOPLE is
connected to so many more concepts than any other single

































of propositions which make up this map start from the JEWISH
PEOPLE. Jo's propositional network is as much anchored by the
JEWISH PEOPLE as Karen's was by the concept GOD.
Importantly, however, the overall title applied to the map
does not indicate that it depicts anything distinctively
historical. It is described as "A brief overview of the Jewish
people". From this it is also clear that it is not an
explicitly theological representation and yet, if anything,
the title seems to indicate an ahistorical or sociological
orientation, where the overriding concern is with a people
rather than with a god.
This impression is powerfully confirmed by the grammatical
tense in which almost all of the propositions are couched.
Only one proposition in the entire map is constructed in the
discontinuous historical past - "the TEMPLE was destroyed by
the ROMANS". All other propositions exist either in the
present or in the continuous past, for example, "The JEWISH
PEOPLE have adapted their religion.. .", "the JEWISH PEOPLE
have been in the DIASPORA" or "HISTORIANS have traced the
steps of the JEWISH PEOPLE". In this way, the past is viewed
instrumentally, in terms of its role or impact on the present,
but not as an organizing frame of reference in itself. The
Jewish past is viewed in terms of how it has shaped the Jewish
people today, that is, sociologically rather than
hi storically.
This sociological orientation is reinforced by the location of
the most explicitly historical concepts in the map (TEMPLE and
ROMANS). These have been organized in an almost self-enclosed
arrangement on the periphery of the map, where they do not
exercise any influence on the final arrangement of concepts.
These, as the map's title suggests, are concerned with
describing the Jewish people. As is proper, a "brief overview"
does make mention of the Jewish people's history, since the
past is a datum which contributes to what the Jewish people
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are today. In this context though, history merely serves as
the handmaiden of sociology.
Intriguingly, then, while this map would seem to be more
ahistorical than the most traditionalist of representations,
it is nevertheless intrinsically secular. Commonplace Jewish
concepts have been linked directly from one to another, as
they are in traditionalist maps, and yet in both structural
and semantic terms this conceptual structure does not even
hint at a theological or traditionalist orientation. Here, GOD
is described as something which the JEWISH PEOPLE believe in,
the LAND OF ISRAEL is a place towards which the JEWISH PEOPLE
pray, JUDAISM is a religion which the JEWISH PEOPLE have
adapted. Thus, core concepts are held together, but not in a
chain of inevitability or in an organic interrelationship, but
rather as the differentiated components which give meaning to
one superordinate concept - the JEWISH PEOPLE. It is
tantalysing affirmation for the claim that sociology has
replaced theology as the governing conceptual framework for
contemporary Jews (see, for example Sacks 1989). The
commonplaces of Judaism have been stable, by definition, but
their meaning has been fundamentally transformed into the
terms of sociology. Certainly, this is a powerful
demonstration of the way in which a person's cognitive
orientation (their master story) shapes their conceptual
organization (see, for example, Gudmondsdottir op cit).
If it is proposed that this map serves as an ideal type for a
particular orientation to the core concepts of Judaism, it
must come with a few reservations. For while it generally
offers a phenomological or sociological description of core
Jewish concepts, this is not totally so. During the course of
supplemental questioning (after the map had been described
once) Jo explains that "GOD has a hand in the DEFIANCE of the
JEWISH PEOPLE" and that "the JEWISH PEOPLE will never
SURRENDER." The tone and content of both these statements are
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quite different from the rest of the map, in that they are
possibly normative and certainly non-verifiable. Of course,
one might argue that as supplemental statements their status
is less solid than that of other propositions in the map, but
then, it can equally be argued that, coming as an
afterthought, they may be less self-conscious or more honest
expressions of cognitive structure.
(iii) A Critical/Historical Paradigm
Simon#1 is a different kind of map again. Superficially, it
shows some resemblance to Karen#1, for example in its
unidirectional structure and in the location of GOD at one
pole of the map (in an apparently cardinal position) with
HISTORIANS at the other pole. This however, is a useful
demonstration of how misleading it can be to analyse maps on
the basis of a partial selection of features. For, it can be
convincingly shown that this map is some way from offering a
traditionalist organization or formulation of Jewish and
historical concepts, even if it is not totally consistent in
its presentation.
In the first place, as the overall title shows, this map is
concerned with the particular. It is 11A chronological
history(ish) of the birth of the first State of Israel". Thus,
although the interviewee has been presented with what are
essentially formal concepts he has given them a particular,
time-bound field of reference or application, in a manner
which, one might say, is characteristic of history as a field
of knowledge (Rogers 1972). This is not a description of
timeless truths or of God's role in history, it is the
description of particular historical events. Thus, Simon has
given a particular historical meaning to all of these concepts
in the same way as many other interviewees do, less
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"Destruction of the second Temple", Michael#2 - "Conquest of
Israel by the Romans", and Juliette#2 - "Destruction of the
Temple and how the Jewish people coped").
Equally significant is the way Simon repeatedly emphasises how
he conceives of the map as representing a chronology. Not only
does this show in the general title, but also at other points
during the interview (eg, "one might add more historical facts
in a chronology like this", and "this is a chronological
diagram of what happened from very early in Jewish history to
the destruction of the temples and the Roman period.") One is
tempted to say that chronology serves as the map's guiding
metaphor and may perhaps explain its unidirectional structure,
whereby one concept leads to another in a continuing
chronological chain of events. Certainly, the impression is of
a map shaped by an historical rather than a theological
orientation.
If, then, the map describes a history of the Jews at a
particular period of time, it -is a long way from providing a
faith-full account of that history. Although GOD may stand at
one pole, this concept is connected with some skepticism to
the rest of the map, via the JEWISH PEOPLE - "GOD choosing
(supposedly) the JEWISH PEOPLE." In bald numerical terms GOD
is not actually connected to more concepts than even one other
concept in the entire map. Meanwhile, the commonplace Jewish
concepts occupy what is at best an ambiguous role. They may
all be connected to one another in a roundabout fashion and
each in its own separate way may occupy a prominent position
in the map, but they do not exhibit a related or decisive
preeminence. They cannot be identified as existing as a unit
or a distinctive group among the other concepts in the map.
Two of the commonplace concepts do, nevertheless, appear to
play especially prominent roles. JUDAISM is described as
"encompassing the whole lot" (all the other concepts ?)
although it is by no means clear how. If anything, there is a
196
sense in which JUDAISM is being used as a synonym for Jewish
history - "JUDAISM encompasses the whole lot from the time God
first makes a covenant with Abraham to the history of the
Jewish people developing cultures etc." It is possible that
this description as well as its location reveals that despite
the prominence given to this concept there is some indecision
about what to do with it, particularly given that it is
physically connected only to two other concepts in the map.
Less ambiguous is the role played by the JEWISH PEOPLE. This
is not only the most widely connected concept, it also
probably plays a cardinal role within the map, given its
influence on concepts which in structural terms are some
distance from it. As Simon makes clear in a number of places,
this is a "history of the Jewish people developing", "of the
Jewish people in the land of Israel". It is one more reason
for arguing that the entire representation is shaped by a
critical historical orientation rather than a theological or
traditional one.
It could be said that this claim is somewhat undermined by the
grammatical tense in which the map is couched, for there is no
general tendency to describe even a major part of the concepts
in a past focused fashion, as one might have expected from a
historical description. But then, there is probably no
consi stent tendency of any sort here. Arguably, Karen#1 and
Jo#1 were exceptional in their consistent use of grammatical
tense. This map is more typical of the other samples we have
generated, in that its grammatical tense cannot be viewed as
symptomatic of any particular cognitive orientation.
This might also be said of the relative position of
historical, sociological and theological concepts here.
Although a historical story has been outlined and although
certain concepts have been linked in a predictable fashion
(for example, ROMANS and TEMPLE) others like (ADAPTATION, WAR,
RABBIS and JUDAISM) have been placed in positions for which
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there are neither equivalents in other maps, nor consistent
structural criteria which they might meet in and of
themselves.
Although this lack of consistency may raise questions about
the map's historicity, it does make it more typical of the
other maps we have obtained. For, as we have said, there are
few which have been drawn with the rigor or consistency which
characterize Karen#1 and Jo#1. However, within the set of maps
we possess, Simon#1 does come closest to serving as an ideal
type for a critical/historical organization of Jewish history
because of its chronological orientation, because of the
absence if not the rejection of a theological perspective and
because of the centrality of the Jewish people within it.
These are features which are characteristic of non-memorial
Jewish historical knowledge and which can therefore serve as
points of reference against which to compare other maps.
Preliminary Discussion
One of the most striking things about these paradigms is that
there are actually three of them. Until now, when we have
talked about Jewish historical knowledge it has been in terms
of two alternatives - critical historical knowledge and
memorial knowledge. Indeed, our attempt to construct these
paradigms began in the expectation that we would produce two
exemplary polar cases. It was only as we began to work through
Jo#1 that we discovered that although this was not a memorial
or theological map it was not a historical map either. It was
only as a result of identifying the kinds of features which we
have described above that we were led towards the notion of a
sociological mapping paradigm.
This outcome allows us to make a further claim. For, no doubt,
it could be said that the kind of analysis we have just
attempted is in danger of reading too much into maps or at
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least of finding in them precisely or only those things for
which we have been looking. This is a danger inherent in all
interpretative methodologies, and in a less intimate piece of
research there are certain precautions we would have to take
in order to limit these dangers, as we will explain in the
next chapter. For the moment, however, we would argue that the
unexpected consequences which have resulted from this exercise
may well justify our claim that it has been carried out with
reasonable care and appropriate rigor. After all, our analysis
must have been conducted with some objectivity if it produced
an outcome which was significantly different from our original
expectations.
One more point is worth making at this stage. For, it will
have been apparent that each of these three analyses has been
led by some rather than all of the analytical categories in
our scheme. Thus, we did not pay much attention to the notion
of guiding metaphor in Karen#1 although it was important to
our interpretation of Simon#1. Similarly, we identified
grammatical tense as being a significant indicator in both
io#1 and Karen#1 but not in Simon#1.
We would argue that this fluidity of analysis is consistent
with the experimental principles behind our methodology, in
that it is interested more in the overall meaning conveyed by
cognitive structures than in the detailed description of their
particular parts. This also explains why we did not work
through these categories in the same consistent order.
Analysis was led as far as possible by the particular content
of each map.
Using Cate gories to Conduct a Comparative Analysis of the
Conceptual Representation of Jewish Historical Knowledge.
Having said all of this, it is nevertheless evident that any
attempt to conduct a comparative analysis of two different
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sets of maps will require adapting the methodology we have
just exemplified. If our identification of paradigm maps made
use of a descriptive-analytical methodology in its ideal
state, then our proposal to compare two groups of half a dozen
maps will demand that we make some experimental concessions so
as to make possible the analysis of larger quantities of data.
This is what we attempt to do over the following pages where
we use the six analytical categories listed above in a way
which is hopefully both systematic and holistic, and where map
characteristics are described separately but without losing
sense of the overall meaning which individual maps convey. By
setting out data in this way we hope to facilitate the
comparison of groups of maps without sacrificing the sense of
insight into the individual which is one of the most endearing
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Findings
In the next chapter we will discuss what might be the research
implications of examining maps in this way. For the moment, we will
present what appear to be the main substantive findings produced by
this analysis with regards to our first hypothesis that there are
significant differences between the ways in which students from
committed orthodox Jewish backgrounds conceive of Jewish history
and those who do not share the same up kind of upbringing.
These can be summarized as follows (with points 1 - 6 referring to
individual analytical categories):
1. Machon titles tend to be secular, Bnei Akiva tiles are either
theistic or simply ambiguous.
2. No pattern seems to emerge when the identity of cardinal
concepts in different groups of maps are considered singly.
3. In all Bnei Akiva maps a distinction is made between commonplace
Jewish concepts and other items; either by separating Jewish from
secular terms, timeless from historical concerns, or by
distinguishing stages in a theological or historical chain. In
Machon maps there is less consistency. In half of the Machon maps
no distinction is made between Jewish and other items. In only one
map do commonplace concepts appear to have a superior status.
4. The majority of Bnei Akiva maps involve a blurring of past and
present, which gives some a strong timeless quality. Again, within
the Machon group, there is less consistency in this respect.
However, there are striking examples of compartmentalization of
past from present, or of tension between them.
Guiding metaphors hardly emerge from any maps. When they do they
end to represent maps as chronologies, which, arguably, is not a
etaphor at all.
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6. It is difficult to detect patterns with respect to item
selection. Although Bnei Akiva maps separate other items from
commonplace concepts they do not attribute any specific or
consistent meaning to them. They are particularly diverse in their
representation of the concept HISTORIANS.
Patterns do not emerge from Machon maps either. Some locate items
within historical chains, while others strikingly distinguish
between historical and sociological concepts, ascribing quite
specific and distinct meanings to them.
7. A significant number of Bnei Akiva maps have framed propositions
in personal terms (using the first person plural). None of the
Machon maps show this tendency.
8. Bnei Akiva maps tend to be conceived in theistic or orthodox
Jewish terms, as evidenced by choice of title, identity of cardinal
concept and representation of commonplace concepts.
Machon maps tend to be more diverse. Half are historical, the
remainder are either sociological, phenomenological or
psychological. They tend to be shaped by critical and secular
assumptions, although in some cases this is not without serious
tension.
gain, what the implications of these findings might be we will
iiscuss in the next chapter along with the broader experimental or
empirical implications they raise. For the moment, we will suspend
judgement on both these matters and will turn instead to an
3nalytical consideration of the second hypothesis which we set out
t the end of the last chapter.
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Hypothesis 2: Memorial conceptions of Jewish history are placed
under strain b y
 encounters with critical or historiographical
accounts of the Jewish past.
In many respects this hypothesis looks like an invitation to
examine one of the most popular research questions taken up by
concept mappers - the question of what impact instructional
intervention has on cognitive structure (Carey 1986). For, by
proposing to examine the effects of the critical study of Jewish
history on memorial conceptions of the Jewish past we seem to be
following the path taken by those who have examined the impact of
instruction on conceptual change in biological and scientific
knowledge (Stuart 1983, Wallace & Mintzes 1990, Beyerbach 1986) as
well as those who have investigated changes in disciplinary or
pedagogical knowledge among trainee teachers (Hoz et al 1984, Elbaz
et al 1986, Hoz, Tomer and Tamir op cit). Indeed, the ConSAT
methodology from which our own mapping instrument is derived was
itself originally developed in order to examine the impact of
instruction on conceptual knowledge of geology (Champagne et al,
1984).
)nce again there is, therefore, an enormous temptation to take up
reexisting analytical categories of conceptual change and to apply
them to our particular concerns. Thus we could examine the extent
o which students have integrated certain 'new' concepts and
ropositions into their cognitive structures (Wallace & Mintzes
1990), or the extent to which they have progressively
ifferentiated pre-existing concepts (Cronin et al, 1982). We could
:est how far students' cognitive structures conform to a conceptual
;tructure derived from instructional materials (Hoz, Tomer & Tamir
,p cit), we could chart changes in the semantic richness of maps
Mahler et al, op cit) or investigate changes in the homogeneity of
tructural sub-groups (Kozminsky & Hoz op cit).
lowever, as we have spent much of this chapter arguing, the problem
rith pursuing such an 'adoptive' strategy is that none of the pre-
xisting categories we have just cited are necessarily sensitive
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either to the conception of semantic memory with which we have been
working or to the particular disciplinary features of Jewish
history. It would therefore be difficult to know what the data they
produce actually means in terms of Jewish historical knowledge. For
these reasons, above all, we feel that the analytical categories
which we have so far developed ourselves will be more sensitive to
the impact of instruction on the conception Jewish history, and
also more meaningful -in terms of what they reveal about Jewish
historical cognition.
We propose, therefore:
1. To examine each of the maps generated by the post-instruction
phase of Bnei Akiva interviews on the basis of the analytical
categories we have already developed for the examination of the
representation of Jewish history in cognitive structure.
2. To compare the results of this analysis with data produced from
analysis of Bnei Akiva pre-test maps.
3. To attempt to identify general patterns of similarity and
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Comparative Analysis of Pre-Test and Post-Test Bnei Akiva Maps.
1. Of all the maps in the group Avi#2 shows the most limited
structural and semantic change. Although the position of the
commonplace Jewish concepts has changed, their propositional
content remains strongly and theologically orthodox, if not more so
than in the pre-test map. Certainly, items do not possess meanings
which might be attributed to instruction.
This is important, since of all the subjects in the group Avi was
the only one who did not take part in the whole course of
instruction. He attended only the first two hours of the course and
did not, therefore, encounter many of the central components within
instruction. Although these two maps could not be classified as
constituting a control sample, they do provide a useful
counterpoint to maps produced by other subjects after participation
'in the whole course.
2. Michael#2 shows dramatic changes in conceptual representation.
Commonplace Jewish concepts have been emptied of theological
content and almost entirely depersonalized. The meaning of the map
has been transformed from a present-time and faithful view of the
Jewish religion to a focused account of a particular substantive
historical episode. Particularly striking is the decrease in the
number of propositional links. It is as if the subject has
eliminated all knowledge extraneous to this particular history. No
doubt this also explains the location of HISTORIANS where
effectively it is outside the map - it is not a substantive
historical concept. Also notable is the neat integration of
Berger's typology into the body of the map.
3. There appear to be as many similarities between Abi#2 and Abi#1
as there are differences. On the one hand, both maps are dense with
Dropositions, with many concepts linked to many others. Both have
conceived of HISTORIANS in unusually activist terms. Both have also
tended to conceive of commonplace Jewish concepts in personal
terms. On the other hand, significant changes have taken place. The
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commonplace Jewish concepts have been fractured, with JEWISH
PEOPLE, in a sense, becoming more dominant within the context of
the map as a whole. Arguably, it has become a historical concept
rather than a religious one. Berger's typological concepts have,
meanwhile, been drawn together and integrated into the flow of the
historical representation, accurately reflecting their position
within the instructional materials.
4. One of the most significant changes in Juliette#2 is the
grammatical tense in which the map is framed. While Juliette#1 was
almost entirely framed in the present tense, Juliette#2 is almost
completely in the past tense. It appears that what was a largely
theological representation, which separated Jewish from secular
concerns, has become a clearly demarcated representation of an
historical sequence of events. In the process, the commonplace
Jewish concepts have lost their closely knit self sufficiency to
the degree that there are only limited suggestions that they might
possess intrinsic meaning of their own. Further evidence of the way
in which items have been conceptually transformed is provided by
the representation of HISTORIANS outside the body of the second
nap, presumably because it is not regarded as a substantive
sistorical concept.
5. Yair#2 is a mysterious and ambiguous map. Yair#1 had consisted
)f a rigorous chain of causation powerfully shaped by a theistic
iiew of history. In Yair#2 the subject reports that "it would be
)oring to do the same map again". He has therefore produced a map
vhich appears to be conceived as a theological argument concerning
eward and punishment, and informed by data from the past.
lthough the two maps are different, and especially in their
'epresentation of the Jewish commonplace concepts, there is one
mportant feature which they do share and which may go some way
:owards explaining the lack of influence instruction seems to have
ad on the shape and content of the post-test map. For Yair#1 and
2 are the only maps produced by a subject in this group where one
:ould say that they have been shaped by some sort of master story
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or metaphor. It is tempting to argue that this feature points to a
degree of conceptual mastery which might make the subject's
cognitive structure resistant to the influences of instruction.
6. The title of Karren#2 signals that important changes have taken
place -in the representation of these concepts. Whereas Karren#1 was
concerned with the whole sweep of Jewish history Karren#2
apparently represents the substance of one particular episode in
the Jewish past - the destruction of the second temple. Whereas the
commonplace Jewish concepts in Karren#1 were conceived as part of a
sophisticated theological argument, here they have been fractured,
with the JEWISH PEOPLE entering history, and the remaining concepts
being predicated, almost as an afterthought on the concept TEMPLE.
The concepts from Berger's sociological typology have been
integrated into history but are not limited to the discontinuous
past. HISTORIANS, meanwhile, is not conceived as a substantive
concept at all but as a second order term from which to make sense
of the body of the map.
Findings
The main substantive findings produced by this analysis might be
summarized as follows (with points 1-6 corresponding to individual
analytical categories):
1. In half the maps there has been a notable shrinkage of focus.
While pre-test map were conceived as representing timeless issues
or universal histories (eg, "Elements of Judaism and challenges to
it"), half of the post-test maps have acquired a particular or
limited historical meaning (eg, "Conquest of Israel by the
Romans").
2. With the exception of Avi#2 and Yair#2 (and probably for reasons
which we have intimated above), there has been a change in the
identity of cardinal concepts. Whereas in pre-test maps these were
made up of commonplace Jewish concepts which had been given
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theological content, in post-test maps other items serve as
cardinal concepts, without any religious significance.
3. A number of changes have taken place in the representation of
commonplace Jewish concepts. Whereas in the pre-test maps they
formed an identifiable and even organically linked group, distinct
from other secular or ephemeral items, in post-test maps they have
become fragmented and are reduced to networks of two or three
concepts (in different permutations). In a number of cases they
have been emptied of intrinsic meaning or significance, even if
they are not entirely indistinguishable from other items.
4. Pre-test maps (apart from Karren#1) tended to blur past and
present tenses, perhaps showing a general tendency to conceive of
concepts as timeless or as presently meaningful. Although there is
again a mixture of tenses in post-test maps, there appears to be
greater control or internal consistency about how they are used.
Maps now contain parts which are identifiably historical and
separate from other parts which very definitely are not historical.
5. Only one map - Yair#2 - exhibits what might be called a guiding
metaphor. It may be significant that this map also shows very few
symptoms of having been influenced by instructional intervention.
6. There have been striking changes in item representation. Four
maps in the post-test group clearly represent the three
sociological categories which played a prominent part in
instructional materials, whereas in pre-test maps there was little
that was uniform about their conception. These four maps have also
been consistent in attributing a second order meaning to
HISTORIANS, as a concept which does not conform to the substantive
character of the rest of the map.
7. While there was a tendency among some pre-test maps to present a
personalized conception of these concepts, with a number of
propositions being framed in the first person plural; in post-test
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maps this only happens in exceptional cases, and in much more muted
fashion.
In brief, these are the main findings that result from a
comparative analysis of pre-test and post-test maps. Strictly
speaking they relate only to the impact of instructional
intervention on Jewish historical knowledge. The question we must
now consider is what they mean in terms of the relationship between
Jewish history and Jewish memory. It is this problem that will be
close to the centre of our concerns in the next chapter.
CHAPTER TEN
Drawing conclusions and discussing implications
Over the last few chapters we have tried to signal how we have
regarded the empirical part of our research as operating on two
registers. On one level, we have characterized it as constituting
an attempt to generate data which would shed light on our original
concerns about the relationship between Jewish memory and Jewish
history. On another level, we have suggested that it might serve as
a pilot study in an attempt to apply a particular research tool to
unexplored territory.
Inevitably, as we discuss the findings produced by research, it is
the second register that must take precedence, since any
substantive conclusions about changes or differences in the
cognitive representation of Jewish history will be conditioned by
conclusions reached concerning the essential reliability and
validity of the research tool. There will be little point
suggesting that the results produced by the comparative analysis of
pre-test maps imply one thing or another, if, to quote dough and
Driver, it is then shown that maps are little more than "artifacts
of the methodology, transient solutions devised in an interview
when an answer of some kind is a social imperative" (1986). Our
discussion of the implications raised by research will therefore
begin with issues of experimental syntax (the methodological
grammar of research) and will only then proceed to issues of
substance, that is, matters related to the specific hypotheses for
the examination of which research was constructed.
Syntactical Implications
Champagne and Klopfer, the original creators of the Concept
Structure Analysis Technique (ConSAT), suggest that "in the
development of any measuring instrument, especially one which
purports to provide information about something as elusive as how
students structure [science] concepts, there are legitimate
concerns about the instrument's reliability and validity" (1984
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p.100). Indeed, it is precisely these concerns which drove much of
our argument through chapters 5 and 6, as we sought to establish,
whether, in theory, it was legitimate to produce conceptual
representations of historical knowledge.
The problem with our methodology, as was also the case in Champagne
and Klopfer's original work, is that it is not possible to
determine either its concurrent or predictive validity because no
other measures of students' structuring Jewish historical concepts
have yet been devised. Nevertheless, the methodology's construct
validity can be established in terms of the procedures used to
select items for inclusion in the map construction task, and in
terms of the procedures used to analyze the representations
produced by subjects.
As regards the former, there are strong grounds for asserting that
experimental items do conform to a typology of the semantic
components of Jewish historical knowledge. Historical knowledge, we
have argued, is made up of concrete universals, colligatory
concepts and concepts which have been taken either from other
disciplines or everyday discourse. It is likely, therefore, that
the thirteen 'concepts' which have been selected for inclusion in
the mapping exercise do actually represent elemental components in
the cognitive representation of Jewish historical knowledge.
As regards the latter, that is, the construct validity of the
procedures used to analyse cognitive representations, we are more
circumspect. Admittedly, we have tried to develop a descriptive-
analytical approach which is discernibly and directly attributable
to a particular theory of semantic memory. Similarly, we have also
attempted to develop a number of analytical categories within that
approach that are sensitive to features in both historical and
memorial knowledge, in accordance with our discussions in chapters
2 and 6. However, a suspicion remains that in their separate parts
these analytical categories do not identify real differences or
changes in Jewish historical knowledge, but rather the tantalizing
but not very substantive echoes of artificial experimental
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constructs. If, therefore, they do possess construct validity then
it is probably as a totality rather than as a collective, that is,
where the combined product of their representations is more
substantial and meaningful than the sum of their parts.
In considering the likely reliability of our experimental
methodology we can be reasonably confident about the outcomes
generated by mapping procedures, even if a number of doubts linger
over the reliability of analytical procedures. We have already
reported in the last chapter how the mapping instrument appeared to
show a high degree of test-retest reliability following comparison
of maps produced in post-test and post-post-test interviews.
Although it is always possible that the strikingly consistent
responses created by some subjects in these rounds may actually
indicate the instrument's insensitivity to informal or unseen
influences on the content of cognitive structure in the intervening
period, the importance of finding such experimental stability
cannot be sufficiently emphasized. For, one of the most frequent
criticisms levelled at methodologies such as this is that they
produce 'idiosyncratic' outcomes which change arbitrarily from one
interview to the next (Dominowski 1974). Interviewees have been
known to claim that if interviewed twenty four hours later about
the same items they would produce significantly different maps.
-lowever, the generation of a number of almost identical maps in the
Dost-post-test phase, despite an interval of nearly three months
Detween interviews, implies not only that the experimental tool is
:apable of producing consistent outcomes, but that cognitive
structure may itself be extremely stable unless significantly
ii sturbed.
Jnfortunately, we still cannot talk about the reliability of
analytical procedures with complete confidence. Indeed, it is
almost inevitable that a descriptive methodology such as this will
e heavily subjective and, therefore, implicitly unreliable. For,
o analyse a map is to read one, and no matter how closely analysis
is tied to a stable set of categories, it is ultimately dependent
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on the kind of intertextual contingencies which are a part of all
reading and which make it such a personal business.
For all that, it is evident that certain mechanisms could be built
into the methodological design so as to limit interpretative flux
and to establish reasonable analytical reliability. Thus, it would
be possible to introduce a blind component, in which anonymous maps
were subjected to analysis. It would certainly be possible to build
in checks and balances whereby analyses were moderated by second or
third parties, and it might even be appropriate to introduce a
reflexive component in which subjects were invited to comment on
the analysis to which their maps had been subjected. One suspects
that all of these strategies and others too would go a long way
towards limiting the sense that the descriptive analysis of maps is
little more than a personal reading.
As far as the work here goes, we can report that many of our
readings have been moderated either by individuals who might be
described as subject matter experts in Jewish history, or by
individuals who possess accumulated experience in reading concept
maps. Furthermore, and in some ways more critical, a number of
analyses have been presented for discussion before seminar groups
made up of students and colleagues. Arguably, these exercises have
gone a long way towards establishing the intersubjective
reliability and validity of the work presented here.
Substantive Conclusions Re gardin q Differences in Cognitiv
If we have, then, developed a valid and reliable methodology for
the representation and analysis of Jewish historical knowledge in
cognitive structure, it is legitimate to consider what substantive
conclusions might be drawn from the findings produced in the
previous chapter. In other words, if the experimental tool is
fundamentally sound we are in a position to ask what its findings
imply.
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Here, unfortunately, we appear to encounter a significant obstacle.
For, although our sample may have been of a sufficient size to
establish the fundamental reliability and validity of the
experimental tool, there may be strong grounds for doubting whether
it is substantial enough (in this particular case) to support
reliable conclusions about differences or changes in cognitive
structure. Our sample was made up of two sets of pre-test maps,
with six maps in each group, one set of six post-test maps and one
set of three post-post-test maps (Three subjects left the programme
before the last round of interviews). The problem is that it is
difficult to determine whether such a collection of 21 maps can
provide the basis for reaching reasonably firm conclusions about
differences or changes in the cognitive representation of Jewish
historical knowledge. After all, there are not exactly any pre-
existing criteria according to which one could determine such a
thing.
We intend to take a subjective and self-consciously minimalist
position, and wfll argue that while the pre-test sample has been
more than adequate for establishing and refining sets of categories
for the analysis of the conceptual representation of Jewish
historical knowledge, it is probably insufficient for building firm
conclusions about the character and causes of different conceptions
of Jewish history. This is particularly so when considering the
influences on or causes behind different cognitive structures. For
although subjects have been grouped in two reasonably homogeneous
samples within the experimental design (particularly in terms of
religious observance), there have probably been too many
uncontrolled variables in each group (like length and intensity of
Jewish education, or extent of historical education) which may have
influenced mapping outcomes.
Indeed, as we have previously argued, it is even debatable whether
concept maps can ever serve pseudo-positivist objectives such as
these which seek to identify a relationship between components of
cognitive structure and discrete influences upon them (cf. Cohen
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1991 p.6). From this perspective, it is not only the size and sort
of sample that prevents us from confirming or rejecting our first
hypothesis, it is, rather, as the messy and sometimes contradictory
nature of our findings show, that cognitive structure cannot simply
be reduced to a number of identifiable and discretely influenced
components (Hunt et a7 1973).
This does not mean that it is not possible to identify
characteristic features of different ways of conceiving of Jewish
history. As our findings show, we have almost certainly identified
a number of quite distinct ways of representing Jewish historical
knowledge in cognitive structure. The point here is that cognitive
structure on the one hand, and 'Jewish background' on the other are
each too rich to correlate with one another in so simple or
mechanistic a fashion. Thus, although we found that "Bnei Akiva
maps tend to be conceived in theistic or orthodox terms" while
Machon maps "tend to be shaped by critical and secular assumptions"
(page 208 above), there are nevertheless too many background
variables influencing the members of each group and too many
exceptional features, or inconsistencies, displayed by many of the
maps themselves for it to be legitimate to draw reasonable
conclusions about influences operating on different conceptions of
Jewish historical knowledge.
Despite these conclusions, and as we have intimated above, we would
nevertheless suggest that one of the important outcomes of our
research has been that it has generated strong examples of
different ways of conceiving of Jewish history. This, after all, is
the particular strength of concept mapping methodologies, in that
they provide a visual image, an external representation, of the
internal representation of knowledge. In this case, we have not
only been able to identify powerful paradigm examples of the
representation of Jewish historical knowledge, but we have also had
the opportunity of comparing the features which they exemplify with
a number of quite personal conceptions of Jewish history. Having
been able to identify in graphic fashion the characteristics which
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constitute different conceptions of jewish history, we have opened
up the possibility of exploring what shapes or influences these
conceptions, even if for the moment that kind of analysis remains a
long way off.
Substantive Conclusions Regarding Changes in Cognitive Structure
In contrast to the rather blurred conclusions which result from the
analysis of pre-test maps, the possibilities suggested by the
comparative analysis of pre-test and post-test maps are quite
striking. In this instance, it is not that the experimental sample
is any larger or more substantive, but it is rather because the
variables being examined are much more limited. In seeking to
examine the impact of a course of instruction on the conceptual
representation of Jewish historical knowledge, we are attempting to
chart the impact of what in objective terms is a common set of
experiences on an already given and limited set of structures, no
matter how diverse the structures may themselves be. For this
reason above all, that is, because the experimental situation is so
much more closely controlled, we can feel relatively confident
about the soundness of some of the conclusions which might be
derived from research findings.
omparative analysis shows four of the six maps having changed in
shape, content and overall meaning, in ways which might be directly
attributable to instructional intervention, although, of course,
:his might equally well be due to subjects better understanding the
'context' in which the mapping interview is taking place (cf.
lackay 1973). Thus, these four maps display changes in overall
:itle, cardinal concept, representation of Jewish commonplace
oncepts and other conceptual items, as well as changes in the
rammatical formulation of propositions, which correspond to
;ignificant conceptual characteristics within instructional methods
md materials.
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Research findings also point to two post-test maps which reveal
certain changes in conceptual representation, but which are neither
consistent with changes in other maps, nor which can be directly
attributed to the influence of instruction. One of these maps was
produced by a subject who attended only a limited part of the
course. The other map was produced by the only subject in this
group whose representations appear to be under the influence of a
strong guiding metaphor of some sort.
A number of substantive conclusions are suggested by these
findings. We will present what are probably the most general
conclusions first and proceed towards what are probably the most
particular.
i) Concept mapping allows the possibility of describing and
comparing representations of Jewish historical knowledge, and of
examining the influence of instruction upon specific features of
Jewish historical knowledge.
ii) The conception of Jewish history can change in substantial,
stable and potentially important ways under the influence of
shortish periods of instruction.
iii) The influence of instruction on a given body of Jewish
historical knowledge is limited in relation to the extent of an
individual's conceptual mastery of that body of knowledge.
iv) Changes in the representation of Jewish historical knowledge
following an encounter between memorial and critical conceptions of
Jewish history appear to correspond to well established notions of
assimilation and adaptation.
v) Critical conceptions of Jewish history can place memorial
representations of Jewish historical knowledge under great strain,
by tending to empty them of their theistic content, by drawing a
clearer distinction between the past and present, and by eroding
their personal significance.
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Experimental and Educational Implications
Although our research was initiated by a particular problem and a
substantive question, in terms of what the relationship might be
between Jewish history and Jewish memory, it seems as 'if the most
outstanding implication of our empirical work is not what it has
revealed about Jewish history but what it promises in terms of the
experimental tool we have used.
Concept mapping is not a new experimental methodology. It has been
developed as an evaluative and pedagogical tool over a period of at
least twenty years. Yet, as we especially explained in chapter 5,
there have been doubts about whether approaches taken from this
tradition could serve as appropriate probes of historical
knowledge. Not only have there been suspicions about whether
history possessed identifiable conceptual components, but there has
been skepticism about the possibility of developing analytical
procedures which might produce valid accounts of the form and
content of historical knowledge.
Our research has shown that not only is it theoretically legitimate
to elicit conceptual representations of Jewish historical
knowledge, but that in practical terms it is possible to generate
data which is meaningful as the external representation of
cognitive structure and as regards the place of Jewish historical
knowledge within it.
This is a strong and significant claim. For until now research into
the character of historical thinking and knowledge as been
something of a poor relation to research into the manipulation and
representation of scientific knowledge. This is partly because
psychological research of this sort has been so much overshadowed
by the particular scientific assumptions behind Piaget's work but
also because history, of all the humanities, has seemed too
contingent or subjective to submit to reliable psychological
methodologies.
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Ironically, however, our work here, and in particular our attempt
to develop an experimental methodology which is faithful to
Anderson and Bower's semantic memory theory, has suggested that
historical knowledge is unusually suited to examination by
psychological probes of the sort we have developed. For, it is not
only that historical knowledge is so rich in propositional content
and therefore ripe for semantic analysis, but that when changes in
historical knowledge are conceived, in philosophical terms, as
resulting primarily from the redescription of already known
concepts rather than as the acquisition of new ones, there seems to
be a tantalizing meeting between psychology and philosophy. For,
the development of historical knowledge conceived in philosophical
terms such as these is positively analogous to the development of
knowledge in semantic memory theory and, as a result, is eminently
suited to examination by psychological probes which are predicated
on this theory.
Stuart has suggested that "if concept maps are to be of greater
utility, for educational research and as an aid to teaching and
learning, a more holistic and qualitative scoring technique needs
to be developed" (1985). Arguably, that is precisely what has been
developed here - an analytical approach which is both systematic
and holistic, where maps and their characteristics are treated
descriptively but also in a way which facilitates analysis of
differences and changes in them. Hopefully, it is a rigorous
experimental approach which does not sacrifice the sense of insight
into the individual which, as we have previously said, is one of
the most endearing features of concept mapping research.
Of course, we do not intend to suggest that concept mapping
constitutes some kind of experimental panacea or substitute for a
whole series of techniques such as clinical interviews, real life
observations and introspective reports. The point we are making is
that a methodology such as the one developed here promises the
possibility of examining aspects of cognition which were previously
considered opaque or somehow inaccessible. They promise, for
232
example, the possibility of charting the development of student's
knowledge over a number of school years and diverse educational
experiences.
This effectively brings us back to our original question. For, it
will seem slightly dubious to make claims such as these when we
have suggested that our work has shed no more than a faint light on
the substantive concerns with which we began, that is, in terms of
the impact of certain forms of history teaching on Jewish
historical knowledge. It should therefore be emphasised that the
circumspect character of our remarks was not intended to raise
doubts about the potential utility or credibility of the research
tool in and of itself, but rather to signal the restricted nature
of this particular piece of research. Taking a long term view, our
work is best characterized as a pilot study in which promising
possibilities are raised but substantial conclusions are not
reached. These promising possibilities include a consideration of
the potential uses to which the experimental tool might be put, but
they also include a number of tentative substantive conclusions
which have been derived from the findings here. For while it has
been inappropriate to draw conclusions about the relationship
between different conceptions of Jewish history and other
background variables, there are a number of reasonably sound
inferences which it might be possible to make about the impact of
the study of critical conceptions of Jewish history on memorial
conceptions of the Jewish past.
In this case, concept mapping has provided graphic evidence of the
way in which theistic and personalized conceptions of Jewish
history are affected by an encounter with a quite different
conception of the Jewish past. Thus, it would seem from one point
of view that memorial representations of Jewish historical
knowledge seem to have been corroded or fractured in this
encounter, while from another perspective, that they have
reinvented or redescribed themselves as an alternative but no less
eaningful set of propositions.
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What this means as regards introducing Jewish adolescents to the
critical treatment of Jewish history can for the moment only be
surmised. Our data certainly does not possess the authority on
which such pronouncements can be based. In offering what at this
stage is no more than an informed guess, we would suggest that
encounters between history and memory may have a number of possible
outcomes. In cases where students already have a highly developed
sense of what they think Jewish history consists of, critical
conceptions of the Jewish past will probably be assimilated with
little disruption into pre-existing and powerful propositional
networks. On the other hand, where students have only a vague pre-
existing sense of what the Jewish past consists of their
representation of the Jewish past may dramatically change. No doubt
each and every individual encounter between critical history and
collective memory will take place somewhere along a spectrum marked
out by these poles.
If these are rather bland and somewhat unexceptional inferences,
they are accompanied by an extremely strong conclusion which our
empirical work does suggest. These might be described as relating
to the vitality of cognition. What this suggests is that from the
perspective of concept mapping research it is rarely appropriate to
talk of memory being undermined by history, or of memorial
knowledge being undermined by critical historical knowledge. For,
there are no cases here about which one could say that they show
one form of conceptualization being subverted or corrupted by
another. What they show, instead, is the fertile character of
cognitive structure as it develops and as it absorbs new bodies of
knowledge. What they show is the student as an active agent in the
educational process.
This is not a new idea. It is at least as old as Bartlett's classic
'schemata' experiments of the 1930's but it still has important
implications. As we suggested in chapter 3, one of the most
significant consequences of the introduction of theories and
principles from cognitive psychology into the world of education
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has been that they have placed the student at the centre of
reflection about the educational process. This is particularly well
exemplified by the experience of examining knowledge through the
use of probes into cognitive structure. For having acquired graphic
evidence of how the student has adapted or assimilated knowledge in
cognitive structure, it is difficult to maintain any notion of the
student's conception of the Jewish past as having been passively
overwhelmed or undermined by an alternative conception of Jewish
history. What we gain instead is a sense of encounter between the
student's pre-conceptions and those embedded within instructional
materials and methods.
Practitioners of concept mapping have frequently maintained that it
is because concept maps provide this kind of evidence that they are
so useful. Not only do they promise the possibility of monitoring
the 'intellectual journey' taken by students or of assessing the
degree to which students have assimilated the conceptual content of
specific courses, they also provide data which is of great value to
the curriculum developer.
In the world of Jewish education it has long been fashionable to
promise curricula which start 'where the student is at'. However,
for all the child-centred enthusiasm of curriculum specialists, and
often through no fault of their own, curriculum developers
frequently do not possess meaningful information about students or
of how they conceive of Judaism and Jewish tradition. This,
potentially, is the kind of information which concept mapping can
supply; rich data concerning the student's conception of
commonplace Jewish concepts, of the relationship between the Jewish
past and the student's present and of the relationship between Jews
and gentiles. If Jewish education is to begin where the student is
at, it seems as if concept mapping will at least help in locating
the starting line.
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From Conclusions to New Beginnings
Unfortunately, our extended reflections, discussions and empirical
examinations do not enable us to achieve some kind of closure. In
many ways they deepen the sense of unease which moved us in the
first place. By having demonstrated how rich and various can be the
encounter between history and memory they make one anxious not
about the students who experience this encounter but rather about
the many more Jewish students who may already suffer from
collective Jewish amnesia.
After so many pages, it seems perverse to think in these terms, but
having surveyed the fertile consequences of the encounter between
history and memory, one suspects that the most urgent Jewish
educational questions are not concerned with the possibly corrosive
impact of critical history on collective memory but with something
else instead. If they relate to the teaching of Jewish history,
then it is probably in terms of the impact Jewish history has on
students who possess few if any Jewish memories. From this
perspective it would be interesting to ask not what impact
historical knowledge has on memorial knowledge but rather if
history can itself create memory.
If this sounds like a proposal to start all over again, it is not
entirely honest. What it really means is making a beginning which
has only become possible at a moment of conclusion such as this.
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Appendix 1.
Schedule for Mapping Interview.
In the first interview with a subject the interviewer goes through parts 1-7. In a repeating interview
with the same subject the interviewer on'y goes through parts 4-7.
1. Introduction:
Explanation of task: First, thank you for agreeing to help in this. Basically, I am going to ask you to
do a couple of exercises over the next haif an hour or so. Not in order to test what you do or do not
know, but, rather. in order to find out something about Jewish education in the country where you
have grown up".
2. Demonstration:
a) 'The first exercise is intended to give you a sense of what this is all about. I am going to give you
a pile of words all of which you will prooaoly recognize. Can you please organize them on the table
in such a way as to show what you think aoout them and what you think is the relationship between
them. Please take as long as you want"
b) The interviewer hands the interviewee a set of 8 small cards with one word written on each.
c) When the interviewee is satisfied with trie arrangement, the interviewer explains that he is going
to draw a copy of the arrangement on a arge piece of paper. If concepts were put close to one
another or in what looks like a closed reationship, the interviewee asks: "Do you intend that these
concepts form a group 7' The interviewer circles every group.
d) The interviewer then asks: "Could you explain in detail why you have organized concepts in this
way and what you see as the relationstup oetween them". The interviewer connects concepts by line
on the piece of paper and records the wa y
 in which their relationship is described.
e) When the interviewee is satisfied that ail conceptual relationships in the map have been
described, the interviewee asks: "Is it possible to give labels to the subgroups you have identified ?"
f) The interviewer then asks the interviewee to reconsider the map: "Are then any other connections
between words or groups other than those you have described ?" The interviewer draws these on
the map in a way which distinguishes them from previously stated relationships.
g) The interviewer asks: "Is it possible to g ye a label or title to the entire arrangement so as to show
the general idea behind it 7'
2.
This phase should end with a map in which the whole organization is characterized, evefy group (if
such exist) is characterized and all related concepts connected by a labelled line.
3. Preparing for the Arrangement:
The interviewer continues: Thank you, that completes the first exercise. 1m now going to give you
another pile of cards containing words which you may or may not recognize. rm going to ask you to
do a couple of similar exercises with these words.
4. Arranging the Concepts:
a) Identification and Classification - The interviewer hands the interviewee 13 cards and explains:
The first thing I'm going to ask you to do with these words is to organize them into two piles - words
you do recognize and words you don't recognize. The interviewer writes down the unrecognized
concepts.
b) Definition - After two piles have been made. the interviewer asks: Please define or explain every
concept you have recognized'. The interviewer writes down the definitions in the order in which they
are given.
c) Arrangement of recognized concepts - The interviewer asks: "In same as way as you did with the
last group of words can you organize these on the table in a way which shows how you think about
them and how they are related'.
d) Recording the arrangement - The interviewer then records the arrangement on a large piece of
paper, in the same way as the interviewee, leaving big spaces between concepts. If concepts were
put close to one another or in what looks like a closed arrangement. the interviewee asks: "Do you
intend that these concepts form a group ?" The interviewer circles every group.
e) Explanation of the arrangement and relating concepts. The interviewer then asks: "Could you
explain in detail why you have organized concepts in this way and what you see as the relationship
between them'. The interviewer connects concepts by line on the piece of paper and records the
way in which their relationship is described.
f) Identification of sub-groups - When the interviewee is satisfied that all conceptual relationships in
the map have been described, the interviewee asks: "Is it possible to give labels to the subgroups
you have identrfied7
g) Additional links - The interviewer then asks the interviewee to reconsider the map: "Are there any
other connections between words or groups other than those you have descnbed ?". The interviewer
draws these on the map in a way which distinguishes them from previously stated relationships.
h) The interviewer adds: Are there any r&ations which you would describe differently from the way
in which you have done so already ?" These are also recorded on the sheet
5. Additional Concepts:
a) In cases where certain concepts were not recognized, the interviewer asks: 'Can you now add
any of the unrecognized concepts to the map ?" The interviewee places these where they belong
and the interviewer also records these on the map, together with any ways in which they are linked
to other concepts.
b) Supplementary concepts - The interviewee is asked "Are their any concepts which you would
have liked to have also included in the mao which were not on these thirteen cards and if so where
would they go ?" Again, these together with any propositional links are recorded on the interviewees
map.
6. Interrogation:
The interviewee has an opportunity to remove concepts from the map. The interviewer asks: "Are
there any concepts which you included in the map only because you were asked to do so. but which
you would otherwise have not related 7' The answer is recorded on the map.
7. A Sense of the Whole Map
The interviewer asks: 'Is it possible to give a label or title to the entire arrangement so as to show
the general idea behind it This is recorded at the bottom of the map.
8. The interviewee is thanked for his/her rime and help.
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THIS IS NOT A TEST
IT ISA QUESTIONAIRE REGARDING YOUR PERSONAL OPINION




4. Did you go to a Jewish primary school ? Yes / No
5a. Did you go to a Jewish secondary school ? Yes / No
b. If yes, was this only in the sixth form ? Yes / No
6a. Did you attend Cheder/Hebrew classes/Teenage centre ? Yes /No
b. if yes, for how many years ?
Since your birth, have your parents (or the relevant parent):
7. Attended synagogue at least once a month
8. Attended a seder
9. Not traveled on Shabbat
1O.Not eaten milk after meat
11.Put on tefillin daily
12.Lit shabbat candles
13.Eaten kosher meat at home
14.Attended synagogue on Yom Kippur
.ways usually occas1ona. never
always usually occas1onay never
alwayS/UsUally occas1or.av never
3Jays usuallyoccasior.a_ly never
aways usually occas1ona.y never
always usually/OCcaS1onaly never
always usually occasionav never
always usually occasionaliy never
15. Until what school year did you take the study of history ?




Show your opinion about the following statements by putting a ring
around one of the 5 responses.
17. History tends to be one of
the more boring subjects taught
in school.
18. History tends to be one of
the easier subjects taught in
school.
19. History tends to be one of
the more useful subjects taught
in school.
strongly agree / agree / not certain / disagree
strongly disagree
strongly agree	 a g ree	 not certain / disagree
strongly disagree
strongly agree	 agree	 not certain / disagree
strnaly disagree
20. Have you ever studied Jewish history other than at Cheder or as
part of Jewish studies in school. And if yes, where and when ?
Show you opinion about the following statements by putting a ring
around one of the 5 responses.
"By studying Jewish history one can better understand:
21. What the role of G-d has
been in Jewish history since 	 .trongIy agree Agree Not certain	 sagree
biblical times".	 Strongly disacree
22. Why and how the Jews have	
°trcnoiy acree aree Not rertaln Dsaoree
survived for so long".
	
roncly disacree
23. What the Jeish future will
	
trnoy 3cree	 oree Not certain Disagree
be like".	 Srcng iy disacree
r
THIS IS NOT A TEST
24. What its like to be a Jew".	 stronaiy agree agree Not certain Disagree
Strorxcy disagree
25. "Studying Jewish history is different from studying history in
general, because
Jewish history has religious
significance while history in
general does not".	 Strongly agree agree not certain Disagree
Stron g ly disagree
26. Jewish historical texts
cannot be subjected to the
critical methods normally used 	 Strrngy a gree acree not certain 	 sagree
by historians" .	 Strongly disagree
25. Please place the following names in the correct chronological
order. (le. in the order in which these people lived)
Shabbtai Zvi Baal Shem To y Theodore Herzl Rashi Bar Kochba
26. Please place the folowing events in the correct chronological
order. (You need only write the word which is underlined.)
The Expulsion from Spain	 Destruction of the Second Temple




Where was the centre of Jewish Life n Ancient Times?
National fife:
0
[erusalem is the Mefropolin not only of the land of Judah, but of many other couniries 	 I
Philo,On the Embass y to Gaius 218
"There was a city in Babylotha called Nehardia.....The
city of Nisbis was situa1d on the same river as it. For
which reason., the Jews, depending on the natural
strength of these places, deposited in them that half
shekel which everyone, by the custom of our
country, offers unto God. Then at the proper lime,
they were transmitted to Jerusalem; and many ten
thousand men undertook the transportation of these
donations out of fear of the attacks of the Parthians, to
whom the Babylonians were then subject."
Josephus, Antiquities of the Jews,
Book 18, Chap 19
A shekel coin made in the city of Tyre. The Rabbis ordered that
when people pad their yearly shekel to the Temple they had to use
shekel coins made in Tyre (Misnah Shekalim 1:7).
- -
	 Tyre was famous for the quality of its coins and for the way in
which they kept their value.
[iJ
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
Pilgrimage Routes from The Diaspora to Jerusalem for the Three Foot
Festivals (Pesach, Shavuot & Sukkot).
routes taken by
	
T.acn tn,tut 61. Avi-Yottan.
he rtlgrtnot.	 C.t:as Atlas II. p 61
boetier uS the	 -.n 'kIt
Rtm..i. enipire.
"Three times a year the Jews gather in the city where the Temple has been built. They come
from wherever in the world they have settled, in order to thank God for the benefits they
have received, to pray for further benefits in the future, as well as to befriend their fellows
when they gather and celebrate together.
It is wonderful how they are not strangers to one another but are members of one nation
who share the same customs. This has come about because of their regular contact and
meetings with one another."




IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
Reliçious Life:
"The world is based on three things: The Torah. Avodaii (the Temple service).
and the practice of Gemilut Chasadim (charity)"
Pirke Avot (Ethics of the Fathers) 1:2
"Rabbi Joshua ben Levi said: Prayers correspond to the daily (temple) sacrifices._.Why did
they say that the morning prayer could be said till midday? Because the regular morning
sacrifice could be brought up to midday. And why did they say that the afternoon prayers
can be said up to the evening. Because the regular afternoon offering can be brought up to
the evening ..."
Tosephta Brachot Chap 3.
Rabbi Joshua said: "This (the Temple) is the place where Israel could seek forgiveness for
their sins...
Avot of Rabbi Nathan Chap 6.
Initaving •1 the mettle Iron.. whm.-h dcal. primaril, -rib the
irniple screrceon th Oo u(Aioncn,cp i. Ocioml 013 tOic P.IceUI ihc
Ilchrrir.L tj,n MtiJ,nh ,IoIr.mietJ by M.d,. l(tchc,. Ant,termj..n,.
C() (14 Jrmm,lent. J N.IJ.L.
t	 r....s.	 .à __
tatII.ccs. iron, the Ilebren . Laten Mu,hnah lluuratcd be Melt.
KeMcy. m,Ie,d.on. lOU 14 Jc,,..lctn. J ' UI.
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IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
4Civil life and Law & Order:
Halacha (Jewish law) is clear; the Sanhedrin (the most important
law-making court) could exercise its authority only when it
gathered within the Temple area. "Hamakom Gorem" — Its location
gave it its power.
Originally (in Temple times) there were not many legal disputes in Israel, since these were
held only in the high court of seventy-one{members] which sat in the Lithkat HaGazii as
well as in the two high courts of twenty-three [members], one of which sal at the entrance to
the Temple mount, the other at the entrance of the Azara& together with the other courts of
twenty-three in all the cities of the Land of Israel".
Jerusalem Talmud, Sanhedrin, Chap 1, Halacha 4.
Ga.. S '..'q Ga...a '-q.
	
,'.	 Ga..
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
• In Temple times the calendar was not calculated in advance.
Instead, a new month was declared whenever a new moon was seen.
Witnesses who had seen a new moon would have to come to Jerusalem,
because only the Sanhedrin could announce a new month. The
Sanhedrin examined the witnesses to check that they had really seen
a new moon.
Tiiere was a large courtyard in Jerusalem which was called Bat Yaazek and it was there thai.
all the witnesses [who were bringing evidence of a new inooni used to assemble and there
the court examined them. Big meals were prepared for them so they that they should get
used to coining.
The witnesses were examined about their sightings of a new moon and finally the head of
the Beth Din would come out and say: "The moon is holy", and all the people
answered...It is holy - it is holy.
Then they would go to a nearb y hill and light a beacon to spread the word of the new moon
to other places.
Mishnah Rash Hashanah, Chapter 2.
Po1icaI Life:
Professor Y. Gafni has argued that the Temple also played a
considerable role in the political life of the nation. Whereas
during the First Temple period, the monarchy and the priesthood
constituted two independent centres of power; from the beginning of
the Second Temple, political and religious elements had been
combined. For much of the period, the official head of the nation
was the High Priest; even the Kings from the Hasrnonean family were
careful to keep the High Priesthood in their hands.
S
6Historians argue about the centrality of the Second Temple in Jewish life:
Moshe Hare, an Israeli historian, has written:
"The Temple service and Jerusalem, as the Temple city, were at the heart of all the events
and experiences of the Jewish people, whether in Israel or the Diaspora......
...In fact, the clearest proof of the significance of the Temple and the Temple Service is
provided by the way Jews reacted to its desiruction. At the time of destruction, the cohanim
continued to work as if nothing was happening, until they were killed. At the moment of
destruction, many even jumped in to the flames and died.....
Many Jews felt thai the destruction of the Temple would be accompanied by the end of the
world, since it was difficult to believe that the world would continue to exist without the
Temple - one of the foundations on which the world rested."
A number of historians have suggested that the Temple did not
occupy such a central place in Jewish life. Their position is based
on two arguments.
1) They point to the way various groups in Israel actually rejected
the Temple. For example, the Essenes rejected the Temple in
Jerusalem and looked forward to a time when "the true Temple would
be built by God". The early Christians believed that the Temple was
not holy and that Jesus would replace in some way the current
occupants of the Temple Mount.
2) They argue that even before the destruction of the Temple the
Synagogue was beginning to take its place.
Jewish Reactionsto De1ruction: Alternative 1
By looking at Roman coins we get a clue as to how Jews reacted to
the destruction of Jerusalem and of the Temple. 	 -
The following passage comes from a book called the Syriac
Apocalypse of Baruch, which historians believe was originally
written in Hebrew shortly after the destruction of the Second
Temple.
"Happy are those who haven't been born.
Or who, having been born, have already died.
Because they didn't know this sorrow,
And they didn't hear what had happened to us.
Woe unto us - those who are alive.
For we witness the afflictions of Zion
And we see what has happened to Jerusalem..
Farmers, sow no more!
Earth, wh yield the fruit of your harvest?
Hold back your sustaining crops!
And you, oh vine, why do you keep giving wine
Seeing that there will be no more wine offerings in Zion,
Nor will first-fruits again be offered?
And you, Oh bridegrooms, enter not the bridal chamber.
You wives, pray not to give birth
Why give birth in sadness '
Syriac Baruch 9:6-16
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"Rabbi Eleazar said: "Since the day that the Temple was destroyed, an iron wall has
intervened between Israel and their Father in heaven."
Babylonian Talmud, Brachot 32b
"A philosopher who lived in the neighbourhood of Rabban Ganiliel said to him: "Since the
day that you were exiled from your land, the law of Moses has been superseded, and
another Law (Evangelion) has taken its place."
Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 116a-b
"When the Temple was destroyed, many Jews .... would neither eat meat nor drink wine.
Rabbi Joshua got into conversation with them.
Said he: "Mv sons, why do you not eat meal?"
They replied: "Shall we eat meat, which used to be brought as a daily offering on the altar,
but is now no more?"
Said he: "Why do you drink no wine?"
They replied: "Shall we drink wine, which used to be poured on the altar as a wine offering,
but is now no more?"
Then he said to them: "In that case, we should not eat figs or grapes either, since we used to
bring them as offerings of first fruits; nor should we cat bread, from which we used to offer
the loaves and the shewbread. We should not drink water, from which we used to pour a
water offering on the feast of tabernacles."
They were silent.
He said to thern "Not to mourn at all is impossible, for the blow has fallen. But to mourn too
much is also impossible. Therefore, this is what the sages advise........
Tosephta Sota 15:11-15
3Those who nultifed the covenant of Avraham: A form of surrender?
"Rabbi Eleazar haModai said: One who desecrates sacred things, who disgraces the
festivals, who humiliates his fellow in public, who nullifies the covenant of Avraham our
forefather, and who interprets the Torah in a manner conlradictory to the Halachali - though
he may have Torah and good deeds - has no share in the world to come."
Mishnah, Pivot 3:15
"I have seen many of Thy people who have foresaken thy covenant,
And thrown off the yoke of Thy religion."
Syriac Baruch 41:3
"Many who had obliterated their sign of the Covenant were circumcised in the days of Bar
Koziba."
Tosephta, Shabbat 15:9
"Rabbi Yehudah said: [Someone who has been de-circumcised] does not have to be
circumcised, because it would be dangerous for him."
They said to him: But didn't the y circumcise many [who had been de-circumcisedl in the
days of Bar Koziba, who then gave birth to sons and daughters?"
Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 72b
Historians argue about the state of Jewish moraje:
Gedalya Alon, an Israeli historian, has argued:
"During the last three decades of the first century, almost everything thai happened seemed
designed to destroy the morale of the Jew, to make him turn his back on his people and his
God.
There were religious clashes and persecutions: bitter subjugation to Rome; the heavy tax
burden: the destruction of the Temple and the dashing of the people's hopes which had risen
to fever pitch during the resistance against Rome.
All this could only bring in its wake a wave of despair."
The Jews in their land in the Talmudic Age
Shmuel Safrai, another Israeli historian has written:
"The difficult conditions which existed after the Defeat left the people in a state of confusion
and pain. A large part of the people were plunged in to despair. and that wasn't simply an
immediate reaction to the War of Destruction. Many gave up running normal lives: sunk in
depression they stopped filling their normal roles...In fact, it seems that this breakdown in
the life of the people even continued for a long period.
And yet the backbone of the Jewish community was not completely broken.....Evidence of
this is not only provided by the fact that within a generation the people were again able to
wage war on Rome, but also by a dramatic Jewish communal and economic revival by the
end of the century. ..This revival was so swift, that within a generation of the Destruction,
Judaism experienced one of the most creative and fruitful periods in its
Eretz Israel from the Destruction of the Second Temp le to the
Muslim Conquest
Supp lement to source 4:
"Imma Shalom, wife of Rabbi Eliezer and sister to Rabban Gainliel, had a certain
philosophes living in her vicinity whose reputation was that he would judge without taking
a bribe. They decided to test him.
She appeared before him with a golden lamp, and declared: "I want a share in my father's
estate."
Tic promptly ordered that the estate be divided (between her and her brother).
Rabban Gamliel said to him: "But in our law it is stated that where there is a son, the
daughter does not inherit."
The other answered: "From the day you were exiled from your land, the Law of Moses has
been removed, and another Law (Ewgebthi) set in its place, wherein it is written: a son
and a daughter inherit equally."
The following day Rabban Gamliel brought him a Lybian ass and said: "Look further on in
your book, wherein it is written: 'I came not to destroy the Law of Moses nor to add to it';
and the Law of Moses says clearly: 'When there is a son, the daughter does not inherit."
Flis sister hinted broadly to the Roman, saying: "Let thy light shine forth as a lamp."
Rabban Gamliel quickly rejoined: "The ass came and kicked the lamp over."
Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 116a-b
6
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Jewish Reactions to Destruction: Alternative 2
In 66 C.E. a large scale Jewish revolt against Rome-broke out.
In 70 C.E. Titus, son of the Emperor, occupied Jerusalem. He
destroyed the Temple and the city.
The rebels continued to fight on elsewhere in Israel until 73 C.E.
They held out longest at Masada, a mountain fortress in the desert
near the Dead Sea. Around a thousand people, men, women and
children, resisted the Roman army for more than two years.
Josephus tells us what happened in his book The Jewish War.
0
"The new governor in Judaea was Flavius Silva. He saw thai only one fortress held out
against the Romans. The fortress was Masada. He built a siege wall right round the fortress
with camps so that noone could escape.
The Roma.ns occupied a spur of rock and built a solid earth platform on top. On this they
built a base of stones and on this a tower 27 metres high protected all over with iron plates.
This tower was for catapaults and stone throwers. A great battering ram was brought up to
the platform and swung continuously against the fortress wall until it was smashed".
When the defenders of Masada realized that all hope was lost they
decided to kill themselves.
Josephus reported what Eleazar ben Yair, leader of the rebels,
might have said:
© 
"Long ago, my brave men, we reso[;edto serve neither the Rornans nor any other masters,
save G-d alone, for He is man's true and righteous Lord. We should not choose slavery
now even at this difficult time. We were the first to revolt against the Romans and we shall
be the last to fight against them...
...Come! While our hands are free and can hold a sword, let them do a noble service Let
us die without being made slaves by our enemies. Let us leave this world as free men in the
company of our wives and children. This is what the Law ordains, that is what our wives
and children demand of us...the opposite of what the Romans wish".
[c]
D•rhe Romans are anxious that none of us should die before the fortress is captured. So let us
deny the enemy their hoped-for pleasure at our expense. and without more ado leave them
to be dumbfounded by our death and awed by our courage."
C.u.na. juwnal Paris Aulielit. Tel is,,
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Ancient historians discuss Jewish defiance:
Writing about 30 years after the destruction of the Temple, the
Roman historian, Tacitus, recorded what happened during the Jews'
war against Rome.
"Vespasian has almost put an end to the war with the Jews. The seige of Jerusalem,
however, remained a task made difficult and arduous by the character of the mountain
citadel and the obstinate superstition of the Jews, rather than by any resources which the
Jews possessed so as to withstand the inevitable hardships of a seige."
Historiae
Writing about 100 years later, another historian, Dio Cassius,
noted how although the Jews were few against the might of the Roman
army, they only gave in when part of the Temple was in flames.
"All believed that it was not a disaster but victory, salvation and happiness to perish together
with the Temple."
Historia 66:6
When the early Church Father Eusebius (3rd-4th centuries) wrote
about the Bar Kochba revolt - a major Jewish rebellion against Rome
- which broke out about 65 years after the destruction of the
Temple, he reported:
"The rebellion of the Jews intensified in both character and extent. Rufus, the [Roman]
Governor of Judaea, after having been sent military reinforcements by the Emperor, went
out against them, and suppressed their madness without mercy."
Ecclesiastical History 4:6
3
Different forms of defiance:
"In order to escape, one may vow to murderers, robbers or tax-collectors that the produce
they demand is /eiuwib(reserved for religious purposes) even though it is not; or that it
belongs to the royal household even though it does not."
Nishnah Nedarim 3:4
I "Rabbi Akiva said: It is permitted to avoid the payment of customs duties."
Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 113a
Jews who worked for the Rornans were despised by their fellows:
"Thc -mnim(heretics) and the inforzncrs....these will go down to Gehinnom (Hell) to be
punished there for all generations."
Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Hashanah 17a
"Also added [to the list of those who weren't allowed to act as witnesses] were tax-
collectors and tax-gatherers".
Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin 25:b
All of these quotations contrast sharply with the following legal
principle which ruled in the Jewish community of Babylon, outside
the Roman Empire.
"The law of the land is binding" I
Babylonian Talmud, Gittin lOb
4
What kind of reaction does this reoresent?
"Rabbi Acha said: The Holy one, Blessed be He, makes use of everything to do his service;
the snake, the frog, the scorpion and even the gnat.
Titus, the wicked, entered the Hoiy of Holies with a sword drawn in his hand. He cut down
the parachel and dragged in two harlots. He spread out a Sefer Torah under them and raped
them there, beside the altar. When he came out, his sword was covered in blood.
He began to blaspheme, insult and spit at G-d on high, saying: 'Isn't he who does war with
a king in the desert and defeats him, the same as he who does war with a king in his palace
and defeats him?"
What did Titus do? He gathered together all the vessels of the Temple and put them in one
casket and embarked on a boat with them.
As soon as the boat set off a storm blew up. Titus said: "It seems to me that this God
possesses power over the sea only
 - the generation of the flood was only punished by way
of water, similarly Pharoh and his army. It seems that it is the same with me. When I was in
his house he didn't have the strength to confront me, yet now he confronts me here."
The Holy one, Blessed be He, said to him: "0 wicked one, by your life, I can punish you
with a creature lower than anything I created during the six days of creation."
Immediately
 The Holy one, Blessed be He, intimated to the sea and it stopped raging.
When Titus arrived in Rome all the citizens came out to praise him: "Conqueror of
Barbarians, they sang.
Immediately
 they led him to the bathhouse where he went in and bathed. When they left,
they brought him a strong drink.
G-d summoned a gnat which entered his nose and which gnawed its way right up to his
brain. Once it started pecking at his brain, he said: "Call the doctors so that they can cut open
my brain and find out how the God of that people punished me."
They immediately
 called the doctors who cut open his brain and found it to be as large as a
young dove weighing two litres.
R.Elazar the son of R.Yose said: "I was there and I saw them put the creature on one side of
a scale and two litres on the other, and they balanced perfectly.
They took them and put them in a glass container and however one changed the other also
.When the gnat died, so too did Titus the wicked."
Avot de Rabbi Nattan
5
Jewish Reactions to DestructiQn: Another Alternative?
"The Roman Emperor sent Vespasian against the Jews. He came and beseiged Jerusalem for
three years.
Abba Sikr was the leader of the Zealots in Jerusalem.
Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai invited Abba Sikra to a private meeting.
Rabban Yochanan said to Abba sikra How long are you going to continue living under
seige and kill all the people from starvation ?"
Abba Sikra replied: "What can I do? If I say a word, the Zealots will kill me."
Rabban Yochanan said: "Devise a plan for me to escape. Perhaps I will be able to save
something."
Abba Sikra advised: "Pretend to be ill, and let everyone come IC inquire about you. Bring
something evil smelling and put it by you so that people will say that you are dead. Then let
your students hide under your bed so thai people will not notice that you are still light, since
everyone knows that a living being is lighter than a corpse."
Rabbi Yochanan agreed. Rabbi Eliezer went under the coffin carriage from one side and
Rabbi Joshua from the other. When they reached the gale of the city some Jewish defenders
wanted to put a spear though the coffin. Abba Sikra refused and said: "Shall the Romans say
that the Jews have pierced their master ?" So they opened a town gate for him and Rabban
Yochanan got out.
When Rabbi Yochanan reached the Roman camp. he greeted Vespasian: "Peace be to you 0
King! Peace be to you 0 King!"
Vespasian replied: "You have lost your life on two counts. First for calling me King, when I
am not. Second, if you are right and I am King, how is that you did not come to me sooner?"
Rabbi Yochanan anwered: "I call you King because you really are, since it is written that
Jerusalem will only fall to royalty. As for you asking why I didn't come sooner, it is
because the Zealots did not permit me."
While they were talking, a messenger arrived from Rome and saluted Vespasian: "Arise!
The Emperor is dead and the Senators of Rome have elected you the Head of State."
Vespasian had just finished putting on one booL When he tried to put the other one on he
could not. He tried to take off the first boot, but it would not come off. He asked: "What is
the meaning of this?"
Rabbi Yochanan said: "Don't worry. The good news has done this. As it says: "Good news
makes the bone fat.
Vespasian said: "I am leaving now, and will send someone to take my place. Now ask me
for something and it will be granted.
Rabbi Yochanan said: "Give me Yavneh and its Sages, the family of Rabban Gamliel and
doctors to heal Rabbi Zaddok."
Babylonian Talmud, Gittin 56a-b
[2]
Historians discuss the oriçins of Yavneh:
Talmudic literature contains other versions of the same story.
These end as follows:
"Vespasian asked. Are you Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai? Tell me, what may I give you ?"
Rabban Yochanan replied: "I ask nothing of you, except for Yavneh where I might go and
teach my students, establish a place of prayer, and keep all the commandments."
Avot de Rabbi Nathan chap 4
"Vespasian said to Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai "Make a request and I shall grant it."
Rabbi Yochanan said: "I ask you to abandon this city of Jerusalem and leave."
Vespasian said: "Is it for that the Romans have made me King? Make a different request."
Rabbi Yochanan said: ' .1 ask you to withdraw from the Western gate of Jerusalem. so that
whoever leaves before the third hour will be saved..."
	 - -_______ ________
Midrash, Lammentations Rabbah 1:34
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
©Historians have offered different explanantjons for Rabban
Yochanan 's actions:
"Rabban Yochanan undoubtedly defected in despair. and he was in all likelyhood
immediately thrown into the Roman internment camp at Yavneh.. His "academy", therefore,
at first consisted of scholars discussing their tradition quite unofficially, having neither
Jewish nor Roman recognition."
Gerson Cohen in Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People
"The choice of Yavneh was significant... It was then used as a home for loyal Jews who
surrendered. Yochanan's surregder put him in the loyalist camp.
When he asked to join the loyalists in Yavneh, Vespasian was ready to agree to the
foundation of a rabbinic school which might form the nucleus of a substitute for the Jewish
Sanhedrin as a future organization of Jewish self-government. He was anxious to encourage
moderate opinion.
The school at Yavneh was thus set up as a legitimate Jewish authority, with Rome's
knowledge and consent, during the war, to prepare to play its part in the post-war
reconstruction."
E.M.Srnallwood, The Jews under Roman rule, From Pompey to
Dioci ethian
"[Following Yochanan's escapel Titus received him in a friendly manner, and gave him
permission to make a request of him. Yochanan modestly asked that he might be permitted
to establish a school at Yavneh where he could give lectures to his pupils.
(This town was in a district which had been bequeathed to the Roman Emperor.)
Titius had nothing to urge against the harmless wish of Yochanan, because he could not tell
that by this unimportant concession he was enabling Judaism, feeble as it then appeared, to
outlive Rome. which was at the height of its power, by thousands of years."
H.Graetz, History of the Jews
[he Sages of Yavneh: The Age of Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakkai (cJO-85ce)
Once, Rabban Yochan ben Zakkai was on his way out of Jerusalem, and Rabbi Joshua was
following him.
When Rabbi Joshua saw the Temple in ruins, he cried out: "Woe to us, that this place,
where the sins of the children of Israel were forgiven, is now destroyed."
Rabban Yochanan said to him: "My son do not grieve, because we have another way of
seeking forgiveness just as effective.
It is by performing acts of compassion and forgiveness, by doing good deeds to one
another."	 ________	 - -
Avot of Rabbi Nathan Chap 6
Said Rabbi Joshua ben Korcha "Rabban Yochanan also ruled that, wherever the Head of
the Bet Din might be, witnesses [who had seen the new moonj should not go to him but
only to wherever is the place of the Assembly [the High Courtj."
Mishnah, Rosh Hashanah 4:4
"When the Yam Tovof Rash Hasbaaah fell on Shabba they used to sound the Shofar in
the Temple, but not in the country at large. After the Temple had been destroyed, Rabbi
Yochanan ben Zakkai ruled that the Shofar was to be sounded wherever there was a Bet
Din."
Mishnah, Rosh Hashanah 4:1
4
0The Sages of Yavneh: The Age of Rabban Gamliel (c.85-1 l4ce)
"For the apostates let there be no (hope) unless they return to Thy teachings. May the
Christians and the heretics perish in a moment. (Speedily) may their name be erased from the
book of life, nor let them be inscribed with the righteous. Blessed art Thou, Oh Lord, who
(humbles) the arrogant."
The Twelth blessing of the Shemona Esreh as found in the
Cairo Genizah.
"Rabban Gamliel says: One should recite the Shemoneh Esreh every day.
Rabbi Joshua says: An abbreviated farm of the Shemoneh Esreh (will do).
Rabbi Akiva says: If one can read his prayers fluently he should say the Shemoneh Esreh
but if not an abbreviated form (will do).
Rabbi Eliezer says: He who make his prayers fixed [a mechanical taskj causes them to lose
the quality of supplication."
Mishnah, Brachot 4:3-4
The Rabbis of Yavneh created a new format for the Passover Seder:
"Rabban Gamliel used to say: Whoever fails to mention the following three things at the
Passover (sedez) has not fulfilled his obligation, namely: 1) the Paschal lamb, 1) the Ma(zaJ
3) the Maror."
Mishnah, Pesachim 10:5
"The Rabbis of Yavneh used to sa y: lam one of Gods children, and my illiterate fellow-
man is one of Gods children... I get up early to go to my work and he gets up early to go to
his work... Would you say that I do much and he does little?
But we have been taught that, whether much or little, it is all one, provided that a person
directshis heart to Heaven."	 ___________________________________________





Jabneh and its Sages.4
Legend:
JabnehLg.IartonJ visit of 	 Sage
GimzojR._'hhumjcenter of Sages acttvitles.
One of the local centrn for the
study of the Torah was Bene Berak,
where Rabbi Akiva lived. It is men-
tioned in the Passover Haggadah:
"Once Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi
Joshua and Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi
Tarfon all sat down together for the
Seder at Bene Berak"
' From M. Avi-Yonah. Carias Atlas 11. map I 16. P. 77.
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IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
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Wh.t did people re&Iythink houtthe Romni
Rabbi Yehudah (bar Ilai), Rabbi lose and Rabbi Shimon (bar Yochai) were sitting
together, and Yehudah ben Gerim was there as well.
Rabbi Yehudah began by saying: "What wonderful things this people [the Romans] have
done ! They have established market places, built bridges, and constructed bath-houses."
Rabbi Yose kept silent.
Rabbi Shiinon said: "Whatever they have done they have done only for their own sakes.
They have built markets - so that they can house prostitutes: baths - in order to preen
themselves: bidgs-so that they can collect tolls." 	 -
Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 33b
Rabbi Yochanan said: It is a mitzvah to go to see the ruler.
One need not be concerned about the implied recognition of sovrcignty. When the time
comes, and the House of David is restored, there will be no problem in telling one
sovrcintv from the other."
Jerusalem Talmud, Berachot 3:6a
"A group of people are travelling along the highway when they are accosted by gentiles
[government troops I who say: Give us one of your number that we may execute him.
otherwise we shall kill all of you!
What to do 1'	 Let them all be killed, rather than surrender a single soul.
But if they are asked for a specific person, as Joab asked for Sheba the son of Bichri, then
let them surrender him, so that the rest not be killed.
Rabbi Shimon ben Laqish said: "That applies only if he was guilty of a capital crime, as
Shimon ben I3ichri was."
Rabbi Yochanan said: "No, even though he was not proven guilty, the order must be
respected."
Jerusalem Talmud, Terurnah 7:46b
1c
A case study: The population of the Galilee:
The following inscription was found in a synagogue in Kasyoun in
the Upper Galilee, dedicated to the Roman Emperor Septimius
Severus. It is in Greek and is dated 197.
"May peace accompany the Emperor Lucius Septiinus Severus, as well as Marcus Aurelius
Antonius and Lucius Septimus Geta his Sons because of these Jewish vows."
This coin dates from the time of Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi. at the
beginning of the third century. It comes from Sepphoris (Tzippori),
one of the largest Jewish towns in the Galilee.
The inscr:ption reads:
Dio-Ceasaria [Sepphoris] the holy and autonomous cit y of refuge, loyal partner in a
covenant of brotherhood and mutual assistance between the holy council of the city and the
senate of the Roman people."
Eic]
IMAGE REDACTED DUE TO THIRD PARTY RIGHTS OR OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
Historians believe that it sheds light
the Gaiileans were to Rome.
The relationship between Sepphoris and Rome seems to have
fluctuated. Rabbi Yose hen Chalafta, a resident of Sepphoris in the
mid-second centur y , is quoted as saying:
"I saw Tzippori in its tranquility."
Tosephta, Shabbat 7:18
"The law of " S/ththacbaB
	
left for the poor does not aDDlY to olives."
Mishna, •!!!._ 1
The following letter was found among the Bar Kochba letters.
on the question of how loyal
•.
,	 '.I .H	 rts1L:.l1....
"Prom Shimon ben Kosiba to Yeshua
ben Galgoula and to the men of the fort.
peace. I taken heaven to witness against me
that if [unlessi you harm [moblize] the Galileans
who are with you
every man. I will put fetters
on your feet as I did to ben Aphiul.
[Shijmon beEn Knsil)aJ." 	 -.
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The system of semantic categories for bi-concept links (x and y denote concepts).
Derived from Mahier et a! (1991)
Analogy link: x is like, similar, analogous or corresponds to y.
Aim link: x aims or approaches y.
Precedence link: x precedes y in time or in a sequence.
Characteristic link: x has y, x is characterized by y, x is a feature, property, aspect,
trait or attribute of y.
Contingency link: x is dependent or contingent on y.
Description link: x describes y.
Evidence link: x indicates, supports, documents or confirms, is illustrated or
demonstrated byy.
Formation link: x forms or is formed within y.
Influence link: x influences y.
Leads to link: x leads, results, causes, produces or is a tool of y.
Neutral link: x andy are related (with no further specification).
Operation link: x operates on, or is being operated on by y.
Part of link: x is a part, segment or portion of y.
Relation link: x and y are related by either a direct or inverse relation.
Sameness link: x is the same as, or identical to y.
Type/example of link: z is a member, type, kind or example of y or is in the category
of y.
Unclassifiable link: cannot be classified by this scheme.
Nonexistent link: no link exists between x and y.
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